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Abstract
Overcoming Cognitive and Motivational Barriers to Media Literacy:
A Dual-Process Approach
by
Erica Lynn Rosenthal
Claremont Graduate University: 2012

In today’s fast-paced, hyper-mediated society, the ability to balance accuracy and
efficiency is essential. Media literacy educational programs have arisen to meet this need and
proliferated in recent years. Although the practice of media literacy is thriving, its underlying
mechanisms are poorly understood and evidence of effectiveness is mixed (e.g., Bergsma &
Carney, 2008). A social psychological perspective has the potential to illuminate previously
overlooked variables and inform research and practice in this growing field. In particular,
whereas media literacy efforts typically emphasize thorough processing of media messages,
dual-process theories of persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)
suggest this is not always realistic. When motivation or ability is compromised, individuals
default to a low-effort processing mode, relying on peripheral cues or heuristics rather than
carefully evaluating message arguments. In this mode, media messages can persuade
unconsciously.
Using a dual-process approach, the present research investigated how specific barriers to
motivation (perceptions of personal invulnerability) and processing ability (emotion-based
advertising, environmental distractions) influence the processes of media literacy. Participants

(N = 882) were randomly assigned to 16 conditions in a 2 [vulnerability: demonstrated, control]
x 2 [distractions: present, absent] x 2(2) [ad type: informational, emotional; two replicates of
each type] between-subjects nested design. The vulnerability manipulation increased distrust in
the target ads and reduced their persuasiveness, not through the hypothesized mechanism of
heightened perceptions of vulnerability, but mediated by increased counterarguing. Relative to
informational ads, emotional ads were judged more persuasive, attractive, similar to personal
experience, and elicited greater identification. However, they were also rated less trustworthy
than informational ads, suggesting emotional advertising largely bypasses logical decisionmaking processes. Distraction reduced counterarguing only among those who found the ad
relatively unpersuasive.
The results of this research highlight the central role of trust in media literacy processes.
Although individuals recognize and distrust emotional forms of advertising, they are nonetheless
persuaded by such appeals. Given the sophistication of contemporary advertising techniques and
the ubiquity of distractions, the present research suggests new approaches to media literacy are
needed, specifically tailored to decision-making under these more realistic media-use conditions.
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CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF MEDIA LITERACY

Introduction
A major theme infusing social psychology is the notion that all social behavior is, at its
core, goal-driven. Among the most fundamental motives are those of accuracy (the need for
reliable information about the world) and efficiency (the need to conserve precious cognitive
resources), motives that are frequently in conflict. This tension between accuracy and efficiency
motives is particularly evident in how we cope with information overload. On a daily basis, we
are bombarded with a relentless stream of media messages, all competing for limited attentional
resources. Prior to modern times, the primary challenge was determining what information is
needed, and subsequently locating and accessing this information. In recent years, however, the
challenge has shifted to keeping apace of this massive glut of information.
An enormous amount of mental energy would be required to thoroughly scrutinize just a
fraction of the available information; cognitively, we are simply not equipped to handle all of
these messages, and become easily fatigued (Potter, 2004). To avoid fatigue, we often behave as
cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), conserving mental resources by employing various
shortcuts (e.g., heuristics, schemas, and other useful knowledge structures). The increased
efficiency afforded by such shortcuts typically comes at a cost in terms of accuracy, however,
and may result in over-reliance on stereotypes or biased information-processing, leading to errors
of attribution and judgment. In today’s fast-paced, hyper-mediated society, the ability to balance
accuracy and efficiency motives in sifting through the flood of information, determining what is
most pertinent to personal needs and goals, and disregarding what is less relevant (or even
harmful) is not merely an important skill, but an essential one.
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In addition to the overwhelming increase in the quantity of information, the very nature
of information is changing. The boundaries between previously distinct types of information
(e.g., advertising, news, entertainment) have become increasingly blurred. With the proliferation
of product placement, targeted online ads, viral marketing (advertising messages transmitted via
peer-to-peer networks), and video news releases (ads disguised as news segments), advertising
has become ubiquitous, and at the same time more difficult to detect. Children typically acquire
the ability to distinguish traditional commercials from other types of programming around the
age of five and can recognize the persuasive motives inherent in such commercials between age
seven and eleven (John, 1999). However, the ability to recognize persuasive intent does not
necessarily mean skepticism is applied in an “online” manner (i.e., spontaneously and
consistently during routine media use). Little research has addressed the extent to which
individuals of any age are aware of (and able to guard against) the potential effects of less overt
forms of advertising.
Is Media Literacy a Solution?
Within this milieu of information overload and ambiguous boundaries between different
forms of information, media literacy has arisen as a popular approach to the prevention of
harmful media effects (e.g., Bergsma & Carney, 2008). An early summit of media literacy
proponents established what has become the most cited definition: “the ability to access, analyze,
evaluate, and communicate messages in a variety of forms” (Aufderheide, 1993 1). However, the
construct of media literacy remains elusive; definitions abound in the literature, and the precise
meaning and purpose of media literacy has long been a source of contention among scholars,
practitioners, and advocates (e.g., Hobbs, 1998). The term is alternately used to refer to a state of
1

This exact quote is not actually found in Aufderheide, 1993. Rather, this is a paraphrasing of the original source
material, which has since become a consensual definition, repeated as cited here throughout the media literacy
literature and always attributed to Aufderheide.
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knowledge (e.g., awareness of the forces behind media production), a state of heightened
skepticism regarding mass media messages (often specifically regarding the motives of their
creators), a set of competencies (i.e., skills for the deconstruction and critical analysis of media
messages), and a type of educational approach or intervention (i.e., efforts to cultivate such
knowledge and skills).
Some view media literacy as an extension of traditional (i.e., language) literacy, as both
involve the skills of deconstructing and constructing (i.e., reading and writing) texts within the
conventions of the particular medium. The parallels between media literacy and traditional
literacy may end there, however. An individual who can read words off a page and form
grammatical sentences would generally be considered literate, but someone can be
technologically savvy, highly skilled at accessing needed information or communicating
information to others, and nonetheless not media literate. Most conceptualizations of media
literacy require some degree of critical thinking, analysis, or reflection about the content,
sources, and values inherent in media messages, beyond simple comprehension of these
messages. Moreover, traditional literacy is generally viewed as a stable trait; once the relevant
knowledge and skills have been acquired, an individual is and always will be literate (barring a
catastrophic brain injury). Media literacy is often treated in a similar manner, though the
activation of media literacy skills is likely more fluid and context dependent. Some scholars
(e.g., Austin, Miller, Silva, et al., 2002; Austin, Pinkleton, & Funabiki, 2007) view media literacy
not as a stable trait, but rather, an iterative decision-making process (or set of processes) in
relation to media messages.2

2

The present research follows Austin and colleagues’ (e.g., Austin et al., 2002; 2007) conceptualization of media
literacy as a process. However, in Chapter One, the term ‘media literacy’ refers primarily to its practice (i.e.,
educational programs and interventions) unless otherwise specified.
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Media literacy is frequently discussed in the context of health promotion and prevention
(e.g., substance use, violence, disordered eating), but the rationale for a media literate public
transcends behavioral health concerns. In elementary and secondary education, media literacy is
among the core “21st century skills” deemed critical to success in the emerging global economy
(Partnership for 21st Century Skills, 2011). According to some advocates (e.g., McBrien, 2005;
McCannon, 2009; Schwarz, 2005a), media literacy is vital to the ability to operate as skeptical
consumers, autonomous thinkers, and responsible, informed citizens in a democratic society.
This argument is particularly compelling in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to
eliminate previously imposed campaign finance limits, giving corporations an unprecedented
ability to influence the democratic process through campaign advertising (Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 2010).
Although the practice of media literacy is thriving, research has lagged behind. Several
scholars have noted the relative paucity of theoretically informed and methodologically rigorous
research on media literacy, as well as inconsistent evidence of its effectiveness as an intervention
strategy (e.g., Bergsma & Carney, 2008; Eagle, 2007; McCannon, 2009). As a result, educators
and other practitioners (e.g., curriculum developers) have been attempting to teach media literacy
without a well-validated and coherent evidence-base regarding what works, and often with
limited theoretical rationale for their efforts. As a relatively young and theoretically
underdeveloped field, media literacy research is ripe for the integration of fresh perspectives.
This paper focuses on the potential of social psychological theory, particularly in the areas of
persuasion and information-processing, to challenge the validity of various assumptions
underlying the study and practice of media literacy, illuminate new research directions, and
inform media literacy efforts in the twenty-first century.
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The remainder of this chapter provides a brief overview of media literacy practice, as
well as existing theory and research on media literacy. Chapter Two discusses the potential of
persuasion theories to address the limitations of existing media literacy approaches, and
concludes with an overview of the current research. The methodology and results from each of
three pilot studies are described in Chapter Three. Chapter Four presents the hypotheses and
methods for the main experimental study, followed by the results in Chapter Five. Finally, the
paper concludes with a discussion of findings from the main study, along with the scholarly and
practical implications of this research and future directions for the study of media literacy
(Chapter Six).
Media Literacy in Practice
Dating back to the advent of written language, periods of alarm have often greeted
whatever new media were, at the time, viewed as a potential threat to the status quo. The
contemporary era of media alarmism began in the 1950s, as concern grew over the emerging
medium of television (Schwarz, 2005b). At the time, little was known about how TV viewing
might affect people’s attitudes and behavior. Driven by research into the effects of TV exposure
during the 1960s, media literacy education began to emerge in the U.S. in the 1970s, under the
moniker of critical viewing skills (Tyner, 1998).3 Critical viewing skills were geared exclusively
toward television, with the primary objective of protecting children from the presumed harmful
effects of such exposure (particularly exposure to violent imagery). With funding from the U.S.
Department of Education, critical viewing skills curricula thrived in the latter part of the 70s and
early 80s. The movement was short lived, however, as the “back-to-basics” reform movement

3

Media literacy emerged substantially earlier in other countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway,
and Canada. Media literacy has been taught continuously in British schools since the 1960s, and the critical viewing
skills movement in the U.S. drew momentum from similar initiatives in Britain and Canada.
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(e.g., National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) introduced statewide competency
testing, and critical viewing skills education began to be seen as a luxury.
After being driven underground for a period of time, media literacy education reemerged
in the 1990s as a grassroots movement, driven by individual teachers, often operating without
administrative support (Schechter, 1997). Today, all fifty states have media literacy concepts
included in their curricular standards (Kubey & Baker, 1999), though these standards are often so
vague that it is difficult to determine whether objectives are being met. To meet this need, the
Center for Media Literacy has proposed a standard set of learning objectives known as the “five
core concepts” of media literacy (Thoman & Jolls, n.d.). These concepts have been widely
adopted in the U.S., and provide much of the basis for media literacy interventions:
1) All media messages are constructed
2) Media messages are created using a creative language with its own rules
3) Different people experience the same message differently
4) Media have embedded values and points of view
5) Most media messages are constructed to gain profit and/or power.
Although the majority of experts advocate the integration of media literacy concepts across the
curriculum (e.g., Hobbs, 1998), it is most commonly taught as a brief health education unit, or in
vocational classes focused on media production.
Philosophical Approaches
Given its far-reaching applications, from education to public health to civic engagement,
media literacy draws scholars and advocates from fields as diverse as communications,
journalism, fine arts, psychology, sociology, cultural studies, and literary criticism, among others.
This transdisciplinary nature is simultaneously one of the field’s greatest strengths and foremost
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challenges, as media literacy’s varied constituencies continue to debate its purpose, approaches
to its practice, and methods of study (e.g., Hobbs, 1998).
In recent years, two major philosophical orientations toward media literacy have
emerged. The first, exemplified by the National Association for Media Literacy Education
(NAMLE), views media literacy as critical thinking about media, and focuses on examining and
challenging the methods and messages of mass media. The second, activism-oriented approach
began as a splinter group within NAMLE (then known as AMLA, the American Media Literacy
Association), and was formalized in 2002 with the founding of the Action Coalition for Media
Education (ACME). Followers of ACME’s approach believe critical thinking alone is not
sufficient, and advocate collective action against mass media (e.g., “kill your TV”). ACME
rejects media industry contributions to media literacy efforts (e.g., funding, partnerships), on the
grounds that corporate involvement often operates as a smokescreen to deflect criticism, and
ultimately co-opts the movement. Critics of ACME’s orientation argue that such a protectionist
approach leaves little room for obtaining pleasure through media consumption, and fosters
unquestioning cynicism rather than healthy skepticism (e.g., Rogow, 2005). However, the activist
approach often promotes student media production as a central aspect of media literacy, enabling
students to challenge mass media representations through their own alternative constructions
(and simultaneously develop valuable technical and creative skills).
Implementation Challenges
Although media literacy has been successfully integrated into public education in several
other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, and Canada), the U.S. educational
system poses unique challenges. Rather than a central administrative entity, the U.S. has over
16,000 relatively autonomous public school districts (Center for Media Literacy, n.d.), each of
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which determines its own curriculum in accordance with state standards. As a result,
implementation of media literacy initiatives on a national level would be exceedingly difficult.
Moreover, the current educational climate in the U.S., characterized by an emphasis on
performance and assessment, is less than ideal for comprehensive media literacy education. The
constant threat of funding cuts has motivated many teachers to shift to a pedagogical approach
often described as teaching to the test (Stecher & Hamilton, 2002). This teacher-focused mode of
instruction is the antithesis of the inquiry-based, critical pedagogical approach that underpins
much of the media literacy movement. Additionally, with an unprecedented focus on
quantification and evidence-based practice, rigorous research on media literacy is limited, and
findings are mixed. The challenges of implementing media literacy educational programs are
only exacerbated during times of economic uncertainty. As resources become scarce, subjects
viewed as supplementary, and particularly those lacking quantifiable student outcomes, are
typically the first to go (Schwarz, 2005a). As such, media literacy efforts are often abandoned in
favor of more traditional subjects.
These challenges do not imply media literacy efforts are futile. Quite the opposite, they
underscore the need for more (and more rigorous) research on media literacy’s effectiveness, as
well as the mechanisms through which it might operate. According to Chakroff and Nathanson
(2008, p. 568):
In order for these programs to be taken seriously by the people who have the power and
money to implement them, researchers must provide more concrete answers to what
works and what does not. That way, those in charge of curriculum decisions are able to
make more informed decisions.
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The growing research literature is beginning to allow for some tentative answers to these
questions. This literature is still quite small, however, and limited by various methodological and
theoretical weaknesses.
Media Literacy Theory and Research
In a 2007 address on the status of media literacy research, Hobbs observed that while
media literacy practice has reached its proverbial childhood, the state of knowledge in the field is
“still in its infancy.” A 2009 review of the literature (McCannon) counted fewer than one
hundred media literacy studies, while another (Martens, 2010) placed the number of conceptual
or empirical manuscripts at 165, compared to some ten-thousand studies addressing media
effects (Potter & Riddle, 2007).
Among the most consistent findings in media literacy research are those pertaining to the
acquisition of media literacy knowledge. Interventions have been found to increase knowledge
around production techniques and the ability to distinguish between commercials and television
programming (e.g., Rapaczynski, Singer, & Singer, 1982; Singer, Zuckerman, & Singer, 1980),
as well as between fantasy and reality (e.g., Doolittle, 1980). Researchers (e.g., Hobbs & Frost,
1999, 2003; Quin & McMahon, 1995) have also documented improvements in students’ ability
to recognize point of view, bias, target audience, production techniques, and advertising motives
and subtexts. There is little evidence, however, that media literacy knowledge translates into
long-term changes in attitudes and behaviors. This review focuses on media literacy research
directly addressing attitudinal or behavioral outcomes, rather than knowledge as a hypothetical
antecedent to attitudes and behaviors.
When researchers address attitudinal or behavioral outcomes, those relating to health
promotion are frequently targeted. A systematic review (Bergsma & Carney, 2008) of health-
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promoting media literacy interventions between 1990 and 2006 uncovered twenty-eight that met
the study’s inclusion criteria.4 The most common were those addressing issues related to
nutrition or disordered eating (including body image), violence prevention, and substance abuse
prevention, the majority of which were delivered in classrooms settings. Of the studies included
in the review, more than half were aimed at children in grade six and under, with the remainder
targeting adolescents or college students. The results of Bergsma and Carney’s analysis suggest
longer interventions tend to be more effective than short (e.g., single-session) interventions,
though there are exceptions (e.g., Austin & Johnson, 1997). Interventions that covered all five of
the Center for Media Literacy’s core concepts or provided information about the specific health
issue being addressed were also more likely to be effective.
Theoretical and Methodological Limitations
Research and evaluation of media literacy programs is becoming more common, but
rigorous studies still remain the exception (Brown, 2006). Published reports often lack a
thorough description of the sample, study design, intervention, or measures (Bergsma & Carney,
2008), rendering any generalizations about methodology tenuous. Moreover, evaluations of
existing curricula are often inadequately controlled, or confounded by the inclusion of several
different components in the experimental intervention. Thus, when media literacy programs are
ineffective, pinpointing why can be difficult, and even when they are effective, it is not always
possible to identify which elements of the intervention were responsible. Given the
predominantly school-based nature of media literacy research, random assignment is often

4

The criteria for inclusion Bergsma and Carney’s (2008) systematic review were as follows: (1) published in
English between 1990 and July 2006; (2) peer reviewed; (3) sample, design, intervention, measures, and analysis
were described; (4) included an experimental (in reality, quasi-experimental) health-promoting media literacy
intervention of at least 25 minutes; and (5) focused primarily on teaching media literacy, operationalized as one or
more of four key competencies (access, analyze, evaluate, create). Because several studies had more than one
intervention that met the inclusion criteria, the 23 studies included in the systematic review comprised a total of 28
interventions.
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unfeasible. As a result, the research is typically survey-based and often qualitative in nature (e.g.,
case studies). Quantitative research on media literacy is frequently plagued by small samples and
inconsistencies in implementation across classrooms. In most cases, the researchers themselves
(rather than regular classroom teachers) implement the interventions.
The objectives of media literacy programs are not always clearly defined or phrased in a
manner conducive to measurement. Such objectives often refer vaguely to enhanced critical
thinking skills or heightened awareness of media production techniques. Researchers typically
assess knowledge regarding the information provided as part of the curriculum, but do not
attempt to measure the extent to which individuals are applying this knowledge in their daily
lives. Behavior is rarely assessed directly; rather, attitudinal measures are often assessed as a
proxy for behavioral outcomes of interest (Cantor & Wilson, 2003). As a result, evidence of
behavior change is weak. The vast majority of studies have been short in duration, providing
little insight into what long-term outcomes might be expected from media literacy interventions.
Finally, there has been very little replication. In sum, whereas scattershot approaches to media
literacy are unlikely to be effective, the growing literature suggests theory-driven and carefully
implemented interventions can produce a variety of positive outcomes (for reviews, see e.g.,
Bergsma & Carney, 2008; McCannon, 2009).
The Message Interpretation Process Model
The leading theoretical model of media literacy—and the one with the most empirical
support—is the Message Interpretation Process (MIP) Model (Austin & Meili, 1994; Austin,
Roberts, & Nass, 1990). The MIP model elucidates a sequential process through which cognitive
and affective variables influence decision-making when individuals encounter media messages
(Figure 1). According to the model, this decision-making process can operate through a high-
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effort logical (i.e., cognitive) route, a low-effort emotional (i.e., affective) route, or both routes
simultaneously.

Figure 1. Elements of the Message Interpretation Process Model. Logical (e.g., perceived
realism) and emotional (e.g., desirability) variables contribute to later decision-making variables
in the theoretical model (e.g., identification with media portrayals, expectancies regarding
relevant behaviors, behavior choices). From “MIPmodel,” by E. W. Austin, (n.d.), retrieved from
http://www.wsu.edu/~eaustin/research.htm.
First, when faced with a media message, individuals evaluate the perceived realism and
perceived similarity (to personal norms and experience) of a media portrayal. These are logical
appraisals. The more realistic (i.e., like most people) and similar (i.e., reflective of personal
experience or that of close others) the portrayal is perceived to be, the more likely individuals
will be to identify with the portrayal. At the same time, identification can be influenced by the
desirability (i.e., attractiveness) of the portrayal (an emotional appraisal), either alone or in
interaction with perceived similarity. The more individuals identify with a portrayal, the more
12

they will internalize the message and desire to emulate the portrayal. Finally, consistent with
Bandura’s social cognitive theory (1986), positive expectancies lead to behavioral intentions,
self-efficacy, and ultimately predict analogous behavior.
According to the model, desirability can enter into the decision making process at any
point, and the logical and emotional routes may operate in conjunction or in conflict. For
example, one may perceive a portrayal to be unrealistic but nonetheless find it highly desirable or
attractive. Because the emotional route requires less cognitive effort, emotion can easily
overwhelm and bias logical responses to messages. However, individuals can acquire skills to
enable them to refute media messages, even highly desirable ones. Austin and colleagues
propose media literacy interventions can be targeted to virtually any step in the process, resulting
in individuals perceiving portrayals as less realistic, less normative, less desirable, and less
rewarding (i.e., reduced positive expectancies). They have accumulated substantial evidence in
support of the MIP model with regard to adolescent health behaviors, including alcohol (e.g.,
Austin & Johnson, 1997; Austin, Chen, & Grube, 2006; Austin, Miller, Silva et al., 2002),
tobacco (e.g., Austin, Pinkleton, & Funabiki, 2007; Austin, Pinkleton, Hust, & Cohen, 2005), and
sexual behavior (e.g., Pinkleton, Austin, Cohen, Chen, & Fitzgerald, 2008).
Austin and colleagues’ research within the MIP model framework has uncovered a
number of interesting findings with regard to the mechanisms through which media literacy
operates. Austin and Johnson (1997) suggest understanding of persuasive intent is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for reductions in identification with media portrayals. Persuasionrelated knowledge works in conjunction with perceptions of desirability and (to a lesser extent)
similarity. The construct of skepticism appears to have affective and cognitive dimensions,
represented by trust and perceived realism, respectively (Austin et al., 2002). As a result,
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activating skepticism works through logical and emotional processes in somewhat different
ways; enhancing cognitive awareness (i.e., processing) strengthens the logical decision-making
route, whereas activating negative affect (i.e., distrust) enhances the emotional route. Austin and
colleagues (2007) investigated a phenomenon in previous MIP findings that they term the
“desirability paradox.” This refers to evidence that media literacy training often decreases beliefs
associated with risky behaviors, while increasing ratings on measures of desirability. It appears
that increased media literacy alters the way individuals conceptualize desirability. Measures of
desirability typically tap into positive affect toward media portrayals. After receiving media
literacy training, however, these desirability measures reflect participants’ awareness that
advertisers use certain tactics for the purpose of crafting desirable portrayals. That is, an
increased level of media literacy with regard to affective means of persuasion is associated with
higher ratings of desirability. It appears that this heightened awareness cancels out whatever
effect positive affect might otherwise have on the decision-making process. Nonetheless, this
research raises key issues related to measurement of media literacy constructs.
Other Evidence of Effectiveness
Beyond Austin and colleagues’ research on the MIP model, there is growing evidence of
the effectiveness of media literacy programs in relation to attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, as
well as factors that contribute to effective media literacy interventions.
Body image and disordered eating. Several studies have evaluated the effects of media
literacy programs targeting body image and disordered eating. Although there is little evidence
that such programs impact eating behaviors, they can affect self-esteem, life-skills, and
awareness of media messages promoting the thin ideal (Littleton & Ollendick, 2003). A media
literacy program of the National Eating Disorders Association has been effective in promoting
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adolescent girls’ sense of empowerment and self-esteem, as well as reducing internalization of
the thin ideal and desire to be thin (Piran, Levine, & Irving, 2000). Numerous studies have
documented reductions in the perceived realism and desirability of media portrayals representing
the thin ideal (Irving & Berel, 2001; Irving, DuPen, & Berel, 1998), internalization of thin beauty
standards (Irving, DuPen, & Berel), weight concerns (Wade, Davidson, & O’Dea, 2003), and
intentions to diet (Irving & Berel). Research by Neumark-Sztainer, Wall, Story, and Perry (2003)
suggests that among the various attitudinal variables typically measured, only weight concerns
are associated with disordered eating behaviors.
Violence prevention. Media literacy approaches have been used extensively in the
domain of violence prevention. Voojis and Van der Voort (1993) found reductions in approval of
characters’ violent actions and greater appreciation of the consequences of violence among
children who received media literacy training. Huesmann, Eron, Klein, Brice, and Fischer (1983)
implemented an intervention aimed at altering cognitions about media violence (e.g., realism of
television violence, acceptability of aggressive behavior). An intervention designed to motivate
participants not to encode, store, retrieve, or employ aggressive behaviors resulted in less
positive attitudes toward aggression and less aggressive behavior (relative to the control group),
and effectively eliminated the correlation between exposure to television violence and aggressive
behavior among participants in the experimental condition.
An important caveat to the use of media literacy techniques in violence prevention is the
prevalence of counterintuitive “boomerang effects,” or increases in the undesirable attitude or
behavior being targeted by the intervention (Cantor & Wilson, 2003). Essentially, the use of
violent media clips, if not carefully implemented, can reinforce negative attitudes and behaviors
rather than challenging them. Byrne (2009) proposed that boomerang effects occur when an
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intervention draws attention to violent behavior, without promoting the level of active processing
necessary to challenge these messages. Byrne’s research lends support to the notion that
knowledge of media literacy concepts is not sufficient; individuals must also have the motivation
to apply this knowledge (e.g., Austin et al., 2007).
Sexual behavior. Although there do appear to be media literacy interventions targeting
sexual health risks, published research on their effectiveness is virtually nonexistent. Pinkleton
and colleagues (2008) examined a peer-led media literacy intervention for middle school
students, using the MIP model framework. The intervention increased awareness of myths about
sex and self-efficacy to delay sexual activity, and reduced positive expectancies, desirability of
sexual media portrayals, and estimates of peers’ sexual activity. At the time of their review,
Bergsma and Carney (2008) were unable to locate any peer-reviewed studies of such
interventions (because the Pinkleton et al. study was published in 2008, it did not meet their
criteria for inclusion). They suggest political constraints and human subjects concerns pose a
significant barrier to intervention research on adolescent sexual health.
Long-term outcomes. Although the short-term impact of media literacy is well
documented, little research has examined the extent to which effects are maintained beyond an
immediate post-test. According to Byrne (2009), for a media literacy intervention to be
meaningful, its effects should last more than a few days. A small number of studies have found
evidence of long-term effects in the domain of violence prevention. Huesmann and colleagues
(1983) found an initial reduction in aggression that continued for four months after the
intervention. Similarly, Voojis and Van der Voort’s (1993) experimental group participants
maintained changes in factual knowledge and perceived realism of television portrayals two
years after the intervention.
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Parental mediation. Media literacy education is not restricted to school-based settings.
In recent years, more research has begun to focus on the role of parents (or other caregivers) in
developing children’s media literacy. In addition to co-viewing (i.e., watching television
together), caregivers have a variety of mediation strategies at their disposal for monitoring or
controlling children’s media use. Whereas restrictive mediation refers to rules regarding content
or time spent with media, active mediation generally includes posing questions or sparking
discussion before, during, or after media consumption. There is evidence that such “media
literacy moments” can encourage more active processing. Nathanson and Cantor (2000) found
that when children were asked, prior to a cartoon clip, to consider the feelings of the victim, they
were more likely to identify with the victim and less likely to perceive the violence as justified.
Buijzen and Valkenburg (2005) found active mediation techniques to be more effective than
restrictive methods at reducing children’s toy requests, as well as parent-child conflict. A number
of studies have suggested that restrictive mediation alone may backfire by making young people
more likely to seek out the “forbidden” content (Cantor, Harrison, & Nathanson, 1997;
Nathanson, 2002).
Evaluative mediation is a type of active mediation wherein caregivers express
disapproval of specific characters or their actions (e.g., negative commentary on violent
characters of actions). Factual mediation, on the other hand, involves presenting information
about media production techniques. In a direct comparison of evaluative versus factual mediation
strategies, Nathanson (2004) found the former to be more effective, particularly with younger
children. In fact, providing only factual information actually increased negative effects in some
cases. However, research suggests that while evaluative mediation is highly effective with young
children (ages 5 to 8), it can backfire with older children (ages 9-12), who may find such
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approaches condescending (Nathanson & Yang, 2003). Across all age groups, evaluative
mediation appears to be most effective with heavy consumers of violent media. Whereas
criticism of violent media reduces aggressive attitudes and behaviors, praising these characters
promotes such attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, lack of commentary (or even neutral
comments) has an effect similar to praise, seemingly by conveying tacit approval of the
behaviors portrayed (e.g., Nathanson, 1999). These findings suggest that like restrictive
mediation, co-viewing (or even nonjudgmental active mediation) alone may not be sufficient.
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CHAPTER TWO:
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MEDIA LITERACY

A social psychological approach, emphasizing the complex interplay between individual
dispositions and situational contingencies, is particularly well suited to the study of media
literacy. Media are not just something to be consumed; they permeate virtually every aspect of
contemporary life. Interactions with media are uniquely shaped by individual beliefs, attitudes,
motives, abilities, and experiences. Although the MIP model draws upon elements of several
social psychological theories (e.g., social cognitive theory, expectancy theories, dual-process
theories), the model stops short of examining the interactions between individual characteristics
and situational (i.e., contextual) factors, as is typical of social psychological research. Such an
approach could shed light on how the logical and emotional routes of decision-making interact,
under what conditions each type of decision-making dominates, when emotion would be
expected to overwhelm logic, and how, if at all, this can be overcome.
One area in which social psychological theory could be particularly informative is that of
information-processing. Traditionally, media literacy initiatives emphasize critical evaluation and
thorough analysis of media messages, either as the ultimate goal or an intermediate goal leading
to desired outcomes. Dual-process theories such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) suggest
this high-effort type of processing is not always realistic or possible, however, as it requires high
levels of both motivation and processing ability. What this means for media literacy is that
traditional approaches may be ineffective under conditions of low motivation or compromised
processing ability.
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Dual-Process Theories
Although the precise mechanisms differ, ELM, HSM, and related dual-process theories
propose persuasion can occur through either a high-effort central (or systematic) route in which
message arguments are thoroughly examined, or a low-effort peripheral (or heuristic) route in
which the message recipient relies on potentially misleading cues such as the perceived expertise
of the source or the length of message arguments. When both motivation and processing ability
are high, individuals are more likely to engage in central route processing. This is not always
possible, however. For example, young children lack the cognitive capacity to process messages
through the central route (Livingstone & Helsper, 2006), and as a result, may be more vulnerable
to persuasion via peripheral processes. Those with the requisite cognitive capacity may still
default to peripheral (i.e., unconscious, automatic, implicit) processing under certain conditions,
particularly when motivation is lacking or ability is compromised. In this mode, media messages
can “fly under the radar” of conscious awareness and persuade unconsciously. Although ELM
and HSM have many features in common, their predictions differ with regard to how high- and
low-effort processing modes may co-occur. ELM proposes a tradeoff; as one process increases,
the other necessarily decreases. HSM, on the other hand, predicts that heuristic processing can
occur in tandem with systematic processing. According to HSM, at low levels of motivation or
ability, heuristic processing dominates. As motivation and ability increase, systematic processes
are engaged, but heuristic processing continues, with no tradeoff. HSM suggests motivation can
even increase heuristic processing, by enhancing the accessibility of related heuristic cues.
Factors known to influence motivation include the perceived personal relevance of the
message, deprivation of control, or the expectation that one will be discussing the message topic
in the near future. Ability is generally most influenced by recipient variables and those related to
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the persuasion context (e.g., distraction, mood, message modality), though the same variable can
have multiple roles at different points in the persuasion process, or depending on the level of
motivation and ability. Researchers working in the dual-process paradigm typically
experimentally manipulate characteristics of the message source, content, target (i.e., recipient),
or context. This approach enables researchers to examine how these variables affect persuasionrelated outcomes, both alone and in interaction. The present research focused on factors related
to the message content, persuasion context, and the message recipient; as such, source-related
variables will not be discussed.
Persuasion Context
Among the most frequently investigated contextual variables in dual-process research is
distraction. Defending oneself against media influence requires self-regulatory resources
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Thus, automatic processing is particularly likely under
conditions of fatigue, or when these resources are being otherwise utilized (e.g., when
multitasking, such as watching TV while studying or talking on the phone). The cognitive
response approach to persuasion (e.g., Greenwald, 1968) has provided much of the theoretical
framework for studying the effects of distraction. This approach holds that individuals
spontaneously generate cognitive responses (i.e., thoughts) during a persuasive message. These
responses may be favorable or unfavorable (e.g., counterarguments) with regard to the message.
Importantly, it not the message, per se, but the individual’s cognitive responses to the message
that mediate persuasive outcomes. In general, the more positive one’s cognitive response to a
message, the more persuasive the message will be.
The cognitive response approach represents a major departure from the earlier messagelearning model of persuasion (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953), which placed the emphasis on
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the message itself (i.e., who says what to whom, and with what effect). From a pure message
learning perspective, distraction would be expected to reduce persuasion by interfering with
reception of the message. Research within the cognitive response framework (e.g., Petty &
Brock, 1981; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), however, has shown that the effects of distraction are
often much more complex, and depend on the quality (i.e., strength) of message arguments. By
disrupting central route processing, distraction interferes with whatever the dominant cognitive
response to the message would be under ideal conditions. That is, when the message is weak,
distraction reduces the ability to counterargue, leading to increased persuasion. However, when
the argument is strong, distraction interferes with favorable thoughts, reducing its persuasive
impact.
Since its heyday in the 1980s, little social psychological research has directly addressed
the effects of distraction in the context of persuasive media messages. However, a 2008 RAND
Corporation study (Collins) investigated the impact of “media multitasking” on adolescents’
sexual attitudes and behavior. Those who watched more sexual content on TV were more likely
to lose their virginity in the subsequent year, but the relationship was particularly pronounced
among those who reported being online while watching TV. Although Collins did not specifically
examine the mediating mechanisms, the results were interpreted from a cognitive response
perspective. In essence, the distraction associated with multitasking interfered with adolescents’
ability to actively challenge (i.e., counterargue) potentially harmful or inaccurate media
messages regarding sexuality. As a result, these messages were processed in a peripheral manner
and thereby exerted profound effects on beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.
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Message Content
In addition to contextual variables such as distraction, the content or nature of media
messages themselves can pose a barrier to processing ability. Whereas research on persuasion
and resistance typically utilizes overtly persuasive messages, media messages tend to operate on
a more subtle level, cultivating predispositions, beliefs, and values through repeated exposure
(Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002). Many media messages, including
contemporary forms of advertising, may not be easily recognizable as persuasive attempts, and
as a result, can bypass traditional defenses and capitalize on automatic processes.
Even in the case of advertising, persuasive intent can be exceedingly difficult to detect, as
the lines between advertising, entertainment, news, and other types of messages have become
increasingly blurred. The advertising industry continues to venture into new territory with the use
of “stealth marketing” tactics. These include embedded advertising in film and television
(previously known as product placement), brand integration (developing storylines around a
particular brand or product), celebrity endorsements, “advergames” (advertising messages in
game format, primarily targeting children), video news releases (advertising messages in the
format of news segments, sometimes delivered as part of television news programming), and
viral marketing (advertising messages transmitted peer-to-peer, e.g., via web-based social
networks). Marketing researchers utilize cutting-edge techniques such as implicit measures and
neuroscientific methods to measure affective responses to brands (e.g., Innerscope Research,
2008). Consumer research suggests persuasion via peripheral processes can be highly effective,
particularly with children who have not yet developed the cognitive ability to process media
messages in a systematic manner (Livingstone & Helsper, 2006).

23

Within this brave new world of advertising, advertising that operates primarily at the
emotional level (i.e., through affective mechanisms), rather than through a rational consideration
of costs and benefits, is particularly insidious (Harris, Brownell, & Bargh, 2009). The advertising
industry draws a distinction between “informational” and “emotional” forms of marketing
(Innerscope Research, 2008). Whereas informational marketing operates through explicit
processes (e.g., rational consideration of the product’s costs and benefits), emotional marketing
works primarily by establishing positive brand inferences, the effects of which are largely
automatic and unconscious. Marketers make no secret of their use of these tactics, sometimes
even describing the development of brand associations in children as brand imprinting (Urbick,
2008). A prominent market research company advised its clients as follows:
The early to mid-teenage years are ones where brands need to be investing in brand
building…the initial connection and affinity to a brand is made on an emotional level –
and that when purchase decision time comes nearer, the young consumer is looking for
affirmation for the emotional choice they have already solidified (Harris Interactive,
2004, p. 4).
Thus far, research suggests emotional approaches to advertising are more effective than
informational approaches, particularly under conditions of low motivation or ability (e.g., Bargh,
2002; Harris, Brownell, & Bargh, 2009). In a study by Morris, Woo, Geason, and Kim (2002),
emotional responses accounted for more than twice the variability in brand interest and purchase
intent, relative to explicit brand attitudes. Repeated exposure to emotional appeals may
exacerbate these automatic effects. For example, if brand image is conceptualized as a network
of associations (Keller, 1993), advertisements reinforce these associations through repetition,
even under low-involvement viewing conditions (Heath, 2000). According to Nairn and Fine
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(2008), traditional approaches to media literacy are likely to be ineffective in relation to
advertising formats utilizing automatic or implicit persuasion processes, as these forms of
advertising have “no propositional information that the [individual] can critically assess and
evaluate in light of knowledge of the selling or persuasive intent of the message” (p. 454).
Message Recipient
Contextual and message-related variables can interfere with thorough processing, but
characteristics of the message recipient may be just as important. Ability is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for high-effort (i.e., elaborative or systematic) processing. In the absence of
motivation, ability will be of little use. Research suggests the perception of undue manipulative
intent can serve as a powerful motivator in the context of media messages (e.g., Campbell,
1995). In general, individuals reject information they perceive as deceptive or unfairly
manipulative. It stands to reason, however, that the perception of manipulative intent is only
influential to the extent that one perceives oneself to be vulnerable to manipulation. Individuals
who understand how mass media production techniques are used to manipulate and persuade
would generally be considered media literate, but if they believe they are immune the influence
of mass media, they will have little motivation to consistently engage their defenses in
subsequent media use.
This “illusion of unique invulnerability” (Perloff, 1987, p. 217), a specific case of selfenhancement or third-person bias (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), refers to a discrepancy between
perceptions of one’s own susceptibility (e.g., to media influence) and that of others. Fiske and
Taylor noted that such “unrealistic optimism may lead people to ignore legitimate risks in their
environment and fail to take measures to offset those risks” (p. 216). In the domain of health
behavior, perceived vulnerability to risk has emerged as a key variable related to treatment
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compliance and taking preventive measures (e.g., Aiken, Gerend, & Jackson, 2001; Siegel,
Raveis, & Gorey, 1998). Aiken and colleagues specified three stages of perceived vulnerability:
(1) awareness of a health risk, (2) the belief that others are at risk, and (3) acknowledgement of
one’s own personal vulnerability. Research suggests that merely pointing out vulnerability is
generally insufficient to motivate a shift from the second to the third stage, as the public is
already well aware of health risks (Perloff, 1987; Snyder, 1997). Providing personalized
information about health risks is a more effective strategy.
Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, and Serna (2002) examined the third-person effect (i.e.,
perceptions of invulnerability) in relation to advertising. They developed an intervention
designed to challenge these beliefs and thereby motivate both resistance to illegitimate
persuasive appeals and receptivity to legitimate appeals. In the context of their study, illegitimate
appeals were those relying on false claims of authority. Sagarin and colleagues hypothesized that
merely informing individuals of their susceptibility to persuasive appeals would not be sufficient
to overcome the motivational barrier of perceived invulnerability; instead individuals would need
to be provided with “undeniable evidence” (Sagarin & Cialdini, 2004, p. 270) that they could be
manipulated by advertisers. In the asserted vulnerability condition, participants were shown
example ads demonstrating appropriate and inappropriate use of authority, and asked to consider
whether they were initially fooled by an ad utilizing an illegitimate (i.e., fake) authority. In the
demonstrated vulnerability condition, participants were asked not merely to consider, but to
actually rate how convincing they found the target ad. They then were directed to the presence of
an illegitimate authority and referred back to their earlier response. Relative to those whose
vulnerability was merely asserted, participants in the demonstrated vulnerability condition
ultimately found ads using illegitimate authorities less persuasive, and those using legitimate
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authorities more persuasive. Furthermore, this effect was mediated by perceptions of
manipulative intent. Taken as a whole, research on the third-person effect in perceptions of media
influence suggests the role of perceived vulnerability in media literacy warrants further
investigation.
Summary
The goal of most media literacy initiatives is promoting critical evaluation of media
messages, but dual-process theories propose that constraints on motivation and processing ability
reduce the likelihood that an individual will thoroughly process message arguments. Factors
impairing processing ability include characteristics of the persuasion context (e.g., distractions),
as well as the nature (i.e., content) of the persuasive message. Contemporary emotional
marketing strategies are often specifically designed to exploit weaknesses in informationprocessing infrastructure and subvert high-effort processing. In addition to ability barriers, the
message recipient’s motivation may be compromised by perceptions of unique invulnerability to
media influence (i.e., third-person effects). Media literacy programs focusing on awareness of
mass media influence and encouraging thorough processing do little to challenge these beliefs.
Given the ubiquity of distractions in the media environment, the sophistication of advertising
techniques, and the prevalence of third-person effects, media literacy approaches based solely in
conscious, effortful processes are likely to be inadequate for contemporary times.
Overview of Research
The overall goal of the current research was to gain a better understanding of how media
literacy mechanisms operate under realistic media-use conditions of low motivation and
impaired processing ability. More specifically, this research extended previous work within the
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Message Interpretation Process (MIP) Model framework by examining how both logical and
emotional decision-making variables are influenced by variations in motivation and ability.
The main research study involved the experimental manipulation of specific barriers to
both motivation and processing ability. To address the motivational barrier of third-person
effects, a “vulnerability” manipulation was designed (based on the procedures of Sagarin et al.,
2002) to challenge individuals’ beliefs about their personal invulnerability to advertising
messages. Two additional independent variables addressed potential barriers to processing
ability: the type of advertising message (informational or emotional) and the presence or absence
of environmental distractions. For the purpose of this research, informational ads were
conceptualized as those providing tangible arguments about the advertised product or service that
the viewer can consider. Alternatively, emotional ads were conceptualized as those lacking such
tangible information, and designed to work primarily by associating the product (or brand) with
positive emotions. The stimulus ads for the main study were determined by the results of Pilot
Study 1, while the level of distraction was based on the results of Pilot Study 2. Finally, Pilot
Study 3 evaluated the convincingness of the print ad selected for the vulnerability manipulation.
Beyond Outcomes
The present research differed from the majority of media literacy research in two key
ways. First, because media literacy initiatives are traditionally concerned with educating children
and adolescents as a means of preventing risky behaviors, research and evaluation efforts
virtually always target these groups (or college students, at the oldest). The current research
addressed media literacy among adults. Second, although numerous researchers have emphasized
the need for additional evidence of effectiveness with regard to attitudinal and behavioral
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outcomes, the present research did not include a media literacy intervention nor evaluate
effectiveness.
The rationale for these somewhat unusual decisions was that the current research was
designed to examine the individual level processes underlying media literacy, rather than test the
outcomes of a specific media literacy intervention. Some researchers, notably Austin and
colleagues (e.g., Austin et al., 2002; 2006; 2007), have studied the mechanisms through which
media literacy operates in an effort to better understand how interventions lead to desired
outcomes (and why they sometimes fail). The goal of the present research was to extend the
work of Austin and others by studying how barriers to motivation and ability affect these
mechanisms, among those who may already have some degree of media literacy knowledge. In
other words, the current research was concerned with identifying barriers that might prevent
those with latent media literacy knowledge and skills from engaging them in everyday media
use.
Research Questions
Pilot Study 1 had no research questions in the traditional sense. The goal of the study was
simply to confirm the researcher’s a priori categorization of stimulus ads as informational or
emotional, and to select four ads (two of each type) to be used as stimuli in the main study. Pilot
Study 2 addressed the question of what constitutes a sufficient level of distraction to impair
thinking about the target ad, while not completely obscuring the ad. The goal of Pilot Study 3
was to confirm that participants would find the print ad selected to be part of the vulnerability
manipulation sufficiently convincing.
The main study investigated four research questions in two broad domains: (1) the effects
of variations in motivation and ability on a variety of variables conceptualized as intermediate
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media literacy outcomes, and (2) mediators and moderators of the relationships among
manipulated vulnerability, perceptions of manipulative intent (i.e, distrust), and perceived
persuasiveness. Within the first domain, the research was concerned with: (1a) how motivational
(e.g., perceived invulnerability) and ability-related barriers (e.g., the nature of advertising
messages, distractions in the media use environment) impact intermediate media literacy
outcomes, and (1b) how, if at all, these barriers to motivation and processing ability interact in
their effects on these outcome variables. With regard to the second domain, the research
addressed: (2a) what variables mediate and moderate the relationship between manipulated
vulnerability, distrust, and persuasiveness, and (2b) how, if at all, these mediated relationships
are affected by variations in motivation and ability (i.e., the conditions under which mediation is
evident).
Recruitment and Data Collection on Mechanical Turk
Participants for all three pilot studies and the main study were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). Initially conceived as a platform for businesses to
“crowd-source” labor, MTurk has emerged in recent years as an inexpensive and efficient
method of recruiting participants for social research, particularly when a highly specific sample
is not required (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Iperiotis,
2010). MTurk enables requesters to publish small tasks (including surveys) referred to as human
intelligence tasks (HITs). Members (known as workers) browse HITs for which they meet preestablished inclusion criteria, and select which ones to complete.
The growing literature on MTurk (e.g., Iperiotis, 2009; Paolacci et al., 2010) highlights
its advantages (e.g., speed of recruitment, low cost, flexibility) and suggests concerns about
threats to internal and external validity are largely exaggerated. While self-selected and not
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representative of the U.S. population at large, research indicates MTurk samples are comparable
to Internet convenience samples recruited through other means, and more representative of the
adult U.S. population than traditional college student samples. For a brief review of the literature
on MTurk as a recruitment and data collection tool, along with recommendations culled from the
present research, see Appendix A.
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CHAPTER THREE: PILOT STUDIES

Before commencing the main study, three preliminary studies were conducted to pilot the
stimulus materials for each of the three experimental manipulations (ad type, distraction, and
vulnerability). The purpose of Pilot Study 1 was to select four video ads (two informational, two
emotional) that were approximately equivalent in persuasiveness and message strength. The goal
of Pilot Study 2 was to identify a sufficient level of distraction to impair thinking about the target
video ad while not completely obscuring the ad. Finally, Pilot Study 3 was conducted to confirm
that the print ad chosen for the vulnerability manipulation would be sufficiently convincing.
Pilot Study 1: Video Ads
In the real world, most ads appeal to emotion to some degree, though they may or may
not include tangible information about the product that the consumer can evaluate. For the
purpose of this research, informational ads were defined as those that provide tangible product
information, regardless of the extent to which they appeal to emotion. Emotional ads, on the
other hand, were conceptualized as those combining a high level of emotional appeal and the
relative absence of tangible information about the product (i.e., ads that rely primarily or solely
on emotional strategies). The goal of this study was to select two ads representing each end of
the informational-emotional continuum, with approximate equivalence in persuasiveness and
message strength.
Method
Participants and procedure. Adult participants (age 18 and older) were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) between June 30 and July 3, 2011. To maintain a
relatively homogeneous sample, only MTurk members who resided in the United States were
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eligible to participate. Because the stimuli were video ads presented in English, respondents were
required to be English-fluent. Finally, to reduce the risk of participants rushing through the study
and providing poor-quality data, they were required to have an MTurk approval rating of at least
95% (meaning their work has been deemed acceptable on at least 95% of previously completed
tasks).
Those who met these inclusion criteria and chose to participate were randomly assigned
to one of eight conditions, each representing a different combination of ads (two ads per
condition). Immediately following each ad, participants answered a series of questions regarding
their perceptions of the ad. After evaluating both ads, they responded to basic demographic
questions. The median time to complete the survey, including consent and debriefing procedures,
was just over 10 minutes. Participants who reached the end of the survey and clicked “Submit”
were compensated forty cents, well within the standard compensation range for a survey of this
length on MTurk. A total of 199 participants completed the survey, giving N = 398 individual ad
ratings.
Stimulus materials. The stimuli were video ads from YouTube.com. To minimize the
likelihood of prior exposure, only ads from outside the U.S. were considered, and to limit
potential confounds, all ads pertained to the same general product category (food). Ads providing
tangible information about the product that the viewer can logically evaluate were initially
categorized as informational ads. Those that did not provide such tangible information and
appealed to the viewer’s emotions (e.g., cultivating positive associations with the brand) were
categorized as emotional ads. After generating a large pool of potential ads, four tentative
informational ads and four tentative emotional ads were selected for inclusion in the present
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study (Table 1; see Appendix B for screen shots and transcripts of each ad). Seven of the eight
ads were 30-second Australian ads; one was a 60-second ad from the U.K. 5
Table 1
Stimulus Ads for Pilot Study 1
Ad

Type

Description

Country

Length

1

Info

McCain’s Sweet Potato Superfries

Australia

30 sec.

2

Emo

Abbott’s Village Bakery (bread)

Australia

30 sec.

3

Info

McDonald’s McCafe (coffee)

Australia

30 sec.

4

Emo

McCain’s Oven Chips (fries)

U.K.

60 sec.

5

Info

Continental Cook-in-Bag (chicken)

Australia

30 sec.

6

Emo

Tip Top Bread

Australia

30 sec.

7

Info

Uncle Toby’s Oats (microwaveable oatmeal)

Australia

30 sec.

8

Emo

Perfect Italiano (cheese)

Australia

30 sec.

The ads were distributed among eight conditions such that each condition included two
ads (one of each type), and each ad was evaluated in two conditions. To control for potential
order effects, the order of presentation was counterbalanced as shown in Table 2, with each ad
appearing once in the first position and once in the second position. Ad numbers correspond to
those in Table 1 (odd numbers represent informational ads and even numbers represent emotional
ads).

5 Although

ad #4 was from a different country (U.K.) and twice as long as the other ads, it was the same brand as ad
#1. Ad 4 was included in this pilot study to examine the possibility that the brand consistency might compensate for
the difference in length. Ultimately, the differences between ad 4 and the other ads proved too great, and the ad was
not selected.
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Table 2
Conditions and Counterbalancing in Pilot Study 1

!

Condition

First Position

Second Position

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H

Ad 1
Ad 2
Ad 3
Ad 4
Ad 5
Ad 6
Ad 7
Ad 8

Ad 2
Ad 3
Ad 4
Ad 5
Ad 6
Ad 7
Ad 8
Ad 1

All ads were embedded in the survey instrument as Flash® videos. Participants were

encouraged to replay each target ad as many times as they wished before moving on to the
dependent measures.
Measures. In persuasion research, distraction has consistently been shown to interact
with message strength such that it hinders persuasion for strong messages but promotes
persuasion for weak messages (e.g., Petty et al., 1976). To minimize message strength as a
potential confound in the main study, the perceived strength of the stimulus ads was assessed
through a thought-listing task. After viewing the stimulus ad, participants were asked to list, in an
open-ended format, any thoughts they had while viewing the ad, and then categorize each
thought as either negative, neutral, positive, or irrelevant toward the ad. Strength was
operationalized as the proportion of positive thoughts out of total relevant thoughts (i.e., sum of
positive, negative, and neutral thoughts).
Like message strength, the perceived persuasiveness of the target ad could potentially
confound the results of the main study. To evaluate each ad’s persuasiveness, Campbell’s (1995)
eight-item perceived persuasiveness scale was used. Although Campbell proposed three factors
(perceptions of the brand, perceptions of the ad, and likelihood of future use), Sagarin and
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colleagues (2002) found a single factor solution for this scale (ranging from ! = .86 to ! = .95
among college students, depending on the ad). The scale consists of four semantic-differential
items measuring perceptions of the brand along the dimensions bad-good, pleasant-unpleasant,
low quality-high quality, and likable-dislikable; three semantic-differential items addressing
perceptions of the ad along the dimensions pleasant-unpleasant, bad-good, and awful-nice; and a
Likert item: “If you were to use this type of product in the future, how likely are you to choose
this brand?” (extremely unlikely to extremely likely). All measurement scales ranged from 1-7.
Because no validated scales existed for measuring a given ad’s use of informational
techniques or emotional techniques, scales were created to assess these constructs. The use of
informational techniques scale consisted of seven Likert items rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree): “This ad helps me weigh the pros and cons of the product,” “This ad provides
information about the product,” “This ad provides specific reasons to think about when deciding
whether to buy this product,” “This ad provides useful information about the product that I can
think about,” “This ad helps the viewer think about the costs and benefits of this product,” “This
ad tries to persuade viewers by providing information,” and “This ad focuses on concrete
features of the product.” The use of emotional techniques scale had a total of 20 items. Seven
Likert items, rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) evaluated recognition of the
target ad’s use of emotional techniques: “This ad is designed to play on the viewer’s emotions,”
“This ad is intended to bring up strong feelings in the viewer,” “One purpose of this ad is to
connect with the viewer’s values,” “A goal of this ad is to bring up positive memories,” “This ad
is intended to form an emotional bond with the viewer,” “This ad seeks to make the viewer feel
like they belong,” and “This ad tries to persuade viewers by making them emotional.” Three
semantic differential items evaluated general activation of emotion: “I found this ad __”
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(emotional-unemotional, moving-not moving, and touching-not touching). Finally, ten Likert
items, rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), measured the extent to which the
target ad evoked specific emotions in the viewer: “This ad made me feel __” (happy, excited,
warm, peaceful, calm, sad, angry, annoyed, anxious, and disgusted).
The emerging literature on the use of MTurk in behavioral research (e.g., Mason & Suri,
2010) highlights the benefits of including “trip questions” (known as instructional manipulation
checks or IMCs; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) to catch “bots” (i.e., automated
computer scripts), as well as individuals who are not paying attention. IMCs are items or
instructions directing participants to select a specific response option or perform an unusual task
(e.g., skipping the next question), rather than responding as they typically would. A single item,
“This ad is a commercial, but instead of rating this statement, choose the ‘slightly disagree’
option,” was embedded within each set of informational and emotional items, the order of which
was randomized. Because each participant evaluated two ads, there were two opportunities to
pass or fail the IMC.
In addition to the main dependent measures and the IMCs, participants were asked to
identify the brand or product featured in the ad, and a single dichotomous item was used to
assess prior exposure to the target ad: “Have you ever seen this ad before today?” (yes/no). The
full survey instrument is included in Appendix C.
Results
Of the 199 participants who completed the survey, a total of 28 (14.1%) failed at least one
of the two instructional manipulation checks (12 failed one question and 16 failed both). Data
were excluded at the participant level (i.e., ratings of both target ads) for those who failed one or
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more trip question, who completed the survey in less than six minutes (n = 10, of which eight
also failed at least one trip question), or whose IP address indicated a location outside the U.S.
(n = 4). In addition, data were excluded at the ad level (i.e., ratings of an individual ad) if any of
the following was true: captured data indicated the video did not complete (2 responses); the
respondent reported the video froze and did not start up again, or did not play at all (5
responses); the respondent reported they had previously seen the target ad (1 response); the
respondent incorrectly identified the brand or product (8 responses); or the respondent’s
comments indicated they do not consume the advertised product (e.g., vegetarian assigned to ad
for chicken, 3 responses). All told, these criteria resulted in the exclusion of 72 individual ad
ratings (18.1%) from 39 participants (for 33 participants, all data were excluded and for 6
participants, data from only one of the two ads were excluded). The final sample consisted of
166 participants (160 with ratings on both target ads, 6 with ratings on only one ad), giving
N = 326 individual ad ratings. The number of responses per ad ranged from 35 to 47, with a
mean of 41.
Participant demographics. The majority of participants were female (62.0%). Ages
ranged from 18 to 81 (the next oldest was 66), with a median age of 33. The middle 50% of
participants fell between the ages of 25 and 45. Participants were asked to select all applicable
races (as a result, percentages do not add up to 100%). The sample was predominantly white
(83.7%), with 7.8% identifying as black or African American, 6.6% Asian, and 3.6% indicating
other races (American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or “Other
Race”). Participants were additionally asked whether they identify as Hispanic or Latino. Only
4.2% of participants indicated Hispanic or Latino heritage, most of whom were Mexican or
Mexican American.
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Respondents had a high level of education overall, with 51.8% reporting at least a
bachelor’s degree, and 19.3% holding a graduate degree. Twenty-five percent of participants
indicated they are currently students in a two-year, four-year, or graduate degree program.
Including only those who indicated no one else can claim them as a dependent (n = 135), 27.9%
reported a household income less than $30,000, 27.9% were between $30,000 and $50,000,
29.5% were between $50,000 and $100,000, and 14.7% had an income greater than $100,000.
Scale construction. The survey instrument included seven items measuring the target
ad’s persuasiveness, twenty items addressing the use of emotional techniques, and seven items
pertaining to the use of informational techniques. Prior to scale construction, each item was first
screened for normality. Although the majority of items exhibited significant negative skew,
examination of the distributions revealed the violations were by-and-large not severe. The five
emotional items addressing the activation of negative emotions, however, were extremely
positively skewed; as such, these items were dropped. Additionally, items with item-total
correlations less than .60 on their respective scale were dropped. This criterion resulted in the
loss of six items: a single item from the persuasiveness scale (“I personally thought the BRAND
featured in the commercial was __” [pleasant-unpleasant]) and five items from the emotional
scale (those addressing the activation of specific positive emotions).
The resulting scales were highly reliable: persuasiveness (6 items, ! = .89), use of
emotional techniques (10 items, ! = .94), and use of informational techniques (7 items, ! = .94).
The correlations between each of the three scales, along with scale reliabilities, are shown in
Table 3. The uses of both informational techniques and emotional techniques were positively
associated with persuasiveness, but the informational and emotional scales were themselves
negatively correlated. That said, the relationships between each of the three scales were relatively
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low (between 5% and 15% shared variance), indicating the scales represent distinct constructs. In
other words, the emotional scale is not simply the reverse of the informational scale. Finally, the
reliabilities of the three scales were consistently high across participant sex, age (33 or older
versus 32 or younger), type of ad (informational versus emotional), and order of ad appearance
(first versus second). The items comprising the final measures are listed in Appendix D.
Table 3
Scale Correlation Matrix, N = 326a

Persuasiveness (6 items)

Persuasiveness

Emotional

Informational

.89

.38

.23

.94

-.30

Emotional (10 items)
Informational (7 items)
a

.94

Values along the diagonal represent scale reliabilities.

Overview of analyses. Ratings of the target ad’s persuasiveness, use of informational
techniques, and use of emotional techniques were approximately normally distributed. However,
the distributions of time spent on the ad, strength scores (proportion of positive thoughts), and
the frequencies of different types of thoughts exhibited substantial deviations for normality. As
such, nonparametric Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to gauge the effects of ad
presentation order, ad type, and sex on these dependent variables. Parametric t-tests were
conducted for all other dependent variables (persuasiveness, use of emotional techniques, use of
informational techniques).
Order effects. The only variable with a significant order effect was time spent on the
target ad, U = 9379.5, z = 4.59, p < .001. Individuals spent approximately 6 seconds longer on
the first ad they viewed (median = 45.3) than the second ad (median = 39.3). This difference may
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have been due to the time it took to read a warning before moving on to the questions after each
ad. Participants may have been more likely to proceed without reading the warning following the
second ad. Because the time spent on each ad was not a key dependent variable and the order of
ad presentation was counterbalanced so that each ad appeared equally often in each position, this
order effect was not explored further.
!

Time spent on ad. The median time spent on the ad screen ranged from 39 to 42 seconds

for the 30-second ads, with a median time of 72 seconds for the single 60-second ad. The
approximate percentage of participants who played each ad more than once was estimated by
doubling the minimum time spent on the ad screen and calculating the number of participants
whose time exceeded this threshold. These estimates varied widely among the different ads, from
10% (McCain Oven Chips) to 24% (Perfect Italiano), with no discernible pattern. It appears,
however, that the vast majority of participants played the target ads only once. There were no
significant effects of sex, age, or ad type (excluding the 60-second ad) on the time spent on the
ad screen.
Ad strength. Across all ads, the total number of thoughts produced ranged from 1 to 12,
with a median of 3. Relevant thoughts (sum of positive, negative, and neutral thoughts) also had
a median of 3. The number of positive thoughts ranged from 0 to 7 with a median of 2. Ad
strength, calculated as the proportion of positive thoughts out of relevant thoughts, had a mean
value of .66 and a median of .75. The mean strength scores for all ads are shown in Figure 2,
ordered from highest to lowest. The ads with the highest (McCain Superfries: M = .72, SD = .33;
Continental Cook-in-Bag: M = .72, SD = .35) and lowest (Uncle Toby’s Oats: M = .60, SD = .41)
proportions of positive thoughts were all informational ads.
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Figure 2. Ratings of strength by ad, N = 326. Light bars correspond to informational ads and
dark bars correspond to emotional ads.
Mann-Whitney U tests indicated no significant effects of ad type (informational or
emotional) on either strength or the number of listed thoughts of each type. There were, however,
significant sex differences in the number of positive thoughts (U = 10312.5, z = 2.47, p = .013),
relevant thoughts (U = 10061.0, z = 2.86, p = .004), and total thoughts (U = 10393.5, z = 2.44,
p = .015), with women producing more of each type of thought than men. Age was positively
correlated with ad strength, r = .11, p = .045; total positive thoughts, r = .18, p = .001; and total
relevant thoughts, r = .12, p = .033. Among those aged 33 or older, the mean ad strength rating
was .71 (SD = .35); among those 32 or below, it was .61 (SD = .39).
Ad persuasiveness. Overall, persuasiveness ratings were relatively high (M = 5.23,
SD = 1.28). Figure 3 shows the mean persuasiveness ratings for all ads, ordered from highest to
lowest. McCain Superfries (M = 5.57, SD = 1.06) and Abbott’s Village Bakery (M = 5.54,
SD = 1.15) received the highest mean persuasiveness ratings, while Uncle Toby’s Oats
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(M = 4.82, SD = 1.61) and McCafe (M = 5.00, SD = 1.19) were rated lowest. Uncle Toby’s,
however, had the largest standard deviation by far (the next largest was Perfect Italiano,
SD = 1.33).
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Figure 3. Ratings of persuasiveness by ad, N = 326. Light bars correspond to informational ads
and dark bars correspond to emotional ads.
There were no significant effects of ad type or participant sex on ratings of persuasiveness.
Persuasiveness was, however, positively correlated with participant age, r = .12, p = .029.
Use of informational techniques. Across all ads, the mean rating of the use of
informational techniques was 3.79 (SD = 1.65). Mean ratings of each ad’s use of informational
techniques are shown in Figure 4, ordered from highest to lowest. As expected, the ads with the
four highest ratings were all informational ads.
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Figure 4. Ratings of the use of informational techniques by ad, N = 326. Light bars correspond to
informational ads and dark bars correspond to emotional ads.
There was a significant main effect of ad type, t(311.7) = 16.03, p < .001, with informational ads
receiving higher mean ratings on the use of informational techniques (M = 4.89, SD = 1.10) than
emotional ads (M = 2.70, SD = 1.36). Neither participant sex nor age was significantly associated
with informational ratings.
Use of emotional techniques. Overall, the mean rating on use of emotional techniques
was 4.50 (SD = 1.45). As shown in Figure 5, three of the four highest rated ads were emotional
ads, though one of the informational ads (McCain Superfries) surpassed one of the emotional ads
(Perfect Italiano).
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Figure 5. Ratings of the use of emotional techniques by ad, N = 326. Light bars correspond to
informational ads and dark bars correspond to emotional ads.
There was a significant effect of ad type, t(324) = 9.87, p < .001, with emotional ads receiving
higher mean ratings on the use of emotional techniques (M = 5.19, SD = 1.20) than informational
ads (M = 3.80, SD = 1.35). As with informational ratings, emotional ratings had no significant
association with participant sex or age.
Discussion
Overall, the informational and emotional ratings were largely consistent with the a priori
categorizations of each ad as either informational or emotional. The four informational ads
received the highest ratings on the use of informational techniques. Three of the four emotional
ads received the highest ratings on the use of emotional techniques, though one of the
informational ads (McCain Superfries) exceeded the presumed emotional ad Perfect Italiano on
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this measure. Given that Perfect Italiano did not distinguish itself as either an informational or
emotional ad, it was dropped from consideration. Although McCain Oven Chips received the
highest mean emotional rating and lowest mean informational rating, a number of respondents
listed thoughts indicating difficulty determining what the product was. Moreover, the ad was
twice as long as any of the others and the only one of the eight ads that was not Australian. As a
result, this ad was excluded. Because McCain Superfries was really only informational in
relation to McCain Oven Chips, this ad was dropped from consideration as well. Finally, McCafe
was excluded, primarily because the informational ratings for this ad were quite low in relation
to the other informational ads. Table 4 presents mean ratings of the two remaining informational
ads (Continental Cook-in-Bag and Uncle Toby’s Oats) and the two remaining emotional ads
(Abbott’s Village Bakery and Tip Top Bread) on each of the four relevant variables.
Table 4
Mean Ad Ratings on Dependent Variables (SDs in Parentheses), N = 162
Mean Ratings

Info
Emo

Ad Name

N

Informational

Emotional

Persuasiveness

Strength

Continental Cook-in-Bag

35

5.06 (0.92)

4.07 (1.24)

5.50 (1.16)

.72 (.35)

Uncle Toby’s Oats

47

5.38 (0.75)

3.06 (1.28)

4.82 (1.61)

.60 (.41)

Abbott’s Village Bakery

35

3.14 (1.20)

5.16 (1.03)

5.54 (1.15)

.63 (.35)

Tip Top Bread

45

3.41 (1.36)

5.03 (1.10)

5.20 (1.25)

.62 (.39)

Mean ratings for the two selected informational ads and the two selected emotional ads
are compared in Figure 6. Because they were measured on a different scale (0 to 1), strength
ratings are not shown. However, the pattern in ratings of strength was largely consistent with that
of persuasiveness (informational: M = .65, SD = .39; emotional: M = .62, SD = .37).
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Figure 6. Mean ratings of the use of informational techniques, emotional techniques, and
persuasiveness for the two selected informational ads (n = 82) versus the two selected emotional
ads (n = 80).
Pilot Study 2: Distraction Stimulus
Whereas the purpose of Pilot Study 1 was to select informational and emotional ads for
the stimulus ads in the main study, the goal of Pilot Study 2 was to identify an appropriate level
of cognitive load for the distraction stimulus in the main study. The level of distraction needed to
be “sufficient to interfere with thinking about the message, but weak enough not to obscure the
message” (Knowles & Linn, 2004a, p. 129). Because this question was exploratory in nature, no
specific hypotheses were put forward.
Method
Participants and procedure. Adult participants were recruited from MTurk between
July 18 and 22, 2011. All inclusion criteria remained the same as in Pilot Study 1, with the
additional criterion that Study 1 participants who were assigned to the ad used in Pilot Study 2
were ineligible. Those who met the inclusion criteria and chose to participate were randomly
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assigned to one of eight experimental conditions in a 4 (level of distraction) x 2 (number of video
views) between-subjects factorial design. In the no distraction (control) condition, participants
simply watched a video ad. In the other three distraction conditions, participants watched the
same ad and simultaneously completed a distracting cognitive task. Participants in all conditions
viewed the ad either once or twice.
After viewing the stimulus ad, participants responded to a series of items concerning their
level of distraction and recall of the ad, followed by basic demographic questions. The median
time to complete the survey, including consent and debriefing procedures, was 7.7 minutes (7.4
minutes for those who viewed the ad once and 7.9 minutes for those who viewed the ad twice).
Participants who reached the end of the survey and clicked “Submit” were compensated forty
cents. A total of N = 210 participants completed the survey.
Stimulus materials. One of the two informational ads identified in Pilot Study 1
(Continental Cook-in-Bag) served as the stimulus ad in all eight conditions. The ad portrays a
mother and two children preparing chicken dinner by adding a marinade mix to a bag along with
the chicken. Participants were not permitted to pause the ad or otherwise interfere with playback,
and depending on the video play condition, viewed the ad either one or two times
(consecutively).
The distraction stimulus was based on the procedure used by Petty, Wells, and Brock
(1976). During the video ad, participants in the three distraction conditions were exposed to red
and/or blue squares that flashed intermittently around the periphery of the video screen. The
stimuli appeared for a half second each, and were spaced at varying intervals, preventing
participants from anticipating exactly when or where they might appear. The numbers of stimuli
of each color presented in each condition, as well as the average interval between stimuli, are
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shown in Table 5. For those who viewed the ad once (single-play), the low distraction condition
had three red stimuli, the high distraction, single-color condition had six red stimuli, and the high
distraction, two-color condition had three red stimuli and three blue stimuli. For those who
viewed the ad twice (double-play), the number of distraction stimuli in each condition was
doubled (and spread out over the two repetitions of the ad) to maintain a consistent average
interval between stimuli. This design enabled examination of the effect of the absolute number of
stimuli, while holding the interval constant, as well as the effect of the interval between stimuli,
while holding the absolute number of stimuli constant.
Table 5
Protocol for Presentation of Distraction Stimuli in Pilot Study 2
Red
Stimuli

Blue
Stimuli

Total
Stimuli

Average
Interval

Single-Play

0

0

0

---

Double-Play

0

0

0

---

Single-Play

3

0

3

10 sec.

Double-Play

6

0

6

10 sec.

High Distraction 1
(one color)

Single-Play

6

0

6

5 sec.

Double-Play

12

0

12

5 sec.

High Distraction 2
(two colors)

Single-Play

3

3

6

5 sec.

Double-Play

6

6

12

5 sec.

Condition
No Distraction
Low Distraction

Participants were directed to keep track of how many stimuli they counted in each color.
It was not the stimuli, per se, but the cognitive burden associated with keeping an accurate count,
that constituted the distraction or cognitive load in this study.
Measures. Participants in all conditions (including the no distraction condition) were
asked how many stimuli of each color they counted. The mean discrepancy between the actual
and reported number of stimuli of each color served as an index of accuracy. To examine
participants’ recall of the ad (and ensure they were still able to process the video at a minimal
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level), they were asked “What was the name of the brand being advertised in the commercial?”
Five factual multiple choice questions served as an additional recall measure: “What was the
product being advertised in this commercial?,” “How many kids were in this commercial?,”
“What arguments were specifically used in the commercial to promote this product?,” “What
were the three steps the mother mentioned in this commercial?,” and “When the mother put the
chicken in the oven, it was __” (still in the bag/no longer in the bag).
To obtain an objective measure of distractedness, participants completed a slight variation
on the thought-listing task described in Study 1. Here, the word “favorable” was substituted for
“positive” and “unfavorable” for “negative,” and participants were provided with more detailed
instructions (e.g., “do not list thoughts related to the flashing squares”). A scale was created to
assess participants’ subjective level of distractedness (no pre-existing validated scales measuring
this construct were found). All participants completed a nine-item Likert scale, with ratings from
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): “I was not able to give the ad my full attention,” “I
found myself distracted while watching the ad,” “I was able to concentrate on the ad” (reversed),
“My attention was drawn away from the ad,” “I could not focus on the ad,” “I could not follow
what was going on in the ad,” “I was able to focus on the ad the entire time” (reversed), “I had
trouble following along with the ad,” and “I was able to follow the arguments the ad put
forth” (reversed). Two instructional manipulation checks (“I must choose ‘moderately disagree’
for this item” and “I am being instructed to choose ‘moderately agree’”) were embedded in the
measures. The full survey instrument is included in Appendix C.
Results
Of the 210 participants who completed the survey, 37 (17.6%) failed at least one of the
two IMCs (22 failed one question and 15 failed both). This slightly higher failure rate (relative to
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14.1% in Pilot Study 1) may have been attributable to the somewhat confusing wording of these
items in the present study. Participants were instructed to indicate their agreement with
statements such as “I am being instructed to choose ‘moderately agree’” rather than being
explicitly instructed to ignore the statement and “choose the ‘moderately agree’ option,” as in
Study 1. Data were excluded for respondents who failed one or more of the IMCs, whose IP
address indicated a location outside the U.S. (n = 4), whose comments indicated they do not
consume the advertised product (n = 7), for whom the video did not play (n = 1), and those in the
distraction conditions who did not accurately articulate the instructions regarding counting
stimuli (n = 4). In total, these criteria resulted in the loss of 47 participants (22.4%), leaving an
effective sample of N = 163. The number of participants assigned to each of the eight cells
ranged from 12 to 29 (as shown in Table 6), with a mean of 20.
Table 6
Pilot Study 2 Condition Assignments, N = 163
Condition

N

%

Single-Play

20

12.3

Double-Play

29

17.8

Single-Play

20

12.3

Double-Play

13

8.0

High Distraction 1
(one color)

Single-Play

26

16.0

Double-Play

12

7.4

High Distraction 2
(two colors)

Single-Play

24

14.7

Double-Play

19

11.7

No Distraction
Low Distraction

Participant demographics. Slightly more than half of the participants were female
(53.4%). Ages ranged from 18 to 72, with a median age of 32. The middle 50% of participants
fell between the ages of 24 and 45. As in Study 1, participants were asked to select all applicable
races; as a result, percentages do not sum to 100%. The sample was predominantly white
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(82.8%), with 14.7% identifying as black or African American, 9.8% Asian, and an additional
1.8% indicating other races (American Indian or Alaska Native, or “Other Race”). Only 6.1% of
participants self-identified as Hispanic or Latino (Mexican or Mexican American, Puerto Rican,
or “Other Hispanic”).
Overall, participants had a high level of education, with 46.6% reporting at least a
bachelor’s degree, and 14.1% holding a graduate degree. Twenty-four percent of participants
indicated they were students in a two-year, four-year, or graduate degree program. Including only
those who indicated no one else can claim them as a dependent (n = 134), 29.8% reported a
household income less than $30,000, 26.1% were between $30,000 and $50,000, 30.6% were
between $50,000 and $100,000, and 8.9% had an income greater than $100,000. Six respondents
(4.5%) declined to state their income.
There were no significant demographic differences between the 47 respondents excluded
from the analysis and the remaining 163 respondents.
Scale creation. The survey instrument included nine items addressing subjective
distractedness. Prior to scale construction, each item was first screened for normality and
excessive multicollinearity. Several items exhibited significant deviations from normality
(mostly negative kurtosis). The distributions of these variables were largely bimodal, with
extreme positive skew in the no distraction condition (as would be expected). The overall
violations of the assumption of normality were not severe, however. A single item with an itemtotal correlation less than .60 (“I was able to follow the arguments the ad put forth”) was
dropped, giving a highly reliable eight-item scale (! = .96). The reliability of the scale was
consistently high across participant sex, age, single- and double-play conditions, and the four
distraction conditions.
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Overview of analyses. In addition to subjective distractedness, the dependent variables
included measures of recall, accuracy in counting the stimuli, and objective distractedness.
Recall of the ad was represented by two dichotomous measures, brand recall and factual
recall. First, open-ended responses identifying the brand were coded as correct if the respondent
mentioned “Continental,” “cook-in-bag,” “cooking bag” (or misspellings thereof). Answers
coded as incorrect included “chicken,” “Tyson,” “bag,” and variations of “I don’t know.” The
factual recall measure was determined by participants’ responses to the five multiple choice
items. Because each item had relatively few incorrect responses (no more than 25%), those who
answered all five items correctly were coded as passing and those who answered fewer than five
items correctly were coded as failing. Additionally, a continuous measure of recall was generated
by summing the number of items answered correctly (brand identification plus multiple choice
items), producing a scale ranging from zero to six. Accuracy was calculated separately for red
and blue stimuli as the absolute value of the discrepancy between the actual and reported number
of stimuli in that particular condition. Additionally, for red stimuli only, two dichotomous
measures of accuracy were generated: (1) no deviation (i.e., exact count) versus any deviation
from the true number, and (2) deviation within one of the true number versus an absolute
deviation of two or more. Objective distractedness was operationalized as the sum of favorable
and unfavorable thoughts (neutral and irrelevant thoughts were not counted), with fewer thoughts
indicating a higher level of distractedness. The distribution of the combined recall variable was
highly negatively skewed, and the subjective and objective distractedness measures were
positively skewed. The original untransformed variables were used in all cases, but
nonparametric tests were applied. The final measures are listed in Appendix D.
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Participation in Pilot Study 1. A total of 27 participants (16.6%) had previously
completed Pilot Study 1. The only dependent variable significantly related to prior participation
was identification of the brand, "2(1) = 4.48, p = .034. Pilot Study 1 participants were more likely
to correctly identify the brand (77.8%) than those who did not participate in the previous pilot
study (55.9%). This difference may have been attributable to practice with the task of identifying
a brand featured in a video ad. Given the relatively small percentage of Study 1 participants in
this sample, these individuals were simply dropped from the analyses of brand recall, rather than
analyzing the data separately.
Recall of ad. Across all conditions, brand recall was 59.5% and factual recall was 60.1%.
Chi-square analyses indicated no significant effect of distraction condition on brand recall. Brand
recall was, however, significantly affected by the number of video plays, "2(1) = 6.75, p = .009.
Participants who viewed the ad twice were more likely to correctly identify the brand (68.3%)
than those who viewed the ad only once (46.1%). There were no significant sex or age
differences in brand recall. For factual recall, the effects of both distraction, "2(3) = 16.04,
p = .001, and video play condition, "2(1) = 5.23, p = .022, were significant. Respondents in the
no distraction condition were more likely to have answered all five multiple choice questions
correctly (81.6%) than those in the low, high distraction single-color, and high distraction twocolor conditions (60.6%, 42.1%, and 51.2% respectively). Similarly, those in the double-play
condition were more likely to have answered the multiple choice items correctly (69.9%) than
those in the single-play condition (52.2%). As with brand recall, there were no significant sex or
age differences.
As shown in Table 7, the nonparametric Kruskall-Wallis test for the effect of distraction
on combined recall was significant, "2(3) = 19.15, p < .001. Post hoc Mann-Whitney U tests
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revealed participants in the two high distraction (one color and two color) conditions had
significantly diminished recall relative to the no distraction condition (p < .001 and p = .002,
respectively). There was no statistically significant difference in recall between the low
distraction and no distraction conditions. There was also a significant effect of video play on
combined recall, U = 2491.0, z = 2.84, p = .004, with better recall in double-play condition
relative to the single-play condition.
Accuracy. The absolute deviation from the true number of stimuli ranged from 0 to 11
for red stimuli, and from 0 to 6 for blue stimuli. Both had a median of 0 (i.e., no deviation).
Nearly one-third (31.9%) of respondents counted the red stimuli incorrectly, but only 16.6%
deviated by more than one from the true count.
As shown in Table 7, the nonparametric Kruskall-Wallis test indicated distraction
condition had a significant effect on absolute accuracy (discrepancy between the reported
number and the true number) in counting red stimuli, "2(3) = 32.55, p < .001. Post hoc MannWhitney U tests revealed each of the three distraction conditions deviated significantly more
(p < .001) from the true count than the no distraction condition, which had no deviation.
Distraction condition was significantly associated with the likelihood of any deviation on red
stimuli, "2(3) = 34.03, p < .001. The no distraction condition had no deviation, while the other
conditions had increasing proportions of respondents with any deviation (low: 39.4%, high onecolor: 44.7%, high two-color: 51.2%). Distraction condition also predicted the likelihood of a
deviation of two or more from the true number, "2(3) = 16.15, p = .001. Video play had no
significant effect on the absolute deviation in red stimuli, and was not associated with the
likelihood of any deviation, or a deviation of two or more.
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As with red stimuli, distraction had a significant effect on absolute accuracy in counting
blue stimuli, "2(3) = 44.37, p < .001. Only the high distraction, two color condition (the sole
condition with any blue stimuli) differed significantly from the no distraction condition,
U = 676.5, z = 4.18, p < .001. Video play also had a significant effect on blue discrepancies,
U = 2895.5, z = 2.33, p = .020; the mean absolute deviation from the true number of blue stimuli
was higher in the double-play condition than the single-play condition.
Objective distractedness. Across all conditions, the total number of favorable and
unfavorable thoughts ranged from 0 to 12 with a median of 3. Thoughts were predominantly
positive. As shown in Table 7, the Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant effect of distraction
on the number of relevant thoughts. A Mann-Whitney U test indicated a significant effect of
video repetition on the number of relevant thoughts, U = 2502.0, z = 2.67, p = .008, with fewer
thoughts listed in the single-play condition than the double-play condition. As in Pilot Study 1,
there was a significant sex difference in the number of relevant thoughts, U = 2551.0, z = 2.31,
p = .021, with female respondents (M = 3.89, SD = 2.11) generating more thoughts than males
(M = 3.11, SD = 1.65). There was no significant association between age and number of
thoughts.
Subjective distractedness. Overall, the mean rating of subjective distractedness was
3.18 (SD = 1.83). As shown in Table 7, the nonparametric tests indicated a statistically significant
effect of distraction, "2(3) = 79.26, p < .001, and each of the three distracted groups differed
significantly from the control group at the p < .001 level. There was also a significant effect of
video play condition on subjective distractedness, U = 2555.0, z = 2.45, p = .014. Participants
who viewed the ad twice rated themselves less distracted than those who viewed it only once.
Subjective distractedness was not significantly associated with participant sex or age.
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Table 7
Mean Ratings (SDs in Parentheses) and Nonparametric Testsa of Distraction and Video Play,
N = 163
Mean Ratings
Combined
Recall

Red
Discrepancy

Blue
Discrepancy

Total
Thoughts

Subjective
Distractedness

p < .001

p < .001

p < .001

n.s.

p < .001

None

5.45
(0.91)

0.00
(0.00)

0.06
(0.32)

3.73
(1.75)

1.35
(0.60)

Low

5.12
(0.82)

0.73***
(1.07)

0.00
(0.00)

3.67
(1.90)

3.76***
(1.55)

High 1

4.66***
(0.99)

1.05***
(2.09)

0.00
(0.00)

2.92
(1.73)

3.95***
(1.62)

High 2

4.84**
(1.07)

1.00**
(1.29)

0.84***
(1.36)

3.72
(2.26)

4.13***
(1.65)

Distraction
Condition

Video Play
Condition

p = .004

n.s.

p = .020

p = .008

p = .014

Single-Play

4.88
(0.95)

0.56
(0.86)

0.08
(0.31)

3.18
(1.70)

3.50
(1.92)

Double-Play

5.23
(1.03)

0.78
(1.80)

0.44
(1.12)

3.96
(2.12)

2.77
(1.63)

a

For distraction effects, Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted, with post hoc Mann-Whitney U tests comparing each
condition to the no distraction condition. For the effects of video play, Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted.
** p < .005, *** p < .001 for post hoc tests of distraction effects (relative to no distraction condition)

Accurate versus inaccurate respondents. It was hypothesized post hoc that counting the
stimuli accurately might have presented a more substantial cognitive burden (i.e., greater
distraction) than counting inaccurately. To examine the relationships between accuracy and the
other dependent variables, participants with any deviation on red stimuli were compared to those
who counted accurately, and significant differences were found for recall, U = 2148.0, z = 2.78,
p = .005, and subjective distractedness, U = 2123.0, z = 2.73, p = .006. Contrary to the expected
relationship, those whose count deviated by at least one from the true number had significantly
poorer recall (M = 4.79, SD = .89) than those who counted accurately (M = 5.15, SD = 1.03), and
reported greater subjective distractedness (M = 3.72, SD = 1.72) than those who counted
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accurately (M = 2.92, SD = 1.83). Respondents with a deviation of two or more differed
significantly from those within one of the true count in the number of relevant thoughts listed,
U = 1241.5, z = 2.71, p = .007. The less accurate respondents generated fewer thoughts
(M = 2.70, SD = 1.68) than their more accurate counterparts (M = 3.69, SD = 1.95). To further
examine the pattern of results, all analyses were run separately for the subgroups of participants
with 100% accuracy on red square counts (n = 111) and those whose counts were within one of
the true number (n = 136). Imposing these more stringent criteria, however, did not alter the
results in any substantive way.
Confounding variables. It is not possible, within the current design, to simultaneously
separate the effect of the number of distraction stimuli from both the average interval between
stimuli and the total time (see Table 5). Within each level of video play (single or double),
examining the influence of distraction condition provides a test of the effect of the absolute
number of stimuli while controlling for overall time, but this test is confounded by variation in
the interval between the stimuli. Similarly, examining the effect of video play within each level
of distraction provides a test of the number of stimuli while controlling for the average interval,
but this test is confounded by variation in overall time. To further examine the effects of the
absolute number of stimuli, overall time, and the average interval between stimuli, a series of
follow-up analyses was conducted.
As shown in Table 8, the low distraction, single-play condition was compared, separately,
to two other conditions—the high distraction one color, single-play condition (shown in the top
row) and the low distraction, double-play condition (shown in the bottom row). The comparison
between the low distraction and high distraction single-play conditions allows a test of the effect
of the number of stimuli (three versus six), while holding the total time constant (30 seconds),

58

though in this case, the number of stimuli is confounded with the average interval between
stimuli (10 versus 5 seconds). Alternatively, the comparison between the low distraction singleand double-play conditions allows a test of the number of stimuli, but this time holding the
average interval constant (10 seconds). In this case, however, the number of stimuli is
confounded with the total time.
Table 8
Tests of Number of Distraction Stimuli Controlling for Total Time and Average Interval Between
Stimuli
Number of Stimuli (Red)
Controlling For

3

6

Total Time
(30 sec.)

Low Distraction, Single-Play
(Interval: 10 sec.)
n = 20

vs.

High Distraction (1 color), Single-Play
(Interval: 5 sec.)
n = 26

Average Interval
(10 sec.)

Low Distraction, Single-Play
(Time: 30 sec.)
n = 20

vs.

Low Distraction, Double-Play
(Time: 60 sec.)
n = 13

Holding the total time constant at 30 seconds, the effect of the number of distraction
stimuli was significant only for the number of thoughts, U = 169.0, z = 2.08, p = .038;
participants in the condition with six distraction stimuli listed fewer thoughts (M = 2.54,
SD = 1.21) than those in the condition with three stimuli (M = 3.65, SD = 1.93). The effect of the
number of stimuli on recall was marginally significant, U = 180.5, z = 1.89, p = .058, with poorer
recall in the six stimuli condition (M = 4.65, SD = .85) than the three stimuli condition
(M = 5.10, SD = .79). Holding the average interval between stimuli constant at 10 seconds, none
of the effects of the number of stimuli was statistically significant.
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Discussion
Across all conditions, the majority of respondents were able to identify the brand and
correctly answer all five multiple choice questions regarding the content of the ad. The
distraction manipulation significantly impaired factual recall, but not brand recall. The effect of
distraction on the combined recall measure suggests recall was diminished in the two high
distraction conditions, relative to the control condition. Distraction also reduced accuracy, with
increasing deviation from the true number of red stimuli as the level of distraction increased. The
results for accuracy in counting blue stimuli were as expected; with the exception of the high
distraction, two color condition (the only condition with blue stimuli) all distraction conditions
had near perfect accuracy on blue counts. The thought listing measure largely failed to
discriminate between the distraction conditions. Only when the total time was controlled did the
effect of the number of distraction stimuli achieve statistical significance. Thus, the thought
listing measure appears have limited utility as a measure of distractedness. That said, selfreported subjective distractedness was strongly influenced by the distraction manipulation;
participants in each of the three distraction conditions reported a higher level of distractedness
than those in the control condition.
Post hoc comparisons between specific conditions suggest the number of distraction
stimuli is highly confounded with the average interval between stimuli. In the present study, the
effect of distraction refers to both the absolute number of stimuli and the interval between
stimuli. The effect of the total time over which the stimuli are presented (i.e., number of video
plays) appears to be distinct.
The number of video views was related to virtually all dependent measures. Participants
who watched the video twice were more likely to pass each of the recall measures and had higher
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combined recall scores. Those assigned to the double-play condition also generated more
relevant thoughts and reported a lower level of subjective distractedness than those in the singleplay condition. Accuracy in counting blue stimuli was reduced in the double-play condition, but
video views had no statistically significant effect on red accuracy. That said, the variances for
both red and blue stimulus counts were significantly higher in the double-play conditions
(p = .004 and p < .001 respectively), suggesting that playing the ad twice introduced more
variability.
Overall, the results of this study suggest the level of distraction strongly influences recall,
accuracy, and perceived distractedness, with the most consistent differences between the two
high distraction conditions and the no distraction condition. Inaccurate counters were more likely
to perform poorly in general, with reduced recall of the ad, fewer relevant thoughts, and a greater
reported level of distractedness. That said, excluding these inaccurate counters did not alter the
results in any substantive way. Viewing the ad twice appears to improve performance in many
ways—enhancing recall, reducing perceived distractedness, and resulting in more relevant
thoughts. However, those who viewed the ad twice had reduced accuracy in blue square counts
and much greater variation in accuracy overall, suggesting the double-play condition may have
introduced some uncertainty with regard to the task of counting stimuli. Based on these findings,
the high distraction, single-color condition was chosen for the distraction condition in the main
study. To maximize cognitive load and simplify the manipulation (i.e., avoid introducing
uncertainty), a decision was made to allow participants to play the ad only once.
Pilot Study 3: Print Ad
A third pilot study was conducted to confirm that the print ad chosen for the vulnerability
manipulation in the main study would be sufficiently convincing. Because the vulnerability
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manipulation involved demonstrating to participants their vulnerability to advertising, its
effectiveness hinged on participants finding the print ad at least somewhat convincing (a value of
3 on a 7-point scale). The manipulation was simply not theorized to work for those who did not
find the ad convincing.
Method
Participants and procedure. Adult participants were recruited from MTurk between
August 16 and 17, 2011. All inclusion criteria remained the same as in the previous pilot studies.
To avoid depleting the pool of potential participants for the main study, an additional criterion
was imposed that individuals must have participated in one or more of the previous pilot studies.
After approximately twenty-one hours, with only 18 responses submitted, this criterion was lifted
to speed the response rate.
Participants were asked to examine a print ad for thirty seconds and form an impression
of it, and then indicate how convincing they found the ad. No demographic information was
collected. The median time to complete this brief survey was 46 seconds. Participants who
clicked “Submit” at the end of the survey were compensated ten cents. A total of N = 43
participants completed the survey, of which 18 had been participants in one or more of the
previous pilot studies, and 25 were new participants.
Stimulus materials. The print stimulus ad was a full-page, color advertisement for
Wendy’s® “Berry Almond Chicken Salad” from Cooking Light magazine (Appendix B). The
image was cropped slightly to fit within the MTurk window without requiring participants to
scroll. Additionally, the brand (Wendy’s) was obscured to minimize the impact of any preexisting
biases regarding the restaurant chain. The ad featured a close-up image of the salad,
accompanied by the following text:
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NEW
BERRY ALMOND CHICKEN SALAD
Now at [redacted], taste the difference fresh can make - with hand-cut strawberries and
plump blueberries, picked at the peak of the season. Served with a tender grilled chicken
breast, eleven kinds of greens, Asiago cheese and roasted almonds. Drizzled with allnatural, fat-free raspberry vinaigrette. Try it today, because our fresh-picked berries only
last as long as summer!
BERRY BERRY GOOD
For a limited time only.
Measures. Participants were asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 (not at all convincing)
to 7 (extremely convincing), “How convincing did you find this ad?” The brief survey instrument
is included in Appendix C.
Results
The print ad received a mean rating of 4.88 (SD = 1.66), with a median of 5. A total of
9.3% of respondents rated the ad less than 3 (somewhat convincing), the threshold value for the
vulnerability manipulation in the main study. There was no significant difference in ratings
between those who had participated in one of the previous pilot studies and those who had not.
The distribution of responses is shown in Table 9.

63

Table 9
Ratings of Print Ad Convincingness, N = 43
Rating

N

%

1

Not at all convincing

4

9.3

2

Slightly convincing

0

0

3

Somewhat convincing

4

9.3

4

Fairly convincing

4

9.3

5

Convincing

13

30.2

6

Very convincing

13

30.2

7

Extremely convincing

5

11.6

1-2 Less than somewhat convincing

4

9.3

3-7 Somewhat convincing or more

39

90.7

43

100.0

TOTAL

Discussion
Given that more than 90% of ratings exceeded the threshold, the print ad was deemed
sufficiently convincing to be used as part of the vulnerability manipulation in the main study.
That said, the manipulation was designed to target only those individuals who deem the print ad
at least somewhat convincing. Based on the results of this pilot study, it was expected that data
from approximately 10% of respondents (i.e., those who rated the print ad less than 3) would
ultimately be excluded from the main study.

64

CHAPTER FOUR: MAIN STUDY HYPOTHESES AND METHOD

The purpose of the main study was to examine the impact of specific barriers to both
motivation (illusions of invulnerability) and processing ability (emotional advertising,
distraction) on a variety of intermediate media literacy outcomes. Three key independent
variables were experimentally manipulated: (1) perceived vulnerability to advertising (control,
demonstrated vulnerability), (2) type of ad (informational, emotional), and (3) viewing
conditions (distraction, no distraction). Additionally, two exemplar ads (i.e., replicates) were
nested within the ad type variable. A fifth independent variable involved counterbalancing the
order of presentation of certain key measures (explained in greater detail later in this chapter).
Relative to the control condition, the demonstrated vulnerability condition was designed
to overcome perceptions of personal invulnerability to advertising, thereby increasing motivation
to engage in thorough processing of subsequent advertising messages. Whereas the vulnerability
manipulation was designed to address a specific motivational barrier to high-effort processing,
the manipulations of ad type and viewing conditions represented more general constraints on
processing ability. Because emotional ads (as defined here) do not have propositional arguments
that the consumer can evaluate, processing ability was expected to be hindered in the emotional
ad condition, relative to informational ad condition. Similarly, the presence of distractions was
expected to impair the ability to thoroughly process the target ad, regardless of ad type.
Hypotheses
Effects of Motivation and Ability
Research question 1a asked how specific barriers to motivation (perceived
invulnerability) and ability (type of ad, distractions) affect intermediate media literacy outcomes.
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These outcomes include cognitions about persuasibility (beliefs about general persuasibility,
perceptions of unique invulnerability), responses to the target ad (perceptions of manipulative
intent, favorable and unfavorable thoughts, perceptions of persuasiveness), and decision-making
variables identified by the MIP model (trust, perceived realism, perceived similarity, desirability,
identification).
Hypothesis 1. The vulnerability manipulation was designed to reduce the motivational
barrier posed by illusions of invulnerability by challenging these beliefs. Consistent with this
expectation, a main effect of vulnerability was hypothesized, such that relative to the control
condition, demonstration of vulnerability enhances perceptions of persuasibility, perceptions of
manipulative intent, and negative thoughts, and reduces perceptions of unique invulnerability,
perceived persuasiveness, trust, and identification with portrayals. No effects of the vulnerability
manipulation were hypothesized for perceived realism or perceived similarity.
Hypothesis 2. Because emotional ads, by definition, do not include propositional
information that one can logically evaluate, emotional ads were expected to pose a barrier to
processing ability relative to informational ads. Consistent with this expectation, a main effect of
ad type was hypothesized, such that relative to informational ads, emotional ads enhance
perceived persuasiveness, trust, perceived realism, perceived similarity, desirability, and
identification, and elicit more positive thoughts. No effects of ad type were hypothesized for
perceptions of persuasibility, invulnerability, or manipulative intent.
Hypothesis 3. Like emotional forms of advertising, distraction was expected to pose a
barrier to processing ability. A main effect of distraction was hypothesized, such that relative to
the control condition, distraction enhances perceived persuasiveness, trust, perceived realism,
perceived similarity, desirability, and identification, and reduces negative thoughts (i.e.,
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counterarguing). No effects of distraction were hypothesized for perceptions of persuasibility,
invulnerability, or manipulative intent.
Research question 1b asked how barriers to motivation (perceptions of invulnerability)
and processing ability (emotional ads, distractions) interact in their effects on media literacy
outcomes.
Hypothesis 4. A two-way interaction between ad type and distraction was hypothesized,
such that distraction has a greater effect on processing of the informational ad, relative to the
emotional ad. This hypothesis was derived from previous research suggesting affective processes
are less susceptible to processing constraints such as cognitive load (e.g., Rose, Roberts, & Rose,
2004; Zajonc, 1984).
Hypotheses 5 and 6. Additional two-way interactions were hypothesized between
manipulated vulnerability and type of ad (Hypothesis 5), and between vulnerability and
distraction (Hypothesis 6), such that the effect of vulnerability is most pronounced when ability
to process the message is already high (informational ad, no distraction). These hypotheses were
based on dual-process research suggesting ability is a prerequisite condition for high-effort
processing.
Mediators and Moderators of Persuasiveness
Research question 2a addressed mediators and moderators of persuasiveness. The
following hypotheses were derived from Sagarin and colleagues’ (2002) finding of negative
associations between manipulated vulnerability (demonstrated versus asserted) and perceived
persuasiveness, as well as between perceptions of undue manipulative intent and persuasiveness.
Hypotheses 7 and 8. The difference in perceived persuasiveness between the control and
demonstrated vulnerability conditions (described under research question 1a) was hypothesized
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to be at least partially mediated by perceptions of persuasibility (Hypothesis 7) and third-person
effects (Hypothesis 8). Specifically, third-person effects were hypothesized to be reduced, and
perceived persuasibility heightened, in the demonstrated vulnerability condition (relative to the
control condition). Third-person effects were hypothesized to be positively associated with
persuasiveness such that those who acknowledge their personal vulnerability find the ad less
persuasive. Similarly, a negative relationship between perceived persuasibility and
persuasiveness was hypothesized. These relationships are shown in Figure 7.
!

Third-person
effects
"!

#!
"!

Demonstrated
vulnerability vs.
control

Persuasiveness

#!

"!
Perceived
persuasibility

Figure 7. The effect of manipulated vulnerability on persuasiveness was hypothesized to be at
least partially mediated by a reduction in perceived invulnerability (i.e., third-person effects) and
increased perceptions of persuasibility.
Hypotheses 9 and 10. Driven by the expectation that perceptions of manipulative intent
would be most influential for those who believe they are vulnerable to such manipulation,
perceptions of persuasibility and perceived invulnerability (i.e., third-person effects) were
hypothesized to moderate the (negative) relationship between perceptions of undue manipulative
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intent and persuasiveness. Specifically, this relationship was hypothesized to be stronger when
perceived persuasibility is high (Hypothesis 9) or third-person effects are low (Hypothesis 10).
Hypothesis 11. Based on Sagarin and colleagues’ finding that cognitive responses
partially mediate the negative relationship between perceptions of manipulative intent and
persuasiveness, it was hypothesized that thought valence would partially mediate this
relationship in the present study!(Figure 8).
!

Thought
Valence
"!

Perceived
Manipulative
Intent

#!

"!

Persuasiveness
!

Figure 8. The negative relationship between perceptions of manipulative intent and
persuasiveness was hypothesized to be partially mediated by a reduction in thought valence (i.e.,
less positivity of thoughts).
Research question 2b asked under what conditions the mediated relationship described
under Hypothesis 11 would be evident (i.e., how is this mediated relationship affected by
variations in ability?).
Hypothesis 12. The degree of mediation by thought valence was hypothesized to vary as
a function of ability, such that the mediated relationship described under Hypothesis 11 is
stronger in the informational ad and no distraction conditions, relative to the emotional and
distracted conditions.
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Method
Participants and Procedure
Adult participants were recruited from MTurk between August 27 and October 12, 2011.
The survey was refreshed (i.e., taken down and reposted as a new HIT) nineteen times over the
course of forty-six days. Each HIT was left open for between 48 and 72 hours. All inclusion
criteria remained the same as in the previous studies, with the additional criterion that individuals
who participated in any of the three pilot studies were not eligible. Those who met these criteria
and chose to participate were randomly assigned to one of thirty-two experimental conditions in
a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2(2) between-subjects nested design. Three of the crossed independent variables
represented different levels of motivation and processing ability: (1) manipulated vulnerability
(demonstrated vulnerability or control), type of ad (informational or emotional), and viewing
conditions (distraction or no distraction). The fourth crossed variable involved counterbalancing
in the measures relating to perceptions of vulnerability (described in greater detail in the
measures section). Finally, four replicates were nested within the ad type variable (two
informational ads, two emotional ads).
Participants received the vulnerability manipulation, followed by exposure to the target
(video) ad, which was either informational or emotional in nature, with two possible target ads
for each type. The print ad used in the vulnerability manipulation was selected based on the
results of Pilot Study 3, whereas the video ads were determined by the results of Pilot Study 1.
Participants were not permitted to go back to view the ad a second time, or pause the ad during
playback. Simultaneous with exposure to the ad, participants in the distraction condition were
directed to complete a cognitive task as described in Pilot Study 2. The level of distraction in the
distracted condition was determined based on the results of Pilot Study 2.
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After viewing the target ad, participants responded to a battery of items constituting the
dependent variables of the present study, followed by basic demographic questions. The median
time to complete the survey, including consent and debriefing procedures, was 13.1 minutes
(90% of respondents took between 7.8 and 23.7 minutes). Those who reached the end of the
survey and clicked “Submit” were compensated 51 cents. A total of N = 1298 participants
completed the survey. The number of responses per day ranged from a high of 81 on the first day
to a low of 5 on day thirty-eight, with a median of 25.
Stimulus Materials
Vulnerability manipulation. The manipulation of perceived vulnerability was based on
Sagarin and colleagues’ (2002) procedure, with some modifications. First, whereas Sagarin and
colleagues chose to focus on inappropriate use of authority as an illegitimate (i.e., manipulative)
persuasive tactic, the present research used two different persuasion tactics (appeals to freshness
and scarcity). The precise nature of the persuasive tactics was not important in the present study.
Rather, the goal was simply to heighten motivation by inducing participants to confront their
beliefs regarding their personal vulnerability to manipulation by advertisers. Second, whereas
Sagarin and colleagues’ intervention included six example ads, the present study had only one.
Their primary intervention focused on teaching a heuristic for distinguishing legitimate from
illegitimate authorities; as such, it was important to ensure that participants learned the rule.
Because the present study did not involve teaching any such heuristic, additional practice was
not deemed necessary. Finally, Sagarin and colleagues manipulated two levels of vulnerability in
addition to their control condition. In the “asserted vulnerability” condition, participants were
simply told they are susceptible to manipulation by advertisers. In the “demonstrated
vulnerability” condition, participants were shown they are susceptible. Because their asserted
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vulnerability condition was not sufficient to motivate resistance to illegitimate ads, this
intermediate condition was not included in the present study.
In the present study, participants in both the demonstrated vulnerability and control
conditions were first instructed to examine a print ad (the Wendy’s® “Berry Almond Chicken
Salad” ad described in Pilot Study 3) and “form an impression of it.” The ad was displayed on
the screen for 30 seconds before transitioning automatically to the next phase of the
manipulation. Next, participants in both conditions were asked to indicate how convincing they
found the ad, on a scale from 1 (not at all convincing) to 7 (extremely convincing). This question
was followed by the open-ended item “What two aspects of the ad were most important in
determining how convincing you found it?” These questions were part of the vulnerability
manipulation, not dependent variables; for participants in the demonstrated vulnerability
condition, responses to these questions served as evidence of their vulnerability to persuasive
tactics in ads.
Next, participants in the demonstrated vulnerability condition saw their previously
committed answer displayed on-screen (bracketed text indicates customization based on
respondents’ answers to the previous questions):
You said you found the ad [not at all to extremely] convincing ([X] on a scale from 1 to
7).
The crux of the vulnerability manipulation consisted of the following text (adapted from Sagarin
et al.):
You may believe advertising messages affect other people, but not you. However, if you
found the ad at least somewhat convincing (3), that shows you let the advertiser
manipulate you with some very common persuasive tactics. The ad was quite subtle in its
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use of these tactics, so if you weren’t paying close attention, they probably slipped right
past your radar.
Following this feedback, demonstrated vulnerability participants received general commentary
on the potential to be manipulated by the particular persuasive tactics used in this ad. Finally,
participants in the vulnerability condition were directed to reconsider their open-ended responses
regarding what they noticed about this ad. The full text of the vulnerability manipulation is
included in the survey instrument (Appendix C).
Instead of receiving customized feedback regarding the potential to be manipulated by
advertisers, participants assigned to the control condition were presented with trivia about berries
(Appendix C). The purpose of this attentional control was to ensure that participants in both
conditions spent about the same amount of time on this phase of the study, before proceeding to
the video ad. Participants in both conditions were given the opportunity to examine the print ad
again before moving on.
Stimulus ads. Based on the results of Pilot Study 1, four Australian video ads (30
seconds in length) were chosen as the stimulus ads for the present study. Two ads (Continental
Cook-in-Bag and Uncle Toby’s Oats) were used to represent an informational approach and two
ads (Abbott’s Village Bakery and Tip Top Bread) were used to represent an emotional approach
(transcripts of all ads can be found in Appendix B). These ads were selected for approximate
equivalence in persuasiveness and message strength. Each participant was assigned to view one
of the four ads, and was allowed to view the ad only once. Participants were not permitted to
control playback.
Distraction stimulus. The distraction stimulus followed the procedures described in Pilot
Study 2, but with only two levels—a control condition and a distracted condition. Based on the
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results of Study 2, the distracted condition consisted of six red squares which appeared
individually for a half-second each at unpredictable locations on the periphery of the video
screen, over the course of the 30 second video. Before proceeding to the video, participants in
the distraction condition were informed that a number of red squares would appear on their
computer screen around the video. They were directed to do their best to focus on the ad while
also keeping an accurate count of the squares (see Appendix C for full instructions).
Measures
Thought valence. The valence of thoughts generated in response to the target ad (i.e.,
cognitive responses) was measured using the thought-listing task described in Pilot Studies 1 and
2. Thought valence was calculated as the number of favorable thoughts minus the number of
unfavorable thoughts; a positive score indicates positive thoughts were the dominant response,
while a negative score is indicative of counterarguing.
Perceived persuasiveness. Based on Pilot Study 1, four items from Campbell’s (1995)
persuasiveness scale were used again in the present study: “If you were to use this type of
product in the future, how likely are you to choose this particular brand?” and “I personally
thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was __” (bad-good, pleasant-unpleasant, low
quality-high quality). Three additional items tested in Pilot Study 1 were used to improve the
measure’s face validity in relation to the construct of perceived persuasiveness (beyond overall
evaluation of the ad): “I found this commercial __” (persuasive-unpersuasive, convincingunconvincing, not influential-influential).
MIP variables. Previous research on the Message Interpretation Process (MIP) model
(e.g., Austin et al., 2002; 2006) has produced validated measures of trust, perceived realism,
perceived similarity, desirability, and identification, each of which has demonstrated reasonably
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high reliability among either adolescents or college students. The present study utilized
variations on these measures; several of the existing items were adapted for use with adult
populations (e.g., “popular” was changed to “well-liked”), and in some cases, additional items
were included to enhance reliability. Unless otherwise stated, all items described below were
rated on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Previous MIP research has identified two dimensions to skepticism: trust (affective) and
perceived realism (cognitive). Austin and colleagues (2002) used a single item (“This ad can be
trusted”) to measure the construct of trust among college students. To enhance the reliability of
this trust measure, two new items were added: “I am suspicious of what the advertiser was trying
to do in this commercial” (reversed) and “This commercial is misleading” (reversed). Austin and
colleagues (2002) used a single item (“This ad seems realistic”) to measure specific perceived
realism (i.e., in relation to a specific ad) among college students. Their study also included a
four-item measure of global perceptions of realism (i.e., in relation to advertising in general;
! = .76). In the present study, the single item was combined with a slightly revised version of
Austin and colleagues’ global realism measure to generate a three-item specific realism scale:
“This commercial seems realistic,” “This commercial is an accurate reflection of real life,” and
“This commercial is a realistic reflection of how people behave.”
To address perceived similarity, Austin and colleagues (2006) used two items: “People in
this ad are like people I know” and “People in this ad are like people in my family.” This twoitem measure demonstrated only moderate reliability (pre-intervention r = .48, post intervention
r = .28) among adolescents. The existing two items were rephrased and four additional items
were added to generate a six-item scale: “The characters in this commercial remind me of people
I know,” “The characters in this commercial are like my family members,” “I know people
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similar to those portrayed in this commercial,” “The characters in this commercial are similar to
me,” “The characters in this commercial are like my friends,” and “This commercial accurately
reflects how people like me act.”
Austin and colleagues (2006) assessed identification with a three-item measure, which
demonstrated high reliability (pre-intervention ! = .80, post-intervention ! = .76) among
adolescents. Minor wording modifications were made to the existing items to produce the
following five-item scale: “I would like to be like the characters portrayed in this commercial,”
“The characters in this commercial do things I would like to do,” “I would like to look like
people in this commercial,” “It would be nice to be as good looking as people in this
commercial,” and “It would be nice to live like the characters in this commercial.”
Finally, Austin and colleagues (2007) highlighted the distinction between personally
finding portrayals desirable and awareness that advertisers often use desirability-inducing tactics.
To more accurately measure personal perceptions of desirability, a variation on Austin and
colleagues’ (2002) four-item desirability scale (! = .77 among college students) was used. These
items were slightly revised to more clearly tap into how the respondent personally feels about the
ad, as opposed to understanding how one should feel about the ad. On the recommendation of
Austin (personal communication, August 9, 2011), a semantic-differential format was used to
avoid biasing respondents toward greater desirability: “I found this commercial to be
__” (appealing-unappealing), “I found the characters in this commercial to be __” (unattractiveattractive, bored-having fun, happy-unhappy), and “The characters in this commercial seem like
they would be __ by their peers” (disliked-well-liked).
Perceived manipulative intent. Perceptions of undue manipulative intent were measured
using a slightly modified version of an existing six-item scale (Campbell, 1995). Sagarin and
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colleagues (2002) reported reliabilities for this scale ranging from ! = .87 to ! = .95 among
college students, depending on the target ad. The revised scale included four Likert items
adapted from the original scale, rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): “The way
this commercial tries to persuade people seems acceptable to me” (reversed), “The commercial
tried to manipulate the audience in ways that I don’t like,” “This commercial seemed to be trying
to inappropriately control the consumer,” “The commercial tried to be persuasive without being
overly manipulative” (reversed). The scale also included two semantic-differential items (“I
found this commercial to be __” (fair-unfair, sneaky-straightforward).)
Perceived persuasibility. Eight items from Briñol, Rucker, Tormala, and Petty’s (2004)
resistance to persuasion scale were used to measure perceptions of general persuasibility.
Shakarchi and Haugtvedt (2004) validated the full measure with college students (! = .82), and
reported high levels of convergent and discriminant validity with several other measures of
resistance-related constructs. All items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree): “I am strongly committed to my own beliefs” (reversed), “My own beliefs are
very clear” (reversed), “I find my opinions to be changeable,” “It could be said that I am likely to
shift my attitudes,” “I often vary or alter my views when I discover new information,” “After
forming an impression of something, it’s often hard for me to modify that impression”
(reversed), “My ideas are very stable and remain the same over time” (reversed), and “I have
often changed my opinions.”
Third-person effects. To measure perceptions of unique invulnerability (i.e., thirdperson effects), researchers typically use pairs of items, with one item addressing perceived
media influence on oneself, and the other addressing perceived media influence on others
(Perloff, 2002). The present study included five item-pairs, addressing two different types of
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third-person effects: (1) those relating to the effects of the specific target ad (single item-pair),
and (2) those relating to the influence of advertising and media more generally (four item-pairs).
The items used to measure third-person effects in relation to the target ad (i.e., ad-specific third
person effects) were: “How much do you think the video ad (commercial) you just watched
affected your opinion about the product?” and “How much do you think the video ad
(commercial) you just watched would affect most people’s opinions about the product?” The
following items addressed third-person effects in relation to general media influence (bracketed
text indicates alternate wording for ratings of oneself versus others): “Media messages influence
the way [I/people] think about the world,” “[My/People’s] purchasing decisions are often
influenced by what [I/they] see in ads,” “[My/People’s] behavior is influenced by what [I/they]
see in ads,” and “I don’t think advertising affects [me/people] much at all” (reversed). All items
were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). To generate an
index of the magnitude of third-person effects, “self” ratings were subtracted from “other”
ratings for each item pair. Positive scores indicate the existence of a third-person effect—the
perception that others are more influenced than oneself.
The majority of research (e.g., Perloff) suggests question wording and order do not
influence these effects. Nonetheless, order of the self and other items was counterbalanced, and
the two sets were split up to reduce the potential of anchoring effects (one set appeared before
Briñol et al.’s resistance to persuasion scale, one set appeared after).
Distractedness. Four of the nine items tested in Pilot Study 2 were used to assess
subjective distractedness during the video ad: “I was not able to give the commercial my full
attention,” “I was able to concentrate on the commercial” (reversed), “I was able to focus on the
commercial the entire time” (reversed), and “I had trouble following along with the
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commercial.” As in Pilot Study 2, the total number of favorable and unfavorable thoughts and
recall of the ad were used as proxy measures of objective distractedness. Two dichotomous
measures of recall (product recall and brand recall) were generated from a single open ended
item asking participants to identify the brand featured in the ad. Product recall was coded as
correct if the respondent mentioned the product category (e.g., bread, oats or oatmeal), whereas
brand recall was coded as correct if the respondent mentioned one or more words from the brand
name (e.g., Continental, Abbott’s) and correctly identified the product category. Because four
different ads were used in the main study, it was not feasible to include multiple choice questions
pertaining to the target ad as a recall measure. Finally, as in Pilot Study 2, participants in all
conditions were asked to indicate how many stimuli they counted during the video ad6, as a
measure of accuracy in relation to the distraction manipulation.
Additional measures. Participants were asked to identify any dietary restrictions that
would have rendered the product featured in the video ad inedible or extremely unappealing to
them, including vegetarianism, veganism, or a gluten-free diet. In addition to the standard
demographic items (sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, student status, income, and state),
participants were asked a series of questions about their level of familiarity and experience with
media literacy. First, all participants were asked “How familiar would you say you are with the
concept of media literacy?” (I don’t know what media literacy is, not at all familiar, a little bit
familiar, moderately familiar, quite familiar, extremely familiar). Those who indicated they are at
least a little bit familiar were asked an open-ended question, “What does media literacy mean to
you?” as well as “Have you ever had any formal education or training in media literacy?”

6

Participants were informed that “some people were asked to keep count of a number red squares” and told: “If you
do not remember seeing any red squares, you can enter 0.”
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Finally, those who indicated they have formal education or training were asked to select from a
number of options describing their training in media literacy.
Instructional manipulation checks. Two instructional manipulation checks were hidden
in the measures to trip up bots, as well as respondents who were rushing through the survey or
otherwise not closely attending to the questions. The item “This commercial is an ad, but please
ignore this statement and instead choose the ‘moderately disagree’ option” was embedded in the
MIP items, and “My beliefs are correct, but please ignore this statement and instead choose the
‘slightly disagree’ option” was embedded in the items addressing perceived persuasibility.
The full survey instrument is included in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAIN STUDY RESULTS

Data Preparation
Beginning with a total sample of N = 1298, the data were screened for issues related to
quality, technical problems with the online survey mechanism, and univariate outliers prior to
conducting the analyses. A total of 147 participants (11.3%) were excluded for failing at least one
of the two instructional manipulation checks. Of these, 88 failed one question and 59 failed both.
Because the vulnerability manipulation was contingent on participants finding the print ad at
least somewhat convincing (3 on a scale from 1 to 7), 134 participants who rated the print ad 1
(not at all convincing) or 2 (slightly convincing) were excluded (10.3%). Responses were also
excluded for any of the following reasons: IP address indicated a location outside the U.S.
(n = 39); the participant reported dietary restrictions pertaining to the product shown in the video
ad (n = 61)7; technical errors affecting the distractions (n = 25), video ad (n = 2), or print ad
(n = 3); or the participant reported having worked or been otherwise involved in advertising,
marketing, or media literacy education (n = 7).
Although participants were allowed to take up to 60 minutes, 90% fell within a relatively
small range from 7.8 and 23.7 minutes, with a median time of 13.1 minutes. The validity of the
results could potentially be compromised by participants who rushed through the survey,
responding somewhat haphazardly, as well as those who became distracted by external stimuli.
Although most of the rushed responders should have been caught by the instructional
manipulation checks, a decision was made to additionally exclude participants who took an
unusually short or long time to complete the survey. Because the time distribution was highly
7

Respondents were asked to indicate if they had any dietary restrictions relevant to the ad they saw, including
vegetarianism, veganism, or a gluten-free diet. Vegetarians and vegans who were assigned to Continental Cook-inBag (chicken) were excluded, as well as vegans and gluten-free respondents assigned to either of the two bread ads.
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positively skewed, it was deemed inappropriate to use a number of standard deviations from the
mean as the basis for exclusion. Instead, the top and bottom 2.5% were excluded; these
parameters resulted in the exclusion of 64 participants who took less than 6.9 minutes or longer
than 27.6 minutes. Of these, 44 (68.8%) were already being excluded for the various reasons
described above. Thus, imposing these limits on the time to complete the survey resulted in a
loss of only 20 additional participants.
Finally, univariate outliers on the non-Likert variables (age, thought valence, accuracy in
counting the stimuli) were identified, using a z-score with an absolute value greater than 3.29 as
the threshold. There were six outliers on the age variable, ranging from 74 to 99; the next oldest
respondent was 67. The thought valence variable had a single outlier, with a score of 19 (19
favorable thoughts and no unfavorable thoughts). The next highest score was 12, and the
minimum was -9. To identify outliers on the accuracy variable, the data were first split by
distraction condition and z-scores were calculated separately within each condition. There were
no univariate outliers in the distraction condition, with counts ranging from zero to ten stimuli.
The no distraction condition had eight outliers, corresponding to counts of five or more stimuli.
All told, these criteria resulted in the exclusion of 389 participants (30.0%), leaving an effective
sample of N = 909. The number of participants per cell ranged from 19 to 43, with a mean of
28.4; the distribution of participants across conditions is shown in Table 10.
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Table 10
Main Study Condition Assignments, N = 909
Motivation

Distraction

Ad Type

Ad
Continental

Informational
Uncle Toby’s
No
Abbott’s
Emotional
Tip Top
Control
Continental
Informational
Uncle Toby’s
Yes
Abbott’s
Emotional
Tip Top
Continental
Informational
Uncle Toby’s
No
Abbott’s
Emotional
Tip Top
Vulnerability
Continental
Informational
Uncle Toby’s
Yes
Abbott’s
Emotional
Tip Top
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Order

N

%

Self first

30

3.3

Other first

32

3.5

Self first

23

2.5

Other first

32

3.5

Self first

31

3.4

Other first

30

3.3

Self first

27

3.0

Other first

21

2.3

Self first

28

3.1

Other first

36

4.0

Self first

28

3.1

Other first

26

2.9

Self first

25

2.8

Other first

32

3.5

Self first

34

3.7

Other first
Self first

27
33

3.0
3.6

Other first

22

2.4

Self first

21

2.3

Other first

34

3.7

Self first

19

2.1

Other first

43

4.7

Self first

26

2.9

Other first

24

2.6

Self first

35

3.9

Other first

28

3.1

Self first

29

3.2

Other first

26

2.9

Self first

30

3.3

Other first

23

2.5

Self first

27

3.0

Other first

27

3.0

Participant Demographics
Of the effective sample (after excluding poor quality data and univariate outliers) of
N = 909, the majority of participants were female (64.0%), with 34.5% male. Thirteen
respondents (1.4%) declined to state their sex. The sample was somewhat younger than in the
pilot studies. Ages ranged from 18 to 67, with a median age of 28. The middle 50% of
participants fell between the ages of 23 and 38. Nine respondents (.9%) did not list their age. As
in the pilot studies, participants were instructed to select all applicable races. The sample was
predominantly white (83.9%), with 6.3% identifying as black or African American, 7.5%
identifying as Asian, and an additional 5.4% indicating other races (American Indian or Alaska
Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or “Other Race”). Only 7.8% of participants selfidentified as Hispanic or Latino, more than half of whom were Mexican or Mexican American.
Respondents had a high level of education overall (though somewhat lower than in the
pilot studies), with 44.2% reporting at least a bachelor’s degree, and 11.1% holding a graduate
degree. Three respondents (.3%) did not indicate their level of education. Twenty-eight percent
of participants indicated they are currently students in a two-year, four-year, or graduate degree
program. Selecting only those who indicated no one else can claim them as a dependent
(n = 700), 34.9% reported a household income less than $30,000, 25.3% were between $30,000
and $50,000, 27.7% were between $50,000 and $100,000, and 5.9% had an income greater than
$100,000. Forty-four respondents (6.3% of those who claimed non-dependent status) declined to
state their income.
Forty-eight U.S. states were represented (there were no respondents from North Dakota
or Rhode Island), as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The most highly
represented states were California (9.6%), Texas (7.9%), Florida (6.5%), New York (5.8%) and
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Illinois (5.0%). Together, these five states accounted for more than one-third of all responses. Ten
respondents (1.1%) did not list a state.
When asked about their familiarity with the concept of media literacy, nearly two-thirds
of respondents (60.9%) indicated they “don’t know what media literacy is” or were “not at all
familiar.” Seventeen percent were a little bit familiar, with 13.0% rating themselves “moderately
familiar,” and only 8.7% indicating they were “quite” or “extremely” familiar. Of those who
stated they were at least a little bit familiar with media literacy (n = 355), only 13.8% reported
having formal education or training in media literacy, while 20.1% stated they have read or
learned about media literacy on their own, and 4.2% learned about media literacy at home as
children. Of those who indicated some sort of formal education or training (n = 49), the vast
majority (83.7%) reported learning about media literacy in college or post-secondary education,
with 24.5% learning about media literacy in junior high or high school, and 16.3% gaining
familiarity through professional development.
The 389 excluded respondents differed significantly from the remaining sample of 909 by
sex and education. Males were more likely to be excluded (35.3%) than females (26.1%),
"2(1) = 11.97, p < .001. Specifically, males were more likely to have incorrectly answered at least
one of the two instructional manipulation checks (14.0%) than females (9.1%); the sex difference
was particularly pronounced for those who failed both questions (males: 7.0%; females: 2.8%).
Males were also more likely to have an IP address indicating a location outside the U.S. (6.4%)
than females (1.0%). In fact, 79.5% of those with an IP address outside the U.S. were male. In
terms of education, excluded respondents were significantly more likely to report having a
graduate degree (17.0%) than included respondents (11.1%), "2(1) = 8.24, p < .001. Although
none of the individual criteria for exclusion exhibited significant differences by education, those
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with a graduate degree were slightly more likely to have failed at least one instructional
manipulation check, rated the print ad less than somewhat convincing, had an IP address outside
the U.S., or reported dietary restrictions pertaining to the video ad.
Scale Construction
The dependent measures included a total of 57 scaled (i.e., Likert or semanticdifferential) items. Twenty-two items were derived from Austin and colleagues’ (e.g., Austin et
al., 2002; 2006) Message Interpretation Process measures: trust (three items), perceived realism
(three items), perceived similarity (six items), desirability (five items), and identification (five
items). Seven items pertained to the ad’s persuasiveness, six measured perceptions of undue
manipulative intent, and eight items addressed perceptions of one’s general persuasibility. Four
items were used to assess subjective distractedness. Ten items (five self-other pairs) were used to
generate the measures of third-person effects. Third-person effects in relation to the target ad
were measured by a single item-pair, whereas four item-pairs addressed third-person effects
pertaining to general media influence.
Prior to scale construction, each item was first screened for normality. Although several
items exhibited significant skew, examination of the distributions revealed the violations were
by-and-large not severe. Three items with extreme levels of skew were dropped. These included
two perceived persuasibility items with positive skew (“I am strongly committed to my own
beliefs” and “My own beliefs are very clear”) and one negatively skewed desirability item (“I
found the characters in this commercial to be [happy-unhappy]”). From the remaining 54 items,
eleven scales were constructed based on the hypothetical constructs, as described in the measures
section. The correlations among these scales are shown in Table 11, with reliabilities along the
diagonal.
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Table 11
Matrix of Correlations Among Scales, N = 909a
Scale
1

Persuasiveness (7)

2

Trust (3)

3

Manip. Intent (6)

4

Realism (3)

5

Similarity (6)

6

Identification (5)

7

Desirability (4)

8

Persuasibility (6)

9

Ad-spec. TPE (2)b

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.91

.55

.49

.53

.50

.54

.67

.02

-.12

-.15

-.13

.78

.74

.60

.40

.33

.45

-.03

-.12

-.09

-.13

.89

.50

.38

.36

.50

.02

-.07

-.06

-.09

.88

.71

.49

.47

-.01

-.03

-.10

-.11

.93

.68

.53

-.01

-.08

-.14

-.06

.88

.65

.01

-.09

-.17

.03

.76

.03

-.03

-.05

-.13

.82

-.05

-.17

.02

---

.16

.05

.85

-.09

10 General TPE (8)b
11

Distractedness (4)

.90

a

The number of items comprising each scale is shown in parentheses. Values along the diagonal represent scale
reliabilities. Shaded cells indicate scale intercorrelations that approach or exceed the maximum expected value
(calculated as the product of the reliabilities of the corresponding scales). The dashed region includes seven scales
exhibiting considerable overlap.
b Ad-specific and general third-person effects were measured by difference-score indices generated from pairs of
items (i.e., two items equals a single index). The ad-specific third person effects measure, with only one index, does
not have a reliability.

All scales were highly reliable, ranging from ! = .76 to ! = .93. The measures of
perceived persuasibility, ad-specific third-person effects, general third-person effects, and
subjective distractedness shared little variance with the other scales. However, the first seven
scales in Table 11 (persuasiveness, trust, manipulative intent, realism, similarity, identification,
and desirability) exhibited considerable overlap. The relationship between trust and manipulative
intent was particularly strong (r = .74), exceeding the maximum expected value of r = .69. Based
on the degree of intercorrelation, along with acceptable face validity, a decision was made to
consolidate these two scales into a single measure of trust (or distrust). Perceived similarity was
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also strongly associated with both realism and identification, and desirability was highly
correlated with identification and persuasiveness. Given the degree of overlap among these
measures, the 34 items comprising the remaining six scales (persuasiveness, realism, similarity,
identification, desirability, and the consolidated distrust/manipulative intent scale) were
submitted to an exploratory factor analysis to evaluate whether additional consolidation was
justified.
Factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin measure of sampling adequacy had a value of
.952, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, "2(561) = 23110.84, p < .001, indicating the
strength of relationships among the variables was significantly strong to conduct a factor
analysis. With principal axis factoring (PAF) as the extraction technique, all factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted, and direct oblimin (oblique) rotation was performed.
A five-factor solution was produced, explaining 61.6% of the variance of the 34 items. Although
the majority of communalities exceeded .50, several items had low communalities or loaded on
two or even three factors. For these reasons, seven additional items were dropped: one
persuasiveness item (“I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was
[pleasant-unpleasant]”), three distrust items (“This ad can be trusted,” “The commercial tried to
be persuasive without being overly manipulative,” and “The way this commercial tries to
persuade people seems acceptable to me”), and three desirability items (“I found the characters
in this commercial to be [bored-having fun],” “I found this commercial to be [appealingunappealing],” and “The characters in this commercial seem like they would be [disliked-wellliked] by their peers”).
The factor analysis was run again with the same constraints, but excluding the seven
items noted above. This time, a four-factor solution was produced, with 63.4% of variance
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explained for the 27 items. Substantial item-complexity remained, particularly among the
identification items. The factor analysis was run a third time after dropping four more items: one
from the realism scale (“This commercial seems realistic”) and three from the identification scale
(“I would like to be like the characters portrayed in this commercial,” “The characters in this
commercial do things I would like to do,” and “It would be nice to live like the characters in this
commercial”). The remaining 23 items included only two of the original perceived realism items,
two identification items, and one desirability item. The resulting four-factor solution provided
the best fit, with 65.0% of variance explained and virtually all communalities exceeding .50,
though there was still some item-complexity. The factors and loadings generated by the fourfactor oblique solution are shown in Table 12. For interpretive clarity, loadings less than .50 are
not shown.
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Table 12
Factor Loading Table with Communalities (h2) for Four-Factor Solution with PAF Extraction
and Direct Oblimin Rotation, N = 909
F1

F2

F3

F4

h2

The characters in this commercial are like my friends

.846

---

---

---

.729

This commercial accurately reflects how people like me act

.835

---

.503

---

.716

The characters in this commercial remind me of people I know

.834

---

---

---

.702

I know people similar to those portrayed in this commercial

.832

---

---

---

.695

The characters in this commercial are similar to me

.793

---

---

---

.639

This commercial is a realistic reflection of how people behave

.790

---

---

---

.639

The characters in this commercial are like my family members

.780

---

---

---

.610

This commercial is an accurate reflection of real life

.719

---

---

---

.578

The commercial tried to manipulate the audience in ways that I don’t like

---

.837

---

---

.703

This commercial seemed to be trying to inappropriately control the
consumer
I found this commercial to be [fair-unfair]

---

.829

---

---

.698

---

.801

---

---

.658

I found this commercial to be [sneaky-straightforward]*

---

.780

---

---

.611

I am suspicious of what the advertiser was trying to do in this commercial

---

.700

---

---

.498

This commercial is misleading

---

.689

---

.493

I found this commercial [persuasive-unpersuasive]*

---

---

.879

---

.773

I found this commercial [convincing-unconvincing]*

---

---

.861

---

.742

I found this commercial [not influential-influential]

---

---

.824

---

.680

If you were to use this type of product in the future, how likely are you to
choose this particular brand?

---

---

.791

---

.626

I personally thought the brand featured in the commercial was [bad-good]

---

---

.750

---

.566

I personally thought the brand featured in the commercial was [low qualityhigh quality]

---

---

.678

---

.465

It would be nice to be as good looking as people in this commercial

---

---

---

.941

.888

I would like to look like people in this commercial

---

---

---

.906

.829

I found the characters in this commercial to be [unattractive-attractive]

---

---

---

.609

.417

* Item reverse coded
Total Percent Variance: 65.0%
Factor labels:
F1
Perceived realism/similarity
F2
Distrust/perceived manipulative intent
F3
Perceived persuasiveness
F4
Perceived attractiveness
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The results of the factor analysis supported consolidating the realism and similarity items
into a single scale (Factor 1). Factor 2 included the two remaining items from the original trust
scale, along with those addressing perceptions of undue manipulative intent. Factor 3 included
the remaining six persuasiveness items. Finally, Factor 4, with two of the original identification
items and one of the original desirability items, could more accurately be described as addressing
the attractiveness of the characters in the ad.
Final scales. The scales derived from the factor analysis were highly reliable
(! = .86 to ! = .94). The results of the factor analysis lead to some strong recommendations,
including dropping items with low loadings on their respective factors or large cross-loadings
(including several of the desirability items). That said, a great deal of information might be lost
by allowing the results of the factor analysis to drive scale construction. To avoid this situation,
the results of the factor analysis were balanced with a more theory-driven scale construction
approach. The attractiveness scale recommended by the factor analysis was retained as a
replacement for the theoretical desirability construct, but realism and similarity were kept as
separate scales, as proposed by the MIP model. The previously dropped realism item (“This
commercial seems realistic”) was brought back to give this scale three items. Finally, the three
identification items dropped during the factor analysis were reinstated as an additional scale,
despite a high degree overlap with attractiveness and similarity. The correlations between each of
these six final scales, along with the previously discussed persuasibility, ad-specific and general
third-person effects, and distractedness measures, are shown in Table 13.
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Table 13
Descriptives and Matrix of Correlations Among Final Scales, N = 909a
Scale

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.89

-.49

.54

.52

.60

.40

.02

-.12

-.16

-.13

.90

-.52

-.36

-.33

-.25

.01

.11

.06

.12

.86

.71

.54

.33

-.01

-.03

-.10

-.11

.93

.70

.50

-.01

-.08

-.14

-.06

.87

.62

.01

-.07

-.16

.02

.86

.00

-.07

-.12

-.00

.82

-.05

-.17

.02

---

.16

.05

.85

-.09

1

Persuasiveness (6)

4.44

1.33

2

Distrust (6)

5.21

1.22

3

Realism (3)

3.88

1.53

4

Similarity (6)

3.41

1.47

5

Identification (3)

4.12

1.57

6

Attractiveness (3)

4.21

1.41

7

Persuasibility (6)

4.05

1.01

8

Ad-spec. TPE (2)b

0.51

1.51

9

General TPE (8)b

1.80

1.37

2.29

1.55

10 Distractedness (4)

.90

a

The number of items comprising each scale is shown in parentheses. Values along the diagonal represent scale
reliabilities.
b Ad-specific and general third-person effects were measured by difference-score indices generated from pairs of
items (i.e., two items equals a single index). The ad-specific third person effects measure, with only one index, does
not have a reliability.

The reliabilities of all scales were consistently high (ranging from ! = .76 to ! = .94)
across participant sex, age, experimental conditions, and for the final sample versus those
participants excluded for various reasons.
Dependent Variables
In addition to the ten scales described above (and shown in Table 13), the dependent
variables included thought valence, calculated as the total number of favorable thoughts minus
unfavorable thoughts. Values on this variable ranged from -9 to 12, with a median of 2
(M = 1.79, SD = 3.01). With the exception of the subjective distractedness measure, all scales
were approximately normally distributed. As in Pilot Study 2, the distribution of subjective
distractedness was highly positively skewed and approximately bimodal, with ratings clustered at
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the extreme low end of the scale in the no distraction condition (the distraction condition had
greater variability in ratings). A square root transformation did little to improve the distribution
of this variable. Because this measure was only intended to be used as a check on the distraction
manipulation, nonparametric tests were used for this purpose. The final measures are listed in
Appendix D.
Manipulation Checks and Order Effects
Because the ad type distinction (informational versus emotional ads) was adequately
covered in Pilot Study 1, the present study did not include a manipulation check on this variable.
Pilot Study 2 examined the effect of varying the level of distraction, but the results were
somewhat ambiguous, particularly for the objective distractedness measure. As such, the present
study included a secondary check on the distraction manipulation (i.e., the effects of distraction
on recall, total thoughts, and subjective distractedness). Finally, although Pilot Study 3 verified
the convincingness of the print ad used as part of the vulnerability manipulation, it did not
address the effectiveness of the manipulation itself. The vulnerability manipulation was designed
to operate by reducing third-person effects regarding media influence, thereby increasing
motivation to process the video ad more thoroughly. In the present study, the two measures of
third-person effects (ad-specific and general) were used as a check on the vulnerability
manipulation.
Distraction. The results of the manipulation check on the distraction variable were
consistent with Pilot Study 2. Chi-square analyses revealed significant effects of distraction on
both brand and product recall. Participants in the distraction condition were nearly twice as likely
to incorrectly identify the product category (8.2%) than those in the no distraction condition
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(4.2%), "2(1) = 6.19, p = .013. Similarly, those in the distraction condition were more likely to
incorrectly identify the brand (76.8%) than those in the no distraction condition (71.0%),
"2(1) = 3.98, p = .046. There was extensive variation in brand recall across ads, ranging from
9.8% for Continental Cook-in-Bag to 41.8% for Tip Top Bread. Upon further examination, the
effect of distraction on brand recall was evident only in the Tip Top Bread condition,
"2(1) = 9.49, p = .002. Among participants assigned to this ad, more than half of those in the no
distraction condition (53.1%) correctly identified the brand, versus 32.2% of those in the
distraction condition.
Because the distributions of total thoughts and subjective distractedness were positively
skewed, nonparametric Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted for these variables. The effect of
distraction condition on total thoughts barely achieved significance, U = 95404.0, z = 2.01,
p = .044. Participants in the no distraction condition listed a median of 4 thoughts, while those in
the distraction condition listed a median of 3. Distraction condition had a significant impact on
subjective distractedness, U = 45832.0, z = 14.98, p < .001, such that those in the distraction
condition rated themselves more distracted (median = 3.0) than those in the no distraction
condition (median = 1.0). It is noteworthy that the standard deviation in the distraction condition
(1.70) was twice that in the no distraction condition (0.84); the no distraction condition had very
little variation in ratings of distractedness.
Limiting the sample to those who counted the red stimuli within two of the actual number
(n = 840) did not alter the results for subjective distractedness, but did strengthen the effect of
distraction on total relevant thoughts, U = 79675.0, z = 2.38, p = .017. The medians in each
condition remained the same, however. The proportions of respondents who correctly identified
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the product and brand in each condition remained approximately the same, but the overall effect
of distraction on brand recall was rendered non-significant.
Vulnerability. Before conducting checks on the vulnerability manipulation, the relevant
dependent variables were first examined for potential order effects. The order of presentation of
the self and other items used to generate the measures of third-person effects was
counterbalanced in the survey instrument, with the perceived persuasibility items inserted
between the two sets. There were no significant order effects on any of the relevant variables.
To confirm the existence of third-person effects, paired t-tests were conducted to compare
self and other ratings on both the ad-specific and general measures. The results indicate highly
significant overall third-person effects on both measures. Participants rated others more affected
by the specific target ad (M = 4.50, SD = 1.27) than themselves (M = 4.00, SD = 1.71),
t(908) = 10.08, p < .001. The third-person effect was particularly pronounced for perceptions of
general media influence, t(908) = 39.03, p < .001. Others were perceived to be more influenced
by media messages in general (M = 5.94, SD = .78) than oneself (M = 4.13, SD = 1.37).
Finally, to examine the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on third-person effects,
the self-rating was subtracted from the corresponding other-rating, generating five indices of
third-person effects. The four indices pertaining to general media influence were consolidated
into a single scale, as described previously. The vulnerability manipulation did not affect the
general media influence measure or perceived persuasibility, but had a significant effect on the
ad-specific measure of third-person effects, t(846.1) = 3.55, p < .001. The effect was opposite to
the hypothesized direction, however, such that third-person effects were more pronounced in the
vulnerability condition (M = 0.68, SD = 1.67) than the control condition (M = 0.33, SD = 1.31).
This effect was entirely attributable to ratings of the ad’s influence on oneself, t(907) = 4.26,
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p < .001. Relative to the control condition, the vulnerability manipulation reduced, rather than
increased, respondents’ beliefs that they were influenced by the target ad. Mean self and other
ratings on the ad-specific measure in each condition are shown in Table 14, with standard
deviations in parentheses.
Table 14
Mean Self and Other Ratings on Ad-Specific Measures (SDs in Parentheses), N = 909
Self

Others

Control

4.23 (1.69)

4.56 (1.27)

Vulnerability

3.75 (1.71)

4.44 (1.26)

Effects of Motivation and Ability
The first two research questions (1a and 1b) asked how specific barriers to motivation
and ability affect a variety of variables conceptualized as intermediate media literacy outcomes,
and how these barriers might interact in their effects. To address these questions, a multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted with ten dependent variables:
(1) persuasiveness, (2) distrust, (3) perceived realism, (4) perceived similarity, (5) identification,
(6) attractiveness, (7) perceived persuasibility, (8) ad-specific third-person effects, (9) general
media influence third-person effects, and (10) thought valence. The independent variables were
vulnerability condition (control or demonstrated vulnerability), distraction condition (distracted
or not distracted), ad type (informational or emotional), and ad replicate (two exemplar ads of
each type), which was nested within the ad type variable. Although there was no evidence of
order effects on the relevant dependent variables, order was included as a covariate, along with
participant sex and age. Two-way interactions among the three key independent variables
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(vulnerability, ad type, and distraction) were included in the model. Analyses were conducted
using SPSS GLM.
Data Screening
Prior to conducting the formal analyses, the data were screened for multivariate
assumptions. A total of 18 participants with missing data on participant sex or age were deleted
listwise. Univariate outliers on the non-Likert variables had already been excluded during the
initial data screening (along with poor quality data). To identify multivariate outliers,
Mahalanobis’ distance was calculated from the ten dependent variables. Fourteen cases exceeded
the critical "2(10) value of 29.59 (p = .001). These cases were examined individually and a
decision was made to drop the nine with the largest Mahalanobis’ distances (those exceeding 33).
The majority of these cases had very high ratings on some of the MIP variables, combined with
very low ratings on others, or negative thought valence along with high perceived
persuasiveness. The final sample for all remaining analyses was N = 882.
Box’s M was significant at p < .001, indicating a violation of the assumption of
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. Although there was variation in the cell sizes, they
cells were quite large (the smallest cell had 19 cases, more than twice the number of dependent
variables). None of the interactions between the covariates and independent variables was
significant, so it was safe to assume homogeneity of regression. To avoid inflation of Type I
error, the alpha level was set at p = .005 for all multivariate and univariate analyses, and Pillai’s
trace, which is robust to violations of multivariate normality, was used as the test statistic.
Multivariate Results
As shown in Table 15, vulnerability, ad type, and ad replicate all had significant
multivariate effects on the ten dependent variables at the p < .001 level, controlling for order,
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participant sex, and age. There was no significant effect of distraction, and none of the two-way
interactions was significant. Age was significantly associated with the dependent variables, but
order and participant sex were not. To further examine the nature of these multivariate effects,
univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each of the ten dependent variables, excluding the
interaction terms.
Table 15
Results of Multivariate Tests on Ten DVs (Order, Sex, and Age as Covariates), N = 882
F

df

p

Partial !2

Order

1.801

10/861

.057

.020

Sex

1.947

10/861

.036

.022

Age

4.503***

10/861

< .001

.050

12.937***

10/861

< .001

.131

8.170***

20/1724

< .001

.087

13.408***

10/861

< .001

.135

1.631

10/861

.093

.019

Motivation x Ad Type

0.926

10/861

.509

.011

Motivation x Distraction

0.642

10/861

.778

.007

Ad Type x Distraction

1.177

10/861

.302

.013

Source
Covariates

IVs
Vulnerability
Ad Replicate (Ad Type)
Ad Type
Distraction
Interactionsa

*** p < .001
a Because only two-way interactions were hypothesized, only these interactions were included in the model.

Univariate Results
There were no a priori hypotheses regarding participant age, but age was positively
associated with perceived realism, F(1,873) = 15.02, p < .001, attractiveness, F(1,873) = 14.38,
p < .001, and thought valence, F(1,873) = 10.44, p = .001. Relative to those 32 or younger,
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participants aged 33 or older found the ads more realistic (older: M = 4.10, SD = 1.56; younger:
M = 3.75, SD = 1.50), the characters more attractive (older: M = 4.32, SD = 1.39; younger:
M = 4.14, SD = 1.39), and tended toward more positive thoughts (older: M = 2.11, SD = 3.26;
younger: M = 1.63, SD = 2.78).
Likewise, no hypotheses were put forward regarding the ad replicate variable. This
variable was nested in ad type to control for any differences between exemplars of each type.
The individual exemplars differed significantly on the majority of the dependent variables,
including: persuasiveness, F(2,873) = 10.99, p < .001, realism, F(2,873) = 8.77, p < .001,
similarity, F(2,873) = 13.50, p < .001, identification, F(2,873) = 44.43, p < .001, attractiveness,
F(2,873) = 26.68, p < .001, and thought valence, F(2,873) = 5.47, p < .004. As shown in Table
16, the informational ads differed on each of these variables, such that Continental Cook-in-Bag
was rated higher than Uncle Toby’s Oats in persuasiveness, t(447) = 4.13, p < .001, realism,
t(447) = 3.65, p < .001, similarity, t(446.1) = 5.03, p < .001, identification, t(447) = 8.27,
p < .001, and attractiveness, t(428.9) = 3.49, p = .001. The difference between the two
informational ads in thought valence was marginally significant, t(447) = 2.75, p = .006, such
that the thoughts elicited by Continental Cook-in-Bag were more favorable. The emotional ads
differed only in that Abbott’s Village Bakery was rated significantly higher than Tip Top Bread in
identification, t(431) = 4.15, p < .001, and attractiveness, t(410.5) = 6.14, p < .001.
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Table 16
Mean Ratings of Each Ad (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) and Results of T-Tests Within
Each Ad Type, N = 882
Informational
Continental
Cook-in-Bag
(n = 237)

Emotional

Uncle Toby’s
Oats
(n = 212)

Abbott’s Village
Bakery
(n = 226)

Tip Top Bread
(n = 207)

Persuasiveness

4.57 (1.41)

4.03 (1.34)***

Realism

4.02 (1.57)

3.48 (1.51)***

Similarity

3.44 (1.52)

2.77 (1.30)***

Identification

4.32 (1.50)

3.19 (1.38)***

4.76 (1.46)

4.18 (1.45)***

Attractiveness

4.18 (1.27)

3.74 (1.39)**

4.84 (1.25)

4.04 (1.44)***

Thought Valence

1.96 (3.14)

1.14 (3.18)"

"!p

< .01, ** p < .005, *** p < .001

The results of the univariate tests of the effects of the three key independent variables on
each of the ten dependent variables are described in turn below. Differences between the
exemplars of each ad type were controlled for in all univariate analyses, along with order,
participant sex, and age. The means and standard deviations for each dependent variable in the
different conditions are shown in Table 17, and the relevant univariate statistics are presented in
Table 18.
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with the hypotheses, relative to the control condition, the
vulnerability condition decreased perceived persuasiveness, identification, and attractiveness,
increased distrust, and elicited more negative thoughts. As shown in Table 17, the effect of the
vulnerability manipulation was particularly pronounced for distrust; participants in the
vulnerability condition rated the ads more than two-thirds of a standard deviation higher in
distrust than those in the control condition. Although no effects were hypothesized for perceived
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realism or similarity, these were significantly reduced in the vulnerability condition as well. It
was hypothesized that the vulnerability condition would increase perceived persuasibility and
reduce third person effects. Vulnerability had no significant effect on perceived persuasibility or
third-person effects in relation to general media influence. Although there was a significant effect
of vulnerability on ad-specific third-person effects, it was opposite to the hypothesized direction.
Hypothesis 2. As hypothesized, the emotional ads were perceived to be more persuasive,
similar, attractive, and elicited greater identification. The effects of ad type on perceived realism
and thought valence were in the hypothesized direction, but did not reach the p < .005 level of
statistically significance. It was hypothesized that distrust would be reduced for the emotional
ads, but the reverse was true; the emotional ads were rated less trustworthy than the
informational ads. As expected, there were no significant effects of ad type on perceived
persuasibility or third-person effects (either general or ad-specific).
Hypothesis 3. Distraction was hypothesized to enhance persuasiveness, perceived
realism and similarity, identification, and desirability, reduce distrust, and elicit a less negative
response (i.e., reduce counterarguing). The multivariate test indicated no significant effect of
distraction, so no univariate analyses were conducted.
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. Two-way interactions were hypothesized between vulnerability,
distraction, and ad type. Because the multivariate analysis found no significant interactions,
univariate interactions were not tested.

101

Table 17
Mean Ratings on each of Ten DVs by Condition (SDs in Parentheses), N = 882
Vulnerability

Ad Type

Control
(n = 451)

Vulnerability
(n = 431)

Informational
(n = 449)

Emotional
(n = 433)

Persuasiveness

4.74 (1.26)

4.15 (1.31)

4.32 (1.40)

4.59 (1.21)

Distrust

2.39 (1.07)

3.19 (1.20)

2.63 (1.12)

2.94 (1.27)

Realism

4.19 (1.55)

3.56 (1.43)

3.76 (1.56)

4.00 (1.48)

Similarity

3.60 (1.47)

3.22 (1.44)

3.12 (1.45)

3.71 (1.42)

Identification

4.37 (1.50)

3.87 (1.57)

3.79 (1.55)

4.48 (1.48)

Attractiveness

4.35 (1.37)

4.06 (1.40)

3.97 (1.35)

4.46 (1.40)

Persuasibility

4.11 (0.98)

4.01 (1.02)

4.13 (0.95)

3.99 (1.04)

Ad-Specific TPE

0.35 (1.28)

0.73 (1.62)

0.52 (1.50)

0.56 (1.43)

General TPE

1.72 (1.32)

1.85 (1.39)

1.82 (1.38)

1.75 (1.33)

Thought Valence

2.16 (2.87)

1.44 (3.05)

1.57 (3.18)

2.05 (2.73)

Stepdown Analysis
To supplement the results of the univariate analyses, a Roy-Bargmann stepdown analysis
was conducted. To allow for the nested ad replicate variable, the stepdown analysis was
conducted in SPSS GLM through a series of ten sequential ANCOVAs. Based on theoretical
importance, the dependent variables were analyzed in the order shown in Table 18. Because no
significant interactions were found in the multivariate analysis, interactions between the
independent variables were not tested. For all analyses, participant age, sex, order, and the ad
replicate variable (nested within ad type) were included as covariates. The dependent variable in
each analysis was included as a covariate in all subsequent analyses. The results of the stepdown
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tests of the effects of the three key independent variables on each successive dependent variable
are shown in Table 18.
The stepdown results for the vulnerability manipulation suggest this variable primarily
affected persuasiveness and distrust. The univariate effects of vulnerability were significant
(p < .005) for persuasiveness, distrust, identification, attractiveness, realism, similarity, thought
valence, and ad-specific third-person effects. However, after adjusting for the effects of the
manipulation on persuasiveness and distrust, the effects on the other dependent variables were
reduced to near zero. Only the effects of the vulnerability manipulation on ad-specific thirdperson effects approached statistical significance (p = .016) after adjusting for its effects on
persuasiveness and distrust.
The results suggest ad type primarily influenced perceived persuasiveness, distrust, and
identification. The univariate effects of ad type on attractiveness and similarity were quite
substantial, but when adjusted for effects on higher priority dependent variables, these effects
were non-significant.
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Table 18
Results of Univariate and Stepdown Tests for each DV (No Interaction Terms), N = 882
Univariate
IV

DV
Persuasiveness

Ad Type

Distraction

"!p

df

F

df

Partial #2

48.014***

1/873

48.014***

1/873

.052

111.737***

1/873

64.005***

1/872

.068

Identification

26.093***

1/873

0.158

1/871

.000

Attractiveness

10.609**

1/873

0.097

1/870

.000

Realism

43.252***

1/873

0.167

1/869

.000

Similarity

16.245***

1/873

3.331

1/868

.004

Thought Valence

13.638***

1/873

1.391

1/867

.002

Ad-Specific TPE

14.298***

1/873

5.852

1/866

.007

Distrust

Vulnerability

F

Stepdown

General TPE

1.757

1/873

0.018

1/865

.000

Persuasibility

2.505

1/873

2.453

1/864

.003

Persuasiveness

11.939**

1/873

11.939**

1/873

.013

Distrust

17.252***

1/873

44.708***

1/872

.049

Identification

55.700***

1/873

53.142***

1/871

.058

Attractiveness

30.714***

1/873

3.131

1/870

.004

1/873

2.510

1/869

.003

Realism
Similarity

7.278"
42.292***

1/873

6.536

1/868

.007

Thought Valence

7.039"

1/873

0.121

1/867

.000

Ad-Specific TPE

0.319

1/873

0.921

1/866

.001

General TPE

0.548

1/873

0.567

1/865

.001

Persuasibility

4.449

1/873

4.595

1/864

.005

Persuasiveness

0.115

1/873

0.115

1/873

.000

Distrust

0.148

1/873

0.062

1/872

.000

Identification

2.851

1/873

5.481

1/871

.006

Attractiveness

0.008

1/873

1.410

1/870

.002

Realism

0.013

1/873

0.429

1/869

.000

Similarity

0.242

1/873

0.008

1/868

.000

1/867

.009

Thought Valence

5.207

1/873

7.892"

Ad-Specific TPE

0.003

1/873

0.048

1/866

.000

General TPE

0.000

1/873

0.020

1/865

.000

Persuasibility

0.863

1/873

1.154

1/864

.001

< .01, ** p < .005, *** p < .001
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The stepdown results for distraction provide some evidence that the manipulation may
have been effective. After adjusting for the effects of distraction on persuasiveness, distrust, and
the other high-priority dependent variables, distraction had a marginally significant effect on
thought valence (p = .005). Although this effect was highly partialed, it was in the expected
direction; the valence of thoughts was less negative (i.e., reduced counterarguing) in the
distraction condition.
Mediators and Moderators of Persuasiveness
Research questions 2a and 2b addressed potential mediators and moderators of
persuasiveness, and the extent to which these relationships are moderated by variations in ability.
Mediation Analyses
It was hypothesized that perceived persuasibility and third-person effects (ad-specific and
general) mediate the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness. These mediation
hypotheses were evaluated using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) INDIRECT macro for SPSS.
Persuasiveness was entered as the dependent variable, with vulnerability condition as the
independent variable, and order, participant sex, and age as covariates. The total (i.e., overall,
without regard to any mediators) effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness (path
c) was significant (B = -.591, t = 6.84, p < .001). That is, as expected, persuasiveness was
lessened in the vulnerability condition. The three hypothesized mediators of this relationship
(persuasibility and the two third-person effects variables) were first tested in separate models,
and then together in a single model.
Hypothesis 7. For the test of persuasibility as a potential mediator, neither path a (effect
of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasibility) nor path b (relationship between
persuasibility and persuasiveness) achieved statistical significance. Moreover, the bias corrected
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95% confidence interval (1000 bootstrap resamples) for the indirect effect of vulnerability on
persuasiveness through persuasibility included zero (-.0090 to .0170), indicating persuasibility
did not mediate the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness.
Hypothesis 8. Vulnerability had no significant effect on general third-person effects
(path a). Path b (the relationship between general third-person effects and persuasiveness) was
significant, but opposite to the hypothesized direction (B = -.137, t = -4.32, p < .001). That is,
greater perceived vulnerability to general media influence was associated with increased, rather
than decreased, persuasiveness. The 95% confidence interval around the indirect effect through
general third-person effects included zero (-.0499 to .0080), indicating the effect of vulnerability
on persuasiveness was not mediated by general third person effects.
Vulnerability did have a significant effect on ad-specific third-person effects (path a;
B = .368, t = -3.75, p = .002), though this was in the opposite direction of the hypothesized
effect. Rather than reducing third-person effects in relation to the target ad, third-person effects
were increased in the vulnerability condition relative to the control condition. In other words, as
with general third-person effects, the path from ad-specific third-person effects to persuasiveness
(path b) was significant, but opposite to the direction hypothesized (B = -.128, t = -4.37,
p < .001), such that third-person effects were associated with reduced persuasiveness. The 95%
confidence interval around the indirect path through ad-specific third-person effects did not
include zero (-.1030 to -.0184), indicating this variable significantly mediated the effect of the
vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness. That said, this mediation operated counter to the
direction hypothesized. Rather than reducing third-person effects and thereby reducing
persuasiveness, the vulnerability manipulation led to increased third-person effects (i.e., reduced
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perceptions of vulnerability), which was, counterintuitively, associated with reduced
persuasiveness.
The mediation model was run a final time with all three hypothesized mediators. The
results of this analysis were consistent with the single-mediator models, and are shown in Figure
9, with solid lines representing significant paths and dashed lines representing non-significant
paths. Accounting for the relationships between the various mediators and persuasiveness
reduced the effect of vulnerability on persuasiveness from B = -.591 (path c) to B = -.540 (path
c’, shown in parentheses). Although the direct path remained highly significant (t = 6.31,
p < .001), the results suggest ad-specific third-person effects partially mediated the effect of the
vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness.
!

General
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.121
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Third-Person

-.119***
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-.109***
-.591***

Persuasiveness

(-.540)***
-.107
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Figure 9. The effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness was partially mediated
by ad-specific third-person effects, but the mediator worked in the opposite direction of that
hypothesized, N = 882. The total effect (path c) is shown above the arrow, while the direct effect
(path c’) is shown below the arrow in parentheses. (***p < .001)
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Moderation Analyses
Perceptions of persuasibility and third-person effects (ad-specific and general) were
hypothesized to moderate the relationship between perceptions of manipulative intent (i.e.,
distrust) and persuasiveness. These moderation hypotheses were evaluated using hierarchical
regression. Three separate regression models were constructed to predict persuasiveness from
distrust, with three potential moderators (perceived persuasibility, ad-specific third-person
effects, and general third-person effects). The control variables (order, participant sex, age, and
ad replicate) were entered on the first step. Distrust was entered on the second step, along with
the hypothesized moderator. Finally, the interaction between distrust and the hypothesized
moderator was entered on the third-step. All variables were standardized prior to entry in the
model and calculation of interaction terms.
Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 9 was not supported, as there was no significant interaction
between distrust and persuasibility.
Hypothesis 10. This hypothesis was partially supported. There was no significant
interaction between distrust and general third-person effects, but ad-specific third-person effects
did moderate the relationship between distrust and persuasiveness (B = .125, t = 4.91, p < .001).
To investigate the nature of this interaction, simple slopes analyses were conducted. As shown in
Figure 10, for those exhibiting low third-person effects (z = -1), the relationship between distrust
and persuasiveness was stronger (B = -.609) than for those exhibiting high third-person effects
(z = 1; B = -.353), though both slopes differed significantly from zero at p < .001. In other words,
distrust was more strongly associated with reduced persuasiveness when perceptions of the ad’s
influence on oneself (relative to others) was high. As hypothesized, the negative relationship
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between distrust and persuasiveness was attenuated for those who exhibited strong third-person
effects (i.e., those who believed themselves to be relatively unaffected by the ad).

*+,%-./01!2304+5%673894%:)%;<%=3>+,%?3@5A%
B/C.%-./01!2304+5%673894%:)%;<%@=+D3%?3@5A%
"#(%

!"#$%&$'(")"$$*+,-./0#"1*

"#$%
"#&%
"#'%
"%
!"#'%
!"#&%
!"#$%
!)%

"%

)%

2'$3#%$3*+,-./0#"1*

Figure 10. The relationship between distrust and persuasiveness was moderated by ad-specific
third-person effects, N = 882.
Moderated Mediation Analyses
It was hypothesized that thought valence mediates the relationship between distrust and
persuasiveness, and that the degree of mediation is stronger under high ability conditions (no
distraction, informational ad).
Hypothesis 11. The mediation hypothesis was evaluated first using Preacher and Hayes’
INDIRECT macro, with persuasiveness as the dependent variable, distrust as the independent
variable, and order, participant sex, and age as covariates. As shown in Figure 11, the total effect,
or relationship between distrust and persuasiveness (path c), was significant (B = -.541,
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t = 16.99, p < .001). The path from distrust to thought valence (path a) was likewise significant
(B = -.822, t = 10.56, p < .001), indicating greater distrust was associated with less favorable
thoughts (i.e., greater counterarguing). Finally, more favorable thoughts were associated with
greater persuasiveness (path b; B = .224, t = 19.38, p < .001), or alternatively, counterarguing
was predictive of reduced persuasiveness. All paths were in the hypothesized direction.
Accounting for the relationship between thought valence and persuasiveness reduced the path
from distrust to persuasiveness from B = -.541 (path c) to B = -.357 (path c’). Although the direct
path was still significant (t = 12.61, p < .001), the results suggest the valence of thoughts does
partially mediate the relationship between distrust and persuasiveness overall. The bias corrected
95% confidence interval around the indirect effect of distrust on persuasiveness, with 1000
bootstrap resamples, did not include zero (.1453 to .2252), indicating significant mediation by
thought valence.
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Figure 11. The relationship between distrust and persuasiveness was partially mediated by
thought valence. The coefficient in parentheses is the direct path from distrust to persuasiveness,
N = 882. The total effect (path c) is shown above the arrow, while the direct effect (path c’) is
shown below the arrow in parentheses. (***p < .001)
Hypothesis 12. The moderated mediation hypothesis was evaluated using Preacher,
Rucker, and Hayes’ (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS. Persuasiveness was once again entered
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as the dependent variable, with distrust as the independent variable and thought valence as the
mediator, as shown in Figure 11. The hypothesized moderators (ad type and distraction) were
evaluated in separate models, with order, participant sex, and age included as covariates. Ad
replicate was included as an additional covariate for the model with ad type as the moderator.
For both models, the simple mediation findings described under Hypothesis 11 were
reproduced. Ad type had a significant effect on both thought valence and persuasiveness, but
moderated only the path from distrust to persuasiveness (path c), B = .161, t = 3.02, p = .003.
Specifically, the total effect of distrust on persuasiveness was stronger for informational ads
(B = -.659, t = 13.18, p < .001) than for emotional ads (B = -.488, t = 12.36, p < .001), though
significant for both. Distraction had no significant effect on either thought valence or
persuasiveness, and did not moderate any of the paths.
Additional Analyses
In addition to the planned analyses, a series of exploratory analyses was conducted to
further investigate the nature of the relationships between variables. These analyses focused on
the vulnerability manipulation, which had an unanticipated boomerang effect on perceptions of
vulnerability, and the distraction manipulation, the effects of which appeared to be weak at best.
Vulnerability Manipulation
The results suggest the vulnerability manipulation did not operate through the
hypothesized mechanism of reducing third-person effects, but nonetheless reduced
persuasiveness and associated variables. Through what mechanism, then, did the manipulation
work? Perhaps the manipulation operated as a minimal media literacy intervention, enhancing
counterarguing and thereby reducing persuasiveness. This post hoc mediation hypothesis was
evaluating using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) INDIRECT macro. Participant age, sex, and order
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were entered as covariates. As noted previously, the total effect of vulnerability on
persuasiveness (path c) was statistically significant. Figure 12 shows that the path from
vulnerability to thought valence (path a) was likewise significant (B = -.726, t = 3.67, p < .001),
indicating less favorable thoughts (or greater counterarguing) in the demonstrated vulnerability
condition. Finally, path b was significant (B = .265, t = 22.61, p < .001), with a more positive
thought valence associated with greater persuasiveness. Accounting for the relationship between
thought valence and persuasiveness reduced the effect of vulnerability on persuasiveness from
B = -.591 (path c) to B = -.399 (path c’). Although the direct path remained significant (t = 5.76,
p < .001), the results suggest thought valence partially mediated the effect of the vulnerability
manipulation on persuasiveness. The bias corrected 95% confidence interval around the indirect
effect of vulnerability on persuasiveness, with 1000 bootstrap resamples, did not include zero
(-.3070 to -.0861), indicating mediation by thought valence was significant.
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Figure 12. The effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness was partially mediated
by thought valence. The coefficient in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the vulnerability
manipulation on persuasiveness, N = 882. The total effect (path c) is shown above the arrow,
while the direct effect (path c’) is shown below the arrow in parentheses. (***p < .001)
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Distraction Manipulation
Distraction was hypothesized to reduce counterarguing, or lead to less unfavorable
thoughts, but the multivariate and univariate analyses suggest distraction had no effect. However,
the stepdown analysis found that when adjusted for its effects on higher-priority dependent
variables, distraction had a marginally significant (p < .01) effect on thought valence, controlling
for order, participant sex, and age. Participants in the distraction condition exhibited a more
positive thought valence in response to the target ad (M = 2.01, SD = 2.89) than those in the no
distraction condition (M = 1.60, SD = 3.06). Distraction had no significant effects on any of the
other dependent variables.
Research suggests that the effects of distraction often interact with the strength (or
persuasiveness) of the message (e.g., Petty & Brock, 1981). Perhaps in the present study the
effect of distraction on thought valence was moderated by the perceived persuasiveness of the ad,
such that the competing effects at different levels of persuasiveness cancelled each other out
(leading to a nonexistent or weak main effect of distraction). This post hoc interaction hypothesis
was first evaluated using hierarchical regression. No significant interaction was found between
distraction and persuasiveness on thought valence. To further explore the effect of distraction, the
data were split into three approximately equal groups along the perceived persuasiveness
variable (group membership was determined by where participants fell relative to the 33rd and
67th percentiles). The bottom third (n = 293) consisted of those who rated the target ad less than
4 on the persuasiveness scale. The middle third (n = 299) included participants who rated the ad
between 4 and 5 (inclusive). Finally, the top third (n = 290) was composed of those who rated the
ad higher than 5. The effect of distraction on thought valence was evaluated separately within
each of these three groups, and was significant only in the low perceived persuasiveness group,
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t(291) = 2.67, p = .008. That is, for those who found the target ad relatively unpersuasive,
distraction reduced counterarguing (M = -0.13, SD = 2.50) relative to the no distraction condition
(M = -0.92, SD = 2.62). Among those in this low perceived persuasiveness group, participants
were significantly more likely to have been assigned to one of the informational ads,
"2(2) = 11.86, p = .003. The effect of distraction on thought valence in each of the three
persuasiveness groupings is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Distraction significantly reduced counterarguing when perceived persuasiveness was
low (less than 4.0, or bottom third), N = 882.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

The present research set out to address four research questions in two broad domains:
(1) the effects of variations in motivation and ability on a number of variables conceptualized as
intermediate media literacy outcomes, and (2) mediators and moderators of the perceived
persuasiveness of advertising. The vulnerability manipulation, designed to motivate message
elaboration by heightening perceptions of vulnerability, was effective at reducing the perceived
persuasiveness of the target ads, but not through the hypothesized mechanism. The results of a
post hoc mediation analysis suggest the manipulation may instead have worked as a minimal
media literacy intervention, reducing persuasiveness by promoting counterarguing. The
hypotheses regarding informational versus emotional ads were largely supported; individuals
were more persuaded by emotional ads, despite skepticism regarding their motives. The effect of
distraction was limited to reducing counterarguing among those who found the ad relatively
unpersuasive (i.e., those most inclined to counterargue). These findings are discussed in turn.
Effects of Motivation and Ability
Research Question 1a
The first research question asked how, if at all, barriers related to motivation (i.e.,
perceived invulnerability) and ability (i.e., type of ad, distractions) affect media literacy related
outcomes.
Hypothesis 1: Vulnerability. The first set of hypotheses, pertaining to the effects of the
vulnerability manipulation, was partially supported. As anticipated, participants whose personal
vulnerability was demonstrated found the video ad less realistic, less similar to their personal
experience, less attractive, and less persuasive. They also identified less with the portrayal,

115

distrusted it more, and generated more counterarguments than those in the control condition. The
vulnerability manipulation explained 13.1% of the variation in the ten dependent variables,
which was largely attributable to its effects on distrust and persuasiveness.
The vulnerability manipulation also was hypothesized to reduce third-person effects (i.e.,
increase perceptions of one’s own vulnerability to both the target ad and media messages in
general) and increase perceptions of persuasibility. These hypotheses were not supported.
Demonstration of vulnerability did not affect participants’ perceptions of their general
persuasibility or their susceptibility to media messages in relation to others. Whereas the
vulnerability manipulation was expected to increase participants’ perceived vulnerability to the
video ad (thereby reducing third-person effects), it actually worked in the opposite direction.
That is, participants whose vulnerability was demonstrated rated themselves less affected by the
video ad than those in the control condition. Although third-person effects were evident in both
the vulnerability and control conditions, the magnitude of third-person effects was increased,
rather than decreased, by the vulnerability manipulation.
The mixed results for Hypothesis 1 suggest that perceptions of vulnerability were not
responsible for the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on intermediate media literacy
outcomes such as distrust and persuasiveness (discussed more fully under Hypotheses 7 and 8).
Despite the counterintuitive effect of the manipulation on perceived vulnerability, it successfully
increased both logical and emotional processing of the target ads.
Hypothesis 2: Ad type. The second set of hypotheses, relating to the differences between
informational and emotional ads, was largely supported. Despite differences among the
exemplars of each ad type (primarily the informational ads), the emotional ads were viewed as
more similar to personal experience, more attractive, and more persuasive than the informational
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ads, and participants reported greater identification with the emotional ads. Counter to the
hypothesis, participants distrusted the emotional ads more than the informational ads.
Controlling for the differences between ads of each type, the informational-emotional distinction
explained 13.5% of the variation in the ten dependent variables, which was largely attributable to
its effects on distrust, identification, and persuasiveness.
Hypothesis 3: Distraction. The third set of hypotheses, relating to the effects of
distraction, received marginal support. Distraction was hypothesized to enhance persuasiveness,
perceived realism, similarity, attractiveness, and identification, and reduce distrust and
counterarguing. Because distraction had no multivariate effect, its effect on the individual
dependent variables was not examined. That said, in the stepdown analysis, controlling for its
effects on the higher priority dependent variables (persuasiveness, distrust, identification,
attractiveness, realism, and similarity), distraction had a marginally significant (p < .01) effect on
counterarguing, such that it was reduced in the distraction condition.
The effects of distraction can be complex. Research suggests that when a message is
strong, distraction tends to interfere with persuasion (i.e., by reducing favorable thoughts), but
when a message is weak, distraction can enhance persuasion (i.e., by reducing counterarguing;
e.g., Petty & Brock, 1981). Whereas research on distraction usually manipulates message
strength, an attempt was made to control message strength in the present research by selecting
ads with equivalent strength. However, the results suggest some ads were stronger and more
persuasive than others. To examine the possibility that the effects of distraction differed
depending on the perceived persuasiveness of the ad, a series of follow-up analyses was
conducted. The results of these analyses suggest distraction did not interact with persuasiveness
in a linear fashion, but when the persuasiveness variable was divided into three groups of
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roughly equal size, an interesting pattern emerged. Among the two-thirds of respondents who
found the target ad moderately or highly persuasive (mean ratings of 4 or higher), distraction had
no significant effect on the valence of thoughts. However, among those who found the ad
relatively unpersuasive (mean ratings less than 4), distraction significantly reduced
counterarguing.
Research Question 1b
Research question 1b asked how, if at all, barriers to motivation and processing ability
interact in their effects on the dependent variables.
Hypotheses 4 through 6: Interactions. Distraction was hypothesized to have a greater
effect on relevant dependent variables for the informational ad. Additionally, the effect of the
vulnerability manipulation was expected to be most pronounced when ability was not
compromised (informational ad, no distraction). None of the two-way interactions was
significant in the multivariate analysis. As such, their effects on the individual dependent
variables were not evaluated.!
Mediators and Moderators of Persuasiveness
Research Question 2a
Research question 2a addressed potential mediators and moderators of the relationships
between manipulated vulnerability, distrust, and persuasiveness.
Hypotheses 7 and 8: Mediation. Perceptions of persuasibility and third-person effects
(general and ad-specific) were hypothesized to mediate the effect of the vulnerability
manipulation on persuasiveness. Although participants in the demonstrated vulnerability
condition rated the ad more persuasive, this effect remained after accounting for the potential
mediators. That is, the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness was not fully
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mediated by perceptions of persuasibility, perceptions of personal vulnerability to media
messages in general, or perceptions of vulnerability to the target ad specifically.
General third-person effects were not influenced by the vulnerability manipulation, but
had a counterintuitive negative relationship with persuasiveness, indicating that greater relative
perceived vulnerability to media messages was associated with greater persuasiveness. Adspecific third-person effects were influenced by the vulnerability manipulation, but not in the
expected direction. Individuals whose vulnerability was demonstrated rated themselves less
affected by the target ad than those in the control condition. Like general third-person effects, adspecific third-person effects had a negative relationship with persuasiveness, such that greater
perceived vulnerability to the target ad was associated with greater persuasiveness. Because both
indirect paths (paths a and b) were significant and the direct effect of the vulnerability
manipulation on persuasiveness (path c’) was closer to zero than the total effect (path c), adspecific third-person effects partially mediated the effect of vulnerability on persuasiveness.
However, paths a and b were opposite to the directions hypothesized. These findings suggest that
perceptions of vulnerability to the target ad worked against effect of the vulnerability
manipulation, but the effect nonetheless remained strongly negative. In other words, the
vulnerability manipulation had the expected negative effect on persuasiveness in spite of its
effect on perceived vulnerability, not because of it.
A follow-up analysis was conducted to explore why the vulnerability manipulation
achieved the desired effect (reduced persuasiveness) if it did not work through the hypothesized
mechanism. The results of this post hoc analysis suggest the valence of generated thoughts
partially mediated the effect of the vulnerability manipulation on persuasiveness. That is, the
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vulnerability condition elicited less favorable thoughts in response to the target ad, which was in
turn associated with reduced persuasiveness.
Hypotheses 9 and 10: Moderation. Perceptions of persuasibility and third-person
effects (general and ad-specific) were hypothesized to moderate the relationship between distrust
and persuasiveness. These hypotheses were partially supported. As anticipated, distrust was
negatively associated with persuasiveness. The strength of this relationship was not influenced
by perceived persuasibility or general third-person effects, but ad-specific third-person effects
did attenuate the relationship. As hypothesized, the negative relationship between distrust and
persuasiveness was strongest when third-person effects were low or negative. In other words,
distrust, or the perception of manipulative intent, was more strongly related to resistance among
those who perceived themselves to be vulnerable to the target ad.
Hypothesis 11: Mediation. Thought valence was hypothesized to partially mediate the
relationship between perceptions of manipulative intent (i.e., distrust) and persuasiveness. This
hypothesis was supported. Distrust was associated with less favorable thoughts, which was in
turn associated with reduced persuasiveness. All paths in the mediation model were statistically
significant. The direct path from distrust to persuasiveness remained significant after accounting
for the indirect path through thought valence, but was substantially reduced, indicating partial
mediation.
Research Question 2b
Research question 2b addressed the extent to which the mediated relationship described
under Hypothesis 11 is affected by variations in ability.
Hypothesis 12: Moderated mediation. Thought valence was hypothesized to mediate
the relationship between distrust and persuasiveness more strongly for informational ads, and
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under non-distracted conditions. This moderated mediation hypothesis was not supported. The
degree of mediation was not influenced by either ad type or distraction condition.
General Discussion
The results of the present research were in many ways consistent with existing theory and
research, particularly with regard to emotional forms of advertising, and in other ways,
inconsistent (e.g., the counterintuitive effects of the vulnerability manipulation and absence of
interactions between motivational and ability-related barriers). Nonetheless, the divergent
findings shed light on the conditions under which media literacy interventions (even extremely
minimal interventions) are likely to be effective. Finally, the results highlight the central roles of
trust (or distrust) and counterarguing in decision-making processes in relation to media
messages.
Emotional Advertising
Whereas informational ads operate through explicit processes, emotional ads work
primarily by establishing positive brand inferences, the effects of which are largely automatic
and unconscious. Research on emotional forms of advertising (e.g., Harris, Brownell, & Bargh,
2009; Morris, Woo, Geason, & Kim, 2002) suggests such approaches are more effective because
they are able to bypass or subvert logical decision making processes. The results of the current
research support this contention. Despite variability within each type of ad, the differences
between informational and emotional forms of advertising were profound. Consistent with
expectations, the emotional ads were evaluated to be more persuasive, attractive, and similar to
personal experience than informational ads, and also elicited greater identification.
Although emotional ads were associated with greater persuasiveness (and related
variables), they were found to be less trustworthy than informational ads. This unexpected
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finding suggests that individuals are able to recognize appeals to emotion as a potentially
manipulative or unfair tactic and intuitively distrust them, but nonetheless find themselves
persuaded by ads that utilize these techniques. This finding also lends support to Austin and
colleagues’ (2007) distinction between trust and perceived realism as (respectively) affective and
cognitive dimensions of skepticism. The fact that perceived realism aligned with perceived
persuasiveness and trust worked in the opposite direction supports the discriminant validity of
the two constructs. Moreover, these findings support the contention that emotional ads work by
bypassing logical processes. The MIP model proposes that media messages are subjected to
increasingly rigorous levels of scrutiny, and can be rejected at any stage in the process. The
informational ads were deemed less similar to personal experience, less attractive, and elicited
less identification than the emotional ads. Although the emotional ads were more likely to fail the
trustworthiness test, they by-and-large circumvented the other more logical tests, and as a result,
were more persuasive.
Manipulation of Vulnerability
Little research has attempted to manipulate perceptions of vulnerability to media
messages, but Sagarin and colleagues’ (2002) demonstration of vulnerability successfully
promoted both resistance to illegitimate messages (those using inappropriate authorities) and
receptivity to legitimate messages. The present research focused only on promoting resistance to
ads, as measured by perceptions of persuasiveness, counterarguing, and other intermediate media
literacy outcomes. The ability to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate messages was not part
of the current study.
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Consistent with the results of Sagarin and colleagues, the vulnerability manipulation
heightened resistance to the ads; specifically, it reduced perceptions of persuasiveness, realism,
similarity, attractiveness, and identification, and increased distrust and counterarguing. The effect
of the vulnerability manipulation on the dependent variables was substantial, and based on the
results of the stepdown analysis, it appeared to be concentrated primarily on distrust and
perceptions of persuasiveness. These findings suggest demonstration of personal vulnerability
can be a highly effective means of promoting intermediate media literacy outcomes such as
distrust and reduced persuasiveness, at least in the short term. Furthermore, the current research
extended the work of Sagarin and colleagues by suggesting the target ads need not relate closely
to the content of the vulnerability manipulation in order for the manipulation to be effective.
Sagarin and colleagues’ target ads all pertained to the same persuasive technique on which the
vulnerability manipulation focused (use of authorities); the goal of their intervention was
fostering skepticism regarding this specific persuasive technique. In the present study, however,
the target ads intentionally did not include the same persuasive techniques on which participants
had previously been briefed (i.e., appeals to freshness and scarcity). The vulnerability
manipulation in the current study heightened skepticism (i.e., distrust), and this skepticism
generalized beyond the persuasive tactics emphasized in the manipulation to entirely unrelated
persuasive tactics.
Although the vulnerability manipulation ultimately achieved its intended effects on media
literacy outcomes such as distrust and reduced persuasiveness, it did not work through the
hypothesized mechanism of reduced third-person effects (i.e., heightened perceptions of personal
vulnerability). Counter to expectations, the manipulation increased third-person effects in
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relation to the target ads. That is, participants who received the vulnerability manipulation rated
themselves less affected by the ads, relative to others. The fact that the manipulation failed to
reduce third-person effects does not necessarily mean third-person effects are irrelevant in the
context of media literacy. It may be that the concept of a manipulation to challenge perceptions
of personal invulnerability is valid, but that the manipulation was poorly executed in the present
study.
There are a number or possible explanations for why the vulnerability manipulation
backfired. The manipulation itself may have been insufficient to challenge strongly held beliefs
about personal vulnerability to advertising. Based on the procedures of Sagarin and colleagues,
the manipulation consisted primarily of showing participants their previously committed
response regarding how convincing they found the print ad, and describing two persuasive tactics
which they may or may not have noticed. Participants were admonished that if they found the ad
at least somewhat convincing, “you let the advertiser manipulate you with some very common
persuasive tactics,” warned about the potential of “manipulation by crafty advertisers,” and
urged: “don’t let yourself be fooled!” The manipulation consisted of a full page of text which
required participants to scroll through; some participants may have skimmed this text or avoided
it entirely, and as a result did not truly receive the manipulation. Although the print ad was pilot
tested to confirm it would be sufficiently convincing, the text of the vulnerability manipulation
was not.
Alternatively, while the manipulation itself may have been insufficient to overcome
illusions of invulnerability, it is possible that the language of the manipulation was too strong in
relation to the rather innocuous print ad. Several respondents noted in the comments field that
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they did not find the ad’s persuasive tactics (appeals to freshness and scarcity) particularly
manipulative or offensive, and that they would be inclined to try the product despite knowledge
of the persuasive techniques. Some even indicated that they were more suspicious of the
researcher’s motives in trying to convince them of their vulnerability than the advertiser’s. These
comments suggest the manipulation may have induced reactance among some participants, but
against the researcher and the experiment rather than the advertiser. Participants who believed
the researcher was trying to control them may have rejected the message of the manipulation
(rather than the ad), resulting in low ratings of personal vulnerability, relative to others.
Alternatively, but in a similar vein, the text of the manipulation may have primed selfenhancement motives by making personal vulnerability salient. In this biased state, participants
may have been less able to accurately report on their personal vulnerability.
In addition to the counterintuitive effect of the vulnerability manipulation on perceived
vulnerability, the direction of the relationship between perceptions of vulnerability and
persuasiveness was counter to expectations. Third-person effects were hypothesized to be
positively associated with persuasiveness such that individuals who acknowledge their personal
vulnerability are more motivated to resist subsequent persuasion attempts and ultimately find the
ads less persuasive. Instead, general third-person effects (i.e., in relation to media messages in
general) were negatively associated with persuasiveness. The more vulnerable individuals
perceived themselves to be, the more persuasive they found the ads. This finding suggests that
although (some) individuals may recognize their personal vulnerability to persuasive media
messages, this recognition does not motivate resistance to such messages. Alternatively, this
finding may simply reflect participants anchoring their responses regarding personal
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vulnerability to their earlier ratings of the target ad’s persuasiveness. The latter explanation
seems unlikely, however, as the two sets of ratings were quite far apart in the survey instrument.
Moreover, if this were the case, one would expect a stronger correlation between ratings of adspecific third-person effects and persuasiveness, given that these scales targeted the same
stimulus (the target ad). The relationship between persuasiveness and ad-specific third-person
effects was in fact weaker than the relationship between persuasiveness and general third-person
effects.
The vulnerability manipulation was not intended to work as a direct media literacy
intervention, but rather, to motivate more thorough processing through the mediating mechanism
of heightened perceptions of vulnerability. Regardless of the reasons the vulnerability
manipulation backfired, it ultimately did promote resistance to the ads. The results of a follow-up
analysis suggest the effect of the manipulation (on persuasiveness, at least) was partially
mediated by increased counterarguing. Thus, it appears the manipulation did operate as an
extremely minimal media literacy intervention, though it is questionable whether these results
would be maintained in the long term. In any case, this finding suggests individuals need not
view themselves as vulnerable for even very brief media literacy interventions to be effective.
The vulnerability manipulation increased distrust in the ads and reduced perceived
persuasiveness, and its effect on persuasiveness was partially mediated by the valence of
thoughts generated in response to the ads. These findings suggest the manipulation operated
through both emotional (i.e., distrust in the ad) and logical (i.e., increased counterarguing) routes
of decision-making. That said, the fact that mediation by thought valence was only partial
implies additional mediating mechanisms remain unexplained.
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Distraction
Research on distraction (e.g., Petty & Brock, 1981; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) suggests
it typically interferes with whatever the dominant response to a message would have been under
ideal (i.e., non-distracted) conditions. That is, if the message is weak, distraction disrupts
counterarguing and ultimately promotes persuasion. Alternatively, if the message is strong and
the dominant response is favorable thoughts, distraction tends to reduce these favorable thoughts,
leading to reduced persuasion.
In the present research, an attempt was made to control message strength (or
persuasiveness) by selecting ads of approximately equivalent strength, but the results suggest
there was substantial variation both within and between ad types. The main effect of distraction
was weak at best, as would be expected given that its effects tend to be conditional upon message
strength. Consistent with expectations, distraction reduced counterarguing among those who
found the ad unpersuasive (i.e., weak). In other words, among those for whom counterarguing
was the dominant response, distraction reduced the magnitude of this response. There was no
evidence that distraction reduced any tendency toward favorable thoughts among those who
found the ad persuasive (i.e., strong), but research findings have been less consistent with regard
the effects of distraction on strong messages. Furthermore, the majority of participants in the
“low persuasiveness” group viewed informational ads. These findings suggest the effects of
distraction on counterarguing may be limited to those who have the ability (informational ad)
and inclination (unpersuaded by ad) to counterargue in the first place.
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Role of Trust
Consistent with the results of Sagarin and colleagues, thought valence (i.e., cognitive
responses to the ads) mediated the negative relationship between distrust and persuasiveness. In
other words, distrust in the ad was associated with less favorable thoughts (i.e., greater
counterarguing), which were in turn associated with reduced persuasiveness. It was predicted
that mediation by thought valence would be only partial overall because the degree of mediation
would be moderated by factors related to the ability to generate counterarguments (i.e.,
distraction and type of ad). Specifically, distrust was expected to be more strongly associated
with counterarguing when the ability to counterargue was already high. Although there was no
evidence of moderated mediation, the mediation was not complete; distrust also had a direct
relationship with persuasiveness, suggesting additional mediators remain unaccounted for.
In addition to partial mediation by counterarguing, the relationship between distrust and
persuasiveness was expected to be moderated by perceptions of personal vulnerability such that
it would be stronger when perceived vulnerability was high. Research suggests distrust in media
messages can be a powerful motivator (e.g., Campbell, 1995), but one would expect this to be
true primarily to the extent that individuals perceive themselves to be vulnerable. That is, the
perception that an ad is manipulative should have less influence on processing for those
individuals who believe they are invulnerable to such manipulation. The results were consistent
with this prediction, at least with regard to perceptions of vulnerability to the specific target ad.
Those who perceived themselves to be more affected by the target ad had a stronger association
between distrust and persuasiveness than those who believed others were more affected than
themselves. However, moderation by ad-specific third-person effects was only partial; distrust
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was negatively associated with persuasiveness even among those who believed themselves
invulnerable. In other words, distrust of advertising messages appears to be an important
resistance-related variable, particularly (but by no means exclusively) among those who
acknowledge their personal vulnerability to such messages.
Implications
Scholarly implications. The present research contributes to the literatures in both media
literacy and applied social psychology by combining the leading model of the processes
underlying media literacy with a theoretically grounded explication of how barriers to motivation
and ability would be expected to impact these processes. Whereas the media literacy literature
might be characterized as too applied, with inadequate theory driving it, the social psychological
literature is, conversely, not applied enough with regard to media literacy. Despite social
psychology’s cognitive bent, the preponderance of research into persuasion, and growing interest
in resistance (e.g., Knowles & Linn, 2004b), the field has not, thus far, explicitly addressed
media literacy as a phenomenon whose underlying psychological mechanisms warrant closer
examination. Certainly, more research is certainly needed regarding the effectiveness of media
literacy interventions. It is imprudent, however, to attempt to solve a problem without first
understanding the nature of the phenomenon, including its underlying mechanisms and the
conditions affecting its manifestation. As Kurt Lewin, the forefather of contemporary social
psychology and advocate of cooperation between researchers and practitioners, wrote: “there is
nothing so practical as a good theory” (1951, p. 169).
The results of the present research were largely consistent with prevailing theory and
research, particularly with regard to the effects of emotional forms of advertising and distraction.
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Emotional advertising, which operates through positive brand associations rather than rational
analysis of the product’s costs and benefits, poses a substantial barrier to logical decision-making
processes. Although emotional forms of advertising are viewed as less trustworthy than
informational advertising, they are more likely to circumvent logical processes, and as a result,
more persuasive. Emotional ads may promote a literal suspension of disbelief, as viewers are
drawn into the mini-narrative of the ad (e.g., Slater, 2002). Individuals distrust emotional ads on
some level, but this distrust appears to be quickly forgotten, and does not spread to other, more
logical, reactions to these ads. Whereas emotional forms of advertising interfere with processing
ability across the board, the effects of distraction appear to be concentrated on those who might
otherwise reject the ad (i.e., those who find the ad unpersuasive and are inclined toward
counterarguing).
In addition to supporting existing research on emotional advertising and distraction, the
current research highlights the critical roles played by trust (or distrust) and counterarguing in
decision-making processes in the context of media messages. The effect of the vulnerability
manipulation on media literacy outcomes was largely attributable to its influence on distrust;
individuals who received the vulnerability manipulation found the ads less trustworthy. As
proposed by Austin and colleagues (2007), trust appears to be a distinct construct from perceived
realism. The results suggest skepticism is a complex concept, with both cognitive and affective
components; it is possible to distrust an ad, but nonetheless find it realistic (and ultimately
persuasive). Trustworthiness is a key predictor of the persuasiveness of advertising messages,
though this relationship appears to depend on the extent to which individuals believe themselves
vulnerable to such messages. Among those who see themselves as invulnerable, the strength of
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the relationship between distrust and persuasiveness is attenuated. In conjunction with distrust,
the results suggest counterarguing plays a key role in media literacy processes. Distraction
reduced the tendency toward counterarguing among those who found the ads unpersuasive.
Moreover, increased counterarguing was partially responsible for the effect of the vulnerability
manipulation, as well as the relationship between distrust and persuasiveness.
In sum, the results suggest invoking concepts of personal vulnerability to advertising
makes individuals both less trusting in ads, and more likely to counterargue these ads. The
tendency toward counterarguing is reduced, however, by distraction, at least among those with
the ability and inclination to counterargue in the first place. The less an individual trusts an ad,
and the more they engage in counterarguing, the less likely they are to be persuaded by the ad.
That said, distrust is most relevant for those who acknowledge their personal vulnerability.
Methodological implications. In addition to advancing the theoretical literature on
media literacy, the present research suggests new methods of study. Traditionally, media literacy
research involves a standardized intervention, which is implemented in classrooms (or other
settings) with varying degrees of fidelity. Researchers then evaluate the effects of this
intervention on knowledge, attitudes, and in rare cases, behavior, relative to either a comparison
group (usually without random assignment) or the experimental group’s pre-intervention
measures. The current research utilized a different approach entirely, examining responses to
advertising messages under different conditions among participants assumed to have varying
levels of latent media literacy. This approach is more consistent with a view of media literacy as
a context dependent state, rather than a stable trait.
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On a broad level, adopting an interactionist approach that considers characteristics of the
mediated environment, individual factors, and the interplay between the two has the potential to
greatly enhance media literacy research. In studying the effectiveness of media literacy
interventions, researchers could investigate potential interactions between source, message,
target, and contextual variables, as is characteristic of persuasion research. Examination of these
contingencies could improve current understanding of the conditions under which media literacy
interventions are most effective, and how such interventions might be tailored to different
individuals, types of messages, and persuasive contexts.
Implications for media literacy practice. Beyond research methodology, the present
research has the potential to inform the practice of media literacy and influence administrative
decision-making in years to come. The results of this research challenge the validity of
customary assumptions of media literacy education by suggesting that the emphasis on thorough
processing is misplaced. Approaches focused solely on promoting critical processing are unlikely
to be effective under conditions in which the ability to engage in such processing is
compromised. This is particularly true with regard to emotional forms of advertising and
distracted media-use conditions.
New approaches are needed, specifically tailored to emotion-based decision-making
under these more realistic media-use conditions. In particular, the results of this research suggest
activating distrust in advertising should be a central component of media literacy interventions.
That said, activating distrust may not be sufficient to challenge emotional forms of advertising;
media literacy educators must also find a way to activate the cognitive dimensions of skepticism
(i.e., perceived realism, similarity). For example, students should be encouraged to reflect on
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why they distrust the ad and to give this distrust more weight in their decision-making processes.
Distrust appears to promote counterarguing, but it is important to give students the necessary
tools to distinguish trustworthy and untrustworthy media messages, rather than simply branding
all media messages (or all emotional advertising) as untrustworthy. Both educators and students
need to be educated about the complex and sometimes counterintuitive effects of distraction.
That is, media messages can influence people’s attitudes and behavior even without their
conscious awareness, and these effects are often most pronounced when they are otherwise
occupied. The consequences of distraction may be particularly relevant for young people, who
are highly likely to engage in some form of media multitasking on a regular basis (e.g., using
other media while watching television). According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation
(Roberts, Foehr, & Rideout, 2005), youth between ages 8 and 18 engage in 8.5 hours of mediause in only about 6.5 hours of actual time, on average. Although the vulnerability manipulation
appeared to be effective in the short term, it is not recommended that educators adopt this
approach without further research. The manipulation appeared to put individuals in a defensive
posture, such that they rejected not only the ad, but also the researcher. The use of such
techniques in a classroom setting could potentially induce reactance against the educator.
The current research did not evaluate a media literacy intervention in the traditional
sense, but it offers a first step in examining how media literacy processes are influenced by
barriers to motivation and processing ability. The results of this research add to the media
literacy knowledge base, providing raw material for the teachers and curriculum developers of
tomorrow.
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Limitations
Although the present research has substantial implications for media literacy theory,
research, and practice, a number of limitations warrant attention.
Design and internal validity. Although participants were randomly assigned to
conditions, some cells were much larger than others. In particular, in the vulnerability, emotional
ad (Abbott’s Village Bakery), no distraction condition, more than twice as many participants
were assigned to evaluate the effects of media messages on others first than themselves first (see
Table 10). The reason for this irregularity is unclear. The MANCOVA (and follow-up univariate
ANCOVAs) produced some evidence of possible order effects on dependent variables
(persuasiveness and thought valence) that were measured before the order manipulation took
place, though these effects were significant only at p < .05. This anomalous finding suggests
there may have been some preexisting differences between groups on the order variable, despite
random assignment. However, these differences were controlled by including order as a covariate
in all analyses.
An attempt was made to minimize confounds related to ad type by selecting ads of
roughly equivalent strength and persuasiveness, but there was still substantial variation among
the ads, both within and between types. Differences between the replicates of each ad type were
controlled through the nested design. However, because only two exemplars of each type were
utilized and random effects were not modeled, it is not possible to generalize the results to all
possible informational and emotional ads. In other words, incidental differences between the
specific emotional and informational ads that were used in this study could have been
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responsible for the observed effects of ad type. That said, the results for ad type were robust and
consistent with expectations, suggesting any confounding was minimal.
Some analyses involved experimentally manipulated variables, enabling causal
inferences to be made, but others (specifically the mediation and moderation analyses) were
correlational in nature. As a result, it is not possible to conclude unequivocally that distrust is an
antecedent to reduced persuasiveness, mediated by counterarguing. The process could potentially
have worked in the reverse direction, or both distrust and persuasiveness could have been
influenced by an unmeasured third variable. The fact that all evidence of mediation and
moderation was only partial hints at the presence of additional variables. Finally, because all
follow-up analyses (including mediation of the effects of the vulnerability manipulation by
counterarguing and the nonlinear interaction between persuasiveness and distraction) were post
hoc, they were purely exploratory in nature. Any conclusions drawn from these analyses are
tentative and would require replication with a new sample.
External validity. Some of the constructs in the present research may have been
inadequately operationalized. In particular, the vulnerability manipulation did not work as
intended; that is, by increasing perceived vulnerability. Rather, the manipulation had no effect on
perceived vulnerability to media messages in general and reduced the perceived influence of the
target ad on participants themselves, relative to others. While explanations for why the
manipulation backfired remain speculative, one thing is clear—it was not effective at
overcoming the motivational barrier posed by illusions of unique invulnerability. In addition to
inadequate manipulation of vulnerability, the effects of distraction were weak at best, and limited
to a relatively small subset of individuals. The effect of distraction on thought valence only
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became evident in the stepdown analysis after partialing out its effects on six other dependent
variables. The results of Pilot Study 2 were also somewhat inconclusive with regard to the
distraction manipulation. Although distractions impaired recall and increased self-reported
distractedness, they had no effect on a more objective measure of distractedness (number of
thoughts). This finding was reproduced in the main study manipulation checks. The distraction
manipulation may not have been sufficiently distracting.
Beyond the operationalization of constructs, the generalizability of the findings may be
compromised by the web-based nature of the survey and the self-selected sample. Web-based
samples are typically younger, more educated, and higher in socioeconomic status than other
types of surveys (e.g., Gosling et al., 2004). Consistent with other MTurk research (e.g., Paolacci
et al., 2010), the sample in the present study consisted of relatively (but not exclusively) young,
predominantly white, middle-class, educated adults. As a result, the mechanisms uncovered by
the present research may not apply to children or adolescents, minority populations, less
educated or lower socioeconomic status individuals, or those with limited (or no) Internet access.
In addition to the selection bias imposed by the nature of the survey, there were some
demographic differences between the final sample and those participants whose data were
excluded for various reasons. The final sample was slightly more female and less well-educated
than those who were excluded, owing largely to differences in the likelihood of failing one or
more of the instructional manipulation checks.
In addition to limitations in the generalizability of findings to other populations, the
limited ecological validity of the experimental setting may compromise the applicability of the
results to more naturalistic media-use settings. For example, individuals may respond differently
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to being instructed to pay close attention to YouTube.com videos than they would passive
exposure to TV commercials. The distraction manipulation was intended to simulate the effects
of multitasking (e.g., being online or texting) during exposure to TV advertising, but the task of
counting squares is highly artificial.
Measurement. There was a great deal of overlap among the dependent measures,
particularly those adapted from existing MIP measures (e.g., Austin et al., 2002; 2006) and
perceived persuasiveness. The results of the factor analysis were not entirely consistent with the
theoretical constructs. That said, the reliabilities of the theoretical scales were quite high, and the
results were by-and-large consistent with hypotheses.
The thought valence index could be called into question as a measure of counterarguing,
as it may tap into other, unrelated constructs (e.g., a tendency toward listing more thoughts, or
verbosity). Typically, cognitive response measures (such as the thought valence measure) are
calculated by subtracting unfavorable from favorable thoughts and dividing this value by the sum
of favorable and unfavorable thoughts. In the present research, however, this variable was
conceptualized as a measure of both valence and magnitude. Adjusting for the total number of
thoughts generated would have eliminated any indication magnitude from the measure. As such,
thought valence remained uncorrected for verbosity. Moreover, the results on the thought valence
measure have been interpreted in terms of counterarguing, but a less positive thought valence is
not necessarily indicative of greater counterarguing; such a result could simply mean fewer
favorable thoughts were generated.
With the exception of thought valence, all measures in the current research relied on selfreport. Social desirability concerns may have influenced responses, particularly on the questions
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addressing perceptions of the ad (e.g., persuasiveness, attractiveness, identification). Participants
might have inferred that the researcher had a vested interest in the success of the advertised
products. In an effort to avoid social desirability effects, participants were told at multiple points
during the survey that it was part of an academic research study (i.e., not a marketing survey) and
that the researcher had no affiliation with the advertised products or brands. Nonetheless, some
participants may have missed (or not believed) these reminders, as evidenced by various
comments encouraging the researcher to bring the advertised product to the U.S. Similarly, selfenhancement concerns may have motivated less than accurate responses on the items addressing
third-person effects. Related to the limitations of self-report measures, the current research did
not assess any behavioral or long-term outcomes in relation to the ads. The ultimate dependent
variable of interest was perceived persuasiveness, which was used as a proxy for persuasionrelated attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.
Analysis. Although inflated Type I error was controlled by imposing a more conservative
threshold of statistical significance (p < .005), the current research nonetheless involved quite a
few analyses. The statistically significant results could have capitalized on chance to some
extent, particularly the follow-up analyses which had no a priori hypotheses.
Future Directions for Media Literacy Research
Despite its limitations, the present research suggests a variety of new directions for media
literacy research in the twenty-first century. These include greater attention to the role of
motivation, approaches targeting other media (e.g., digital media, contemporary stealth forms of
advertising, entertainment narratives), and the relationship between media literacy and
resistance.

138

Role of motivation. The illusion of invulnerability is just one type of motivational barrier
that could potentially interfere with media literacy objectives. The uses and gratifications
approach (e.g., Katz, Blumler, & Gurevich, 1974; Rubin, 1994) suggests individuals actively
seek out specific forms of media to meet specific needs. Thus, some needs (e.g., diversion) might
counteract media literacy motives, whereas others (e.g., acquiring information) might act in a
facilitative manner. Third-person effects can interface with beliefs about media uses. For
example, the third-person effect sometimes involves a belief that one primarily engages in
“desirable” media uses (e.g., information-seeking), whereas others are more likely to use media
for “undesirable” purposes (e.g., escape, habit).
Like language literacy, media literacy is often viewed as a stable trait, something an
individual will always possess once certain concepts and skills have been acquired. Certainly
some media literacy knowledge (e.g., production techniques) and skills (e.g., deconstruction) can
be taught. However, media literacy may be better conceptualized as a fluid motivational state,
subject to constraints imposed by situational factors (e.g., environmental distractions), chronic
personality traits (e.g., need for structure, need for cognition), as well more variable individual
characteristics (e.g., mood, other salient goals). Knowledge and skills provide the raw materials,
but motivation provides the fuel. Contextual variables (e.g., distractions, the nature of the
message itself, salient goals) may affect an individual’s ability or motivation to activate latent
media literacy skills at any given time. Someday, instead of saying someone is media literate,
one might observe that the individual is currently interacting with media in a media literate
manner.
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Stealth advertising and new media. Despite technological innovation, the vast majority
of media literacy research has focused on the medium of television; little research has addressed
media literacy in the context of new (i.e., digital) media and contemporary forms of advertising.
In recent years, technologies such as digital video recording (DVR) and web-based television
(e.g., Hulu.com) have given users unprecedented control over media content, and rendered the
traditional television commercial all but obsolete. As such, advertisers have begun shifting their
resources toward stealth marketing strategies, including embedded content, viral marketing,
targeted online advertising, promotional tie-ins, and more. Research suggests product placements
need not be consciously perceived to have an impact; they exert equally strong effects on brand
preferences whether or not viewers recall seeing the embedded product (Law & Braun-LaTour,
2004).
Like emotional advertising, these types of advertising pose additional barriers to
processing ability. Harris and colleagues (2009) argue, “marketing programs that influence
through social cognitive processes may be especially difficult to defend against and suggests a
significant opportunity for research” (p. 248). In particular, research is needed regarding (1)
whether individuals are aware of these forms of marketing, (2) the extent to which they are able
to discern persuasive intent in such practices as celebrity endorsements, use of popular
characters, product placements, and advergames, and (3) the extent to which awareness of
persuasive intent mediates outcomes. Media literacy researchers and practitioners have not, byand-large, adjusted to the development of more sophisticated marketing techniques. The
advertising industry will continue to take advantage of emerging social cognitive research on
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automatic and affective processes. Media literacy researchers must rise to the challenge. As such,
approaches to media literacy based solely on explicit processes are inadequate.
Entertainment narratives. Media influence is not limited to advertising. Entertainment
narratives in particular may be uniquely situated to bypass cognitive defenses, and thereby
overcome resistance. The mechanisms underlying narrative persuasion are not well understood,
but social psychologists are beginning to venture into this area (e.g., Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong,
2004). One possible mechanism through which narrative persuasion is believed to operate is
reduction of counterarguing. Whereas a rhetorical argument is easily recognized as a persuasive
attempt, narratives can obscure whatever persuasive intent is embedded in the message. Slater
(2002) further suggests it may be difficult to counterargue or discount the lived experiences of
another person, whether real or fictional. Moreover, like contemporary forms of advertising,
narratives do not necessarily have specific, identifiable arguments to refute.
Narratives may also overcome resistance by enhancing identification with characters, as
well as involvement in the story (i.e., transportation). The cognitive and emotional demands
associated with engagement in a narrative leave little motivation or ability to generate
counterarguments (Green & Brock, 2000). ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) predicts that an
attractive source (e.g., a well-liked protagonist) will be particularly persuasive under lowelaboration conditions, such as when cognitive resources are depleted. However, some of the
persuasion variables elucidated in ELM may not even be applicable in narrative contexts. For
example, Green and Brock found that need for cognition, a well-established moderator of
rhetorical persuasion, does not moderate narrative persuasion.
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Thus far, researchers have not investigated the mechanisms of narrative persuasion in the
context of media literacy, though these theories have been used in the context of entertainmenteducation (E-E) to overcome resistance for prosocial purposes (e.g., Slater & Rouner, 2002). E-E
refers to efforts to incorporate educational or other prosocial content (e.g., health-related
messages) into narratives intended primarily for entertainment. Recent research in this area (e.g.,
Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Woodley, 2011) suggests E-E
programming overcomes various types of resistance (e.g., reactance and perceived
invulnerability) by masking persuasive intent and fostering parasocial interaction and
identification with characters, as well as transportation into the narrative. Media literacy and E-E
are in many ways complementary strategies, though their practitioners tend to employ different
tactics. Media literacy efforts have traditionally followed from the field’s protectionist origins,
and could be characterized as an attempt to resist the natural tendency to favor efficiency motives
over accuracy (e.g., persuasion through affective and other unconscious mechanisms) with the
primary goal of curtailing the negative effects of harmful (e.g., unhealthy, antisocial) media
messages. E-E efforts, on the other hand, capitalize on these very same tendencies with the goal
of maximizing the benefits individuals derive from media.
Focused resistance. Some media literacy proponents, particularly those aligned with
ACME’s anti-corporate stance, advocate broad resistance to mass media. This approach
presupposes, however, that all media messages are unhealthy, illegitimate, or otherwise
inappropriate. While the dangers of insufficient resistance are self-evident, indiscriminate
resistance can produce negative consequences, including reactance. Depending on the context,
“misplaced skepticism” can be just as unproductive as “maladaptive gullibility” (Sagarin &
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Cialdini, 2004, p. 259). Recognizing the potential pitfalls of indiscriminate resistance, McGuire
(1964) advocated for the development of “pretreatments that would make the person receptive to
the true and resistant to the false” (p. 192). Few scholars, however, have attempted to address
this question of how to focus resistance.
In addition to tackling illusions of invulnerability, Sagarin and colleagues’ (2002)
research examined a minimal intervention designed to provide a simple rule for discriminating
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of authority in advertising. Inappropriate use of
authority was defined as follows: “the depicted authority does not at least possess special
expertise on the topic” (p. 528). The intervention successfully increased both resistance to ads
featuring illegitimate authorities and receptivity to those utilizing legitimate authorities. Given
the extent of cognitive and motivational barriers to effortful processing of media messages, as
well as media specifically designed to undermine effortful processing, developing similar
heuristics (or other low-effort strategies) for distinguishing between other types of “legitimate”
and “illegitimate” messages would be a useful addition to the media literacy toolbox.
Conclusions
The present research represents a departure from traditional, effectiveness-focused media
literacy research. Rather than viewing media literacy as a stable trait, this process-based
approach enables it to be studied as a context dependent state, and examine how its mechanisms
operate under various cognitive and motivational constraints. The current research suggests
media literacy approaches focused on thorough processing of media messages may be ineffective
under conditions in which the motivation or ability to engage in such high-effort processing is
compromised. That said, even extremely minimal media literacy interventions (such as
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demonstrating personal vulnerability to a single print ad) can successfully promote distrust and
reduce the perceived persuasiveness of unrelated ads in the short term, and individuals need not
perceive themselves as vulnerable to media influence for such interventions to be effective.
Additional research is needed, however, regarding how to implement such interventions without
promoting reactance. Consistent with previous research, emotional forms of advertising are
particularly persuasive, and appear to operate by circumventing logic. Future research might
investigate why, despite intuitively distrusting emotional ads, individuals still find such ads so
persuasive.
As an emerging discipline, media literacy is at the ideal stage of its development for the
integration of novel approaches and innovative methods. Given the current educational and
political climate, the need for further theory-driven, methodologically rigorous research into
media literacy, particularly its cognitive mechanisms, cannot be overstated. Social psychological
theory and research in the areas of persuasion, social cognition, affect, and motivation have the
potential to challenge the validity of various assumptions underlying the study and practice of
media literacy. At the same time, social psychologists, particularly those interested in the
dynamics of resistance, can extend their reach beyond the laboratory and help to inform how the
citizens of tomorrow will (or will not) learn to cope with the ever-increasing onslaught of mass
media messages. With an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms underlying media literacy,
educators can more effectively empower future generations to become active and engaged
consumers of media, able to use media in service of their own goals, “rather than default to the
media using them” (Potter, 2004, p. 271).
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APPENDIX A:
CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK

Mechanical Turk Literature
For the present research, all participants were recruited (and data were collected) on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). Although it was initially conceived as a
“crowd-sourcing” platform for businesses, increasingly social and behavioral researchers are
using MTurk as a recruitment and data collection tool for survey-based research. While still
young, the growing literature on MTurk (e.g., Iperiotis, 2009; Paolacci et al., 2010) suggests it
has both advantages and disadvantages. These are discussed below, along with available
evidence regarding the internal and external validity of MTurk-based research.
Practical advantages and disadvantages. MTurk offers a number of practical
advantages over traditional recruitment methods (e.g., lab-based research with university student
subjects, other online research). Whereas in lab-based research, the number of participants is
limited by the size of the available subject pool, MTurk has more than 100,000 users from over
100 different countries (Buhrmester et al., 2011). This means that a large number of respondents
can be recruited in a short time frame, depending on the stringency of the inclusion criteria. For a
three-minute survey offering compensation of ten cents (a rate of two dollars per hour), Paolacci
and colleagues (2010) reported collecting 1,000 responses from U.S.-based workers in three
weeks. The cost of recruitment via MTurk is exceptionally low, making it an ideal tool for
graduate students with limited research funding.
In addition to the speed and low cost of recruitment, MTurk can be set up to interface
seamlessly with an external website. This flexibility allows the researcher to collect data using
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existing survey tools (e.g., SurveyGizmo) or even create a customized survey platform with
advanced features (e.g., random assignment, embedded video, other multimedia stimuli), as in
the present research. Finally, MTurk enables participants to remain completely anonymous to
researchers. This anonymity is built into the system. The researcher has no interaction
whatsoever with participants, beyond the published description of the survey (i.e., HIT, or human
intelligence task). Participants are assigned ID numbers through Amazon.com, which are used to
match responses with compensation claims. The compensation process is managed entirely by
Amazon; the researcher is only required to approve responses for compensation.
Potential disadvantages of MTurk include various technical problems and “bugs” that
have been reported. However, technical problems are endemic to any form of online research,
and particularly those requiring synchronization of different software (e.g., linking MTurk to an
external survey tool). The potential for technical difficulties can be reduced by thoroughly testing
the recruitment and data collection mechanisms on different browsers prior to commencing the
research. Another potential drawback is that unsupervised subjects may be less attentive than labbased subjects being watched by an experimenter. Online participants may become distracted
during the experiment and navigate away from the survey instrument, or they may actively
attempt to cheat (e.g., using search engines to look up answers to factual questions). As with
technical difficulties, such problems are possible in any form of online research, and even
supervised lab studies can produce poor-quality data. However, research suggests these problems
are highly uncommon (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Paolacci et al., 2010). To some
extent, the researcher can identify inattentive or cheating participants by including manipulation
checks and recording time spent on each section of the survey. In the present research,
participants were not permitted to pause or restart the video ads. As in any research, the
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importance of data screening cannot be overstated. Finally, requesters must approve survey
responses for respondents to receive compensation. Although this requirement introduces some
undesirable subjectivity into the experimental setting, the researcher can establish objective
standards for what, if anything, justifies non-approval (e.g., obvious evidence of cheating or
lying).
Internal and external validity. Some commentators have expressed concern about
potential threats to internal validity and generalizability, but research suggests these fears are
largely unfounded. According to Paolacci and colleagues (2010), relative to other recruitment
methods, MTurk has low risk of contamination between experimental conditions. The anonymity
afforded by MTurk renders the potential for experimenter effects virtually nonexistent.
Moreover, because each MTurk ID number must correspond to a unique bank account or credit
card number, the risk of participants providing multiple responses to the same survey is minimal.
There is some potential for non-response error, but this appears to be less than in Internet
convenience samples. Because MTurk users often complete multiple HITs, sometimes during the
same session, concerns about data quality are not uncommon. There is little evidence, however,
to support the assumption that Internet-based research in general (Gosling et al., 2004) or MTurk
in particular (Buhrmester at al., 2011; Paolacci et al.) produces poorer quality data than
traditional methods.
The best way to ensure high external validity is to use probability-based, random
sampling methods. Such methods are often prohibitively expensive, and even the most rigorous
sampling methods have some margin of error. Like other Internet-based samples, participants
recruited through MTurk are self-selected and have access to the Internet. They are likely to
choose to complete HITs that interest them or that pay (relatively) well. While not representative
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of the U.S. population at large, research suggests MTurk samples are comparable to Internet
convenience samples recruited through other means, and more representative of the adult U.S.
population than traditional college student samples (e.g., Iperiotis, 2009; Paolacci et al., 2010).
Paolacci and colleagues conducted a demographic survey of one thousand U.S.-based MTurk
users in February 2010. According to their results, MTurk users are predominantly female (65%)
and slightly younger than the U.S. population (mean age: 36, median age: 33). They have a
higher educational level, on average, but lower income than the general population (two-thirds
earn less than $60,000 per year). In their research, Paolacci and colleagues replicated a number
of standard judgment and decision-making tasks with samples recruited through MTurk, and
their results do not differ significantly from those utilizing more traditional recruitment methods
(for more comparisons of MTurk and other methods, see
http://experimentalturk.wordpress.com).
The Present Research
Other researchers have used MTurk in conjunction with SurveyGizmo or other
commercial survey software. In essence, MTurk is used as a recruitment and compensation tool,
while the data are collected and stored elsewhere. This method requires participants to follow a
link to an external site to complete the survey. They then return to MTurk to submit a
confirmation code, which the researcher then uses to verify that survey has been completed. The
present research required a number of features that were not available on commercial survey
software. Although SurveyGizmo does support embedded video, there was no feasible way to
prevent participants from controlling playback. Moreover, at the time of this research,
SurveyGizmo did not have features for generating multimedia distractions in conjunction with
the videos. As such, I contracted with a software developer to build customized survey
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instruments for Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, and the main study (I built the simple instrument for
Pilot Study 3 using the survey templates available on MTurk). All features related to the
experimental manipulations were contained in these instruments. The survey instruments were
hosted on an external web domain owned by me, but embedded in MTurk window such that
participants were not required to leave MTurk at any point during the survey.
Beyond the ability to include advanced multimedia features, this approach had numerous
advantages. The random assignment mechanism was built into the survey instrument itself.
Moreover, by maintaining a database of worker IDs that had already participated in the same
survey (or a previous survey), I was able to prevent participants from taking the same survey
more than once, and exclude those who participated in any of the three pilot studies. This feature
also allowed me to repost the survey as a new HIT every few days, which returned it to the top of
the list of available HITs. Those workers who participated in same survey under a different HIT
number were able to see the preview, but not proceed to the survey itself.
The disadvantages of this approach were minimal, and mostly technical in nature. The
survey instrument was embedded within a rather narrow window on MTurk. As a result, some
participants complained about having to scroll to see all the questions. Also, when the participant
continued to the next page, sometimes the survey would automatically load at the bottom of a
given page, requiring them to scroll to the top of the screen to begin. Finally, the distractions did
not work on Internet Explorer 7 or prior versions. As such, participants using these browsers
were excluded post hoc.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations for conducting research using MTurk are drawn
primarily from my personal experience and that of my colleagues, in conjunction with the
emerging literature on MTurk.
Avoiding Technical Problems
If the survey has special features (e.g., sound, embedded images, video, Flash animation),
the researcher should note any technical requirements in the overview of the survey. For
example, if the survey has audio, participants should be instructed to make sure the sound on
their computers is enabled. JavaScript and Flash should also be enabled for those who utilize
script blocking software. It is advisable to ask participants whether certain technical elements
worked correctly (e.g., “did the video play?”) or include an open-ended field at the end of the
survey for participants to give feedback; some will note technical problems they encountered.
Before going live, it is recommended that researchers post the survey in the worker sandbox
(workersandbox.mturk.com). This free feature allows the researcher to see exactly how the
survey will look and operate through MTurk, test out any skip logic, or run through the survey to
see how long it takes. If the researcher wishes to test the survey more than once, this will require
multiple HITs to be posted. The research might also choose to beta test the survey on a small
sample of actual MTurk workers to catch any unanticipated problems prior to going live.
Data Quality
To reduce concerns regarding data quality, the researcher might consider excluding
participants from outside the U.S. (MTurk has a built in qualification to do so based on the
location of the worker’s account). It is generally recommended that requesters set the required
pre-approval rate to at least 95%. In addition to these methods, I included “trip questions” (i.e.,
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instructional manipulation checks) designed to catch “bots,” as well as participants who were not
paying attention. Participants were forewarned about the existence of these trip questions, and
informed that they would not receive compensation if they failed. To reduce the potential of
worker backlash, I ultimately chose to compensate all participants who completed the survey
(i.e., reached the end and clicked submit), regardless of performance on the trip questions.
However, any participant who failed at least one trip question was excluded from the analysis.
Researchers might also use statistical means of catching poor-quality data (e.g., examining pairs
of items that should be negatively correlated) or pre-qualifying participants (either using an
existing qualification or creating a new test). The latter approach has the disadvantage of
reducing the potential sample substantially.
To prevent participants from taking the survey more than once, I included a mechanism to
automatically exclude workers who had completed the survey under either the same HIT or a
different HIT. The researcher could do this by adding a qualification, but this would require
manually updating the exclusion list each time a new HIT is posted, which could be rather labor
intensive. Despite the researcher’s best intentions, there is always a possibility that participants
may have more than one worker ID and thereby complete the survey more than once. MTurk
takes measures to prevent this (e.g., requiring each worker ID to be linked to a unique bank
account or credit card), but it may not be possible to eliminate this risk entirely.
Imposing a time limit on completion of the survey may also enhance data quality by
reducing the likelihood of participants becoming distracted and stepping away, or multitasking
(e.g., watching TV) while completing the survey. I also chose to impose post hoc time limits
based on the actual distribution of time to complete the survey, excluding the top and bottom
2.5%. In this way, I was able to exclude a number of participants who completed the survey in an
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unrealistically short amount of time, as well as those who were almost certainly not focused on
the survey the entire time. Depending on the stringency of the exclusion criteria (e.g., trip
questions, time limits), it is generally advisable to recruit between 20% and 50% more
respondents than needed. In my main study, approximately 30% of participants were ultimately
dropped.
Approval and Compensation
Requesters have the option of approving or rejecting each individual survey response. If
the response is rejected, the worker will not receive compensation. That said, there are anecdotal
reports of MTurk workers lodging complaints against requesters who rejected their work, even if
the survey was rejected for legitimate reasons, sometimes going as far as having the researcher’s
MTurk account shut down. Given these risks, it may be advisable to approve (i.e., compensate)
all participants who finish the survey, even if their responses do not meet data quality standards.
This means that the researcher will likely end up paying for 20 to 30% more respondents than are
actually usable. If this is not feasible given the project budget, researchers should be absolutely
explicit about criteria for approval, or what will result in workers’ responses being rejected.
Researchers should avoid “blocking” any worker through MTurk. Once a worker has been
blocked a certain number of times, their account will be shut down and they will no longer be
able to complete MTurk tasks. Researchers who are running multiple studies can set up their own
qualifications to exclude “bad” workers from participating in subsequent studies.
In general, the researcher should tailor the rate of compensation to the estimated
completion time for the survey. It may be helpful to browse MTurk HITs for surveys of similar
length to determine the market rate. In general, a higher level of compensation appears to
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translate into a faster rate of response. However, there may be a point of diminishing returns, at
which workers will complete the survey primarily for the money.
Response Rates
Anecdotally, in my own research and that of others, because workers can sort HITs by
time remaining, HITs often receive a rush of responses in the last few hours before expiring. As
such, it is generally advisable to allow each HIT to expire (or very nearly expire) before
refreshing (i.e., soliciting more responses/adding more time) or reposting the survey under a new
HIT. I generally kept HITs posted continuously overnight, as I often received a lot of responses
late at night and in the early morning hours. In my research, I saw the fastest rate of responses
early on, tapering off after the first few days, but there was nearly always a spike on weekends,
as shown in Figure A1. Response rates tended to be slowest in the middle of the week (Tuesday
through Thursday).
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Figure A1. Daily response rates in main study, August 27 to October 11, 2011.
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APPENDIX B: STIMULUS MATERIALS

Video Ads
Ad 1: McCain’s Sweet Potato Superfries (2010)
Product: Sweet potato fries
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1
Synopsis: Young woman tries to convince her father to try sweet potato fries. Father is initially
skeptical, but after trying the fries, is converted.
Transcript:
Woman: [Carries bowl of sweet potato fries outside to table, where family members are seated.]
Here you are.
Father: [Exclaims] Orange? What do you call these?
Woman: They’re sweet potato superfries.
Father: What’s wrong with normal fries?
Woman: Nothing, but these are made with sweet potatoes.
Father: [Turns fry over in his fingers, looking at it skeptically] Well they better taste just as good.
Woman: Dad, sometimes it’s worth trying something a little different.
[Mother looks on in agreement.]
Father: [Takes a bite. Looks surprised.] That’s good!
Woman: They’re all good, Dad.
Male announcer: New McCain’s Sweet Potato Superfries, rich in vitamin A, with the delicious
taste of sweet potato.
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[Camera pans out to show entire family partaking in sweet potato fries. Bowl of sweet potato
fries displayed in front of bags of the product (crinkle cut and thin cut).]
Male Announcer: Ah McCain...you’ve done it again. [Text simultaneously displayed on screen.]

Figure B1. Screen shots from McCain’s Sweet Potato Superfries ad.

Ad 2: Abbott’s Village Bakery (2010)
Product: Bread
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1, Main Study
Synopsis: Young couple camping, silently roasting bread over campfire and lightheartedly
teasing each other.
Transcript:
[Couple outside tent, in front of campfire. Appear to be watching a sunrise. Soft guitar music
plays. Man roasts a slice of bread over campfire as woman butters toast. Loaf of Abbott’s Village
Bakery bread is visible. Woman adjusts blanket to cover her shoulders. Man stands up, picks up
log he was sitting on, and throws it on the fire.]
Male announcer: From a time when climate change meant throwing another log on the fire, and
bread was baked with a generous spirit.]
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[Man steals woman’s slice of bread and takes a bite. When he lowers the bread to his side, she
sneaks a bite, hugging him around his legs.]
Announcer: The way it should be. Abbott’s Village Bakery. [New scene with loaf of bread, slices
fanned out in front of unopened package of bread, cup of jam, and fire.]
On screen text: The way it should be.

Figure B2. Screen shots from Abbott’s Village Bakery ad (emotional ad in main study).

Ad 3: McDonalds McCafe (2010)
Product: Coffee
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1
Synopsis: Blind taste test of McCafe coffee versus another leading brand, on the streets of
Sydney, Australia.
Transcript:
[Female host shown carrying tray with two cups of coffee.]
On screen text [small print at bottom of screen]: Source: Central Location Sensory Study
conducted on 16th February 2010 in Sydney NSW.
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Host: Blind taste tests have shown that more people prefer McCafe coffee when compared to
coffee from another leading chain. But don’t just take our word for it. Let’s go see what others
have to say.
On screen text [small print at bottom of screen]: Street Test: September 13 and 14 2010, Circular
Quay, Sydney NSW.
Host: Got two coffees here, tell me which one you prefer.
Woman on street: That one [pointing].
Second woman: Definitely the one on the right.
Man: It’s strong, it’s rich.
Second man: It’s far more creamy, I think.
Third man: It’s just a fuller taste.
Second woman: Where is it from?
[Host holds up McCafe platter.]
First woman: Really? That is very surprising.
Fourth man: McCafe.
Third man: I don’t believe it.
Host: So there you have it. Clearly there’s more to McCafe.
On screen text: There’s More To McCafe. [Coffee drink shown in soft focus.]
Host: So, put it to the test yourself.
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Figure B3. Screen shots from McCafe ad.

Ad 4: McCain’s Oven Chips (2010)
Product: French fries
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1
Synopsis: Montage of scenes of various families, memories and milestones, set to the song
“Give a Little Bit” by Supertramp.
Transcript:
[Shot of framed family pictures on wall, with “Pride” in the center. Children’s artwork on fridge,
papier-mâché face presumably sculpted by child. Woman admiring papier-mâché. Older man
taking a picture of family with three generations. Boy, father, grandfather posing with model
ships. Family camping. Plates with baby footprints. Young boy playing soccer. Woman cheering.
Trophies. Toddler girl building with blocks. Hands blocks to father. Wall covered with awards.
New diploma appears. Kids cheering for grandfather in road race. Father and daughter at outdoor
concert. Wedding video. Teenage boys dressed for prom, posing awkwardly for picture.]
Mother: Oh, my boys!
[Shot of framed picture of teenage boys dressed for formal dance. Children dressed as cowboys,
chasing each other, hanging from arms of man with tiny cowboy hat.]
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On screen text: If it matters to family, it matters to us. [Framed shots of McCain products on
wall.]
Announcer: McCain. It’s all good.

Figure B4. Screen shots from McCain’s Oven Chips ad.

Ad 5: Continental Cook-in-Bag (2010)
Product: Marinade mix for chicken
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, Main Study
Synopsis: Mother and two children preparing dinner. Son is skeptical about “chicken in a bag,”
but the mother demonstrates “three easy steps,” and the children participate in the preparation
process.
Transcript:
On screen text: Continental Fresh Ideas (in partnership with Woolworths)
Female vocal: Continental fresh ideas... [trailing off]
[Mother chopping vegetables. Son picks up package of marinade mix.]
Son: What’s this?
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Mother: [Placing chicken in plastic bag] Continental Cook-in-Bag...it’s a tasty new way to cook
chicken.
Son: [Examining marinade mix. Looks skeptical.] Chicken in a bag...really?
Mother: In three steps...watch this. One [pours mix into plastic bag], two [ties bag shut], give it a
shake. [Demonstrates shaking]
Daughter: Can I do it? [Reaching for bag]
[Daughter shakes bag of chicken. Son pulls it away.]
Mother: Three...roast in the oven [Shown putting entire bag in oven, in baking dish.]
[New scene. Sauce being drizzled over chicken. Family is seated at dinner table. Father is now
present.]
Father: Mmmm. This is new. It’s so juicy!
Mother: [Glancing knowingly at children] We thought we’d shake things up a bit.
[Children giggle. Jingle from beginning of commercial replays.]
Female Announcer: New Continental Cook-in-Bag. On special this week at Woolworths. [Four
different varieties of Continental Cook-in-Bag displayed.]
On screen text: On Special This Week at Woolworths

Figure B5. Screen shots from Continental Cook-in-Bag ad (informational ad in Pilot Study 2 and
main study).
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Ad 6: Tip Top Bread (2010)
Product: Bread
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1, Main Study
Synopsis: Various individuals from all walks of life perform ode to Tip Top Bread.
Transcript:
Old man: [Sitting in leather chair] I love a toasted sandwich, when it’s made from Tip Top Bread.
Young man: [Preparing very thick sandwich] Those mountains made at midnight.
Possibly naked man: [Carrying tray of toast and coffee] Cafe service in your bed.
[Young woman in bed giggles.]
Young girl: [Using bread to soak up sauce from bowl] I love washing up the dishes.
Middle aged man: And those muffin tops I see. [Woman in foreground with “muffin-top,”
preparing English muffins.]
Young man: [Resting head on young woman’s chest while she eats a sandwich] That soft,
familiar texture.
Young boy: [Sitting at bus stop in the rain, holding sandwich] Shows she really cares for me.
Team of teenage male rugby players: And we’ll forever eat it.
Losing team of teenage male rugby players: Even when we are the losers.
Man grilling at rugby match: So raise your tongs to Tip Top.
[Rugby players raise up sandwiches, followed by old man from beginning. Naked man raises
tray. Young man preparing giant sandwich finally finishes, looks proud of his creation]
Toddler girl: The bread that my mom chooses.
On screen text: Tip Top. Australia’s favourite bread.
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Figure B6. Screen shots from Tip Top Bread ad (emotional ad in main study).

Ad 7: Uncle Toby’s Oats (2010)
Product: Microwaveable oatmeal
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1, Main Study
Synopsis: Infomercial-style commercial featuring single character, “Gavin,” playing both the
host and the skeptic, carrying on a conversation with himself.
Transcript:
Gavin 1: So, Gavin. What is new in oats?
On screen text: G’day with Gavin
Gavin 2: [In kitchen, holding up container of microwaveable oats] Funny you should ask, Gavin.
[Turns to face camera head on] Because the Uncle Toby’s team has created a new way to get your
oats, in a convenient, no miss, no fuss [close up on cup] microwaveable cup.
Gavin 1: [Cup of creamy honey oats floating on screen] Microwaveable! In a cup! [Appears
confused] Really?!?
Gavin 2 [off-screen]: Really!
Gavin 2 [on-screen]: In fact you don’t even need a bowl [swipes bowl off counter], so it’s perfect
on busy mornings.
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[Gavin 1 looks impressed.]
Gavin 2: [Split screen shows Gavin removing the cup’s cover on one side, adding milk on the
other] Just rip off the top, in with some milk [adding time to microwave] 60 seconds later
[listening for microwave, microwave dings, removes cup from microwave]. Mmmm...creamy
honey.
Gavin 1: Does anybody do oats like Uncle Toby’s?
Gavin 2: Nobody does oats like Uncle Toby’s, Gavin. Nobody.
[Three varieties of Uncle Toby’s microwaveable oats displayed.]
On screen text: Nobody does oats like Uncle Toby’s.

Figure B7. Screen shots from Uncle Toby’s Oats ad (informational ad in main study).

Ad 8: Perfect Italiano (2010)
Product: Assorted cheeses
Source: YouTube.com
Used in: Pilot Study 1
Synopsis: An idealized romance novel-style man poses and preens, demonstrating how well he
fits traditional notions of romantic perfection.
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Transcript:
[Man in fencing gear posed in front of full-size portrait of himself.]
Man: [Speaking with Italian accent] I love to multitask, and I love to listen.
[Now preparing Italian food in modern kitchen.]
Man: And if I have no woman to listen to, I practice my listening face. [Looks down briefly.
Stares directly into camera with intense face.]
On screen text: Perfect Italiano Parmesan [Close up on parmesan cheese being sliced and placed
atop antipasto.]
Man: I love to listen with power.
On screen text: Perfect Italiano Mozzarella [Close up of shredded mozzarella being sprinkled on
lasagna. Piece of cooked lasagna on plate.]
Man: I love to hear of the problems of your friends. [Squints as if listening intensely] Tell me
more.
[Close up of basil leaves being delicately placed on pizza. Camera cuts to assorted Perfect
Italiano Cheeses (parmesan, shredded mozzarella, pizza plus, ricotta, mozzarella, and romano)
displayed with tomatoes, olives, and basil leaves.
Female announcer: [With Italian accent] Sadly, finding the perfect man isn’t as simple as cooking
with Perfect Italiano.
On screen text: So Simple. It’s Perfect.
Man: I am listening. And painting. [Paints picture of deer.]
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Figure B8. Screen shots from Perfect Italiano ad.

Distractions
The distraction stimuli in both Pilot Study 2 and the main study were colored (red or
blue) rectangles, spaced at varying locations and intervals throughout the video ads. Each
stimulus remained on screen for a half second. Pilot Study 2 had eight possible levels of
distraction: 2 (number of video plays: single or double) x 4 (level of distraction: none, low, high
one color, high two color). For the low, high one color, and high two color distraction conditions,
the distractions were spaced at varying intervals across either 30 or 60 seconds, depending on the
number of video plays. The size and interval of each distraction stimulus from the start of the
first video play are shown for each condition in Table B1. The high distraction one color and two
color conditions differed only in that half of the distraction stimuli were blue in the two color
condition. The main study followed the arrangement of distraction stimuli in the high distraction,
single play, one color condition (shown in dashed region.

180

Table B1
Sizes and Intervals of Distraction Stimuli in Pilot Study 2 and Main Study
Low (single play)

High (single play)
and Main Study

Low (double play)

High (double play)

Size
(pixels)

Seconds
from start

Size
(pixels)

Seconds
from start

Size
(pixels)

Seconds
from start

Size
(pixels)

Seconds
from start

1

20 x 30

5.0

20 x 30

2.5

20 x 30

5.0

20 x 30

2.5

2

40 x 35

18.0

40 x 35

9.0

40 x 35

18.0

40 x 35

9.0

3a

30 x 20

26.0

30 x 20

13.0

30 x 20

26.0

30 x 20

13.0

4

25 x 25

21.5

25 x 25

43.0

25 x 25

21.5

5a

30 x 40

23.0

30 x 40

46.0

30 x 40

23.0

6a

35 x 30

27.5

35 x 30

55.0

35 x 30

27.5

7a

35 x 20

30.5

8

35 x 40

38.0

9a

20 x 30

42.0

10

25 x 25

44.0

11

40 x 30

49.5

12a

30 x 35

56.5

a

Blue stimuli in high distraction, two-color conditions

Print Ad
The print ad for Wendy’s® Berry Almond Chicken Salad was used in Pilot Study 3 and
the vulnerability manipulation in the main study. The ad appeared in the May 2011 issue of
Cooking Light and was scanned into a digital (JPEG) image format. The image was cropped
slightly in order to fit within the MTurk window, and the brand name (Wendy’s) was obscured.
Because the text “For a limited time only” was cropped out of the original version, it was
recreated in the final version. An image of the ad, as it appeared in both studies, is shown in
Figure B9.
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Figure B9. Print ad used in Pilot Study 3 and the main study.
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

The following survey instruments include all text related to the manipulations and all
survey items. Unless otherwise stated, all items were required. After continuing to the next page,
participants were not permitted to return to a previous page.
Pilot Study 1
Mechanical Turk Preview Text
[The following text was displayed to individuals who chose to preview the HIT, before accepting
the HIT.]
This survey is part of a dissertation research project being conducted by a graduate student in
psychology at Claremont Graduate University in California.
AM I ELIGIBLE?
You are NOT eligible to participate if any of the following is true:
•
•
•
•
•

You are younger than 18 years old
Your location is outside the United States
You are not able to read and write fluently in English
Your MTurk approval rating is less than 95%
You have taken a previous version of this survey with the same title

WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO?
1.
2.

3.

4.

You will be asked to watch two brief video advertisements (commercials).
You will be asked some questions about the product featured in the ad, as well as how you
felt about the ad itself. You may watch each ad as many times as you need to by clicking
“Replay,” but once you start working on the questions, YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
RETURN TO THE AD. After watching both ads, you will be asked some questions about
your background.
Please note that there are a few questions intended to trip up “bots” and people who are
not paying attention. These “trip” questions will tell you how to respond, so please be
sure to read ALL instructions and questions. If you get any of these questions wrong, your
work will be rejected.
The entire survey should take you no more than 10 minutes. Once you accept, you can
return the HIT at any time, but you will not be able to start the survey over again.
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APPROVAL CRITERIA
In order for your work to be approved, you MUST:
1.
2.

Answer all required questions and click “SUBMIT SURVEY” at the end of the survey.
Correctly answer all “trip” questions designed to verify that you are paying attention,
and are not an automated computer script or answering entirely at random.

If your work is approved, you will receive $0.40 (forty cents) for completing this HIT.
We will try to check your work within a few hours and issue approval or rejection. If we do not
get to your work sooner, the HIT has been set to automatically approve every 24 hours, so the
longest you should have to wait is one day.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
Because this survey includes video, you must have JavaScript and Flash enabled on your
browser, and your computer’s sound must be turned on. Please check now, before you click
“Accept HIT.”
Screening Questions
1) Are you age 18 or older?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be age 18 or older. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect to
MT]
2) Do you read English fluently?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be fluent in English. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect to
MT]
3) Is your primary residence in the United States?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
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[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, your primary residence must be in the
United States. If you are not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here.
[Exclude and redirect to MT]
Consent Page
[Consent form]
Survey Questionnaire
You will be asked to watch two different video advertisements (commercials) from Australia or
the United Kingdom. The advertised products and brands may be unfamiliar to you. While
watching these commercials, please imagine that the advertised product is available in the
United States.
It is VERY IMPORTANT that you pay close attention to the commercials because you will be
asked to answer questions about them afterwards. Some of these questions ask how you felt
about the BRAND FEATURED IN THE COMMERCIAL. Other questions ask how you felt about
the COMMERCIAL ITSELF.
You may watch each commercial as many times as you need to by clicking “Replay,” but once
you click “Continue to Questions,” YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THE
COMMERCIAL TO WATCH IT AGAIN.
[First video ad plays automatically.]
[After video completes, “Replay” and “Continue to Questions” buttons appear. If participant
clicks “Continue to Questions,” the following warning appears]
Are you sure you want to continue to the questions? Once you move on, you will not be able to
return to the commercial to watch it again.
4) Did you experience any trouble viewing this video ad? (Check all that apply.)
!
!
!
!
!
!

No
Yes, it kept stopping and starting, but I replayed it and it worked fine
Yes, it kept stopping and starting, but I got all the way through the video
Yes, it froze in the middle and wouldn’t start up again
Yes, it wouldn’t play at all
Other _______________

5) Please list any and all thoughts you had during the video. Enter only one thought per box
below. [Three boxes presented initially, with opportunity to add more, up to 20.]
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6) For each of the thoughts you listed, please indicate whether this thought was (1) negative
toward the ad; (2) neutral toward the ad; (3) positive toward the ad; or (4) irrelevant (unrelated)
to the ad.
Negative

Neutral

Positive

Irrelevant

7) Please identify the BRAND featured in this commercial. For example, If this had been a
commercial for a Whopper from Burger King, the brand would be “Burger King Whopper” (just
“Whopper” would also be acceptable). If you're not sure about the brand, please identify the type
of product, for example: “burger” or just make your best guess.
______________________________
The following questions ask how you personally felt about the BRAND featured in the
commercial. The brand refers to the company and product being advertised. Later, you will be
asked some questions about the commercial itself. For this set of questions, please focus only on
the BRAND.
8) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7
Good

9) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Pleasant

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unpleasant

10) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Low Quality

2

3

4

5

6

7
High Quality

11) IF YOU WERE TO USE THIS TYPE OF PRODUCT IN THE FUTURE, and it was
available in the U.S., how likely are you to choose THIS PARTICULAR BRAND?
1
Extremely
Unlikely

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Extremely
Likely

The following questions ask how you personally felt about the COMMERCIAL ITSELF.
12) I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was ______.
1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7
Good

6

7
Unpleasant

6

7
Nice

13) I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was ______.
1
Pleasant

2

3

4

5

14) I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was ______.
1
Awful

2

3

4

5

The next set of questions relate to your perceptions of the commercial itself. For each statement,
please indicate how much you agree or disagree, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

[Question order randomized]
15) This ad helps me weigh the pros and cons of the product.
16) This ad is designed to play on the viewer’s emotions.
17) This ad provides information about the product.
18) A goal of this ad is to bring up positive memories.
19) This ad provides specific reasons to think about when deciding whether to buy this product.
20) One purpose of this ad is to connect with the viewer’s values.
21) This ad focuses on concrete features of the product.
22) This ad seeks to make the viewer feel like they belong.
23) This ad tries to persuade viewers by making them emotional.
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24) This ad provides useful information about the product that I can think about.
25) This ad is intended to bring up strong feelings in the viewer.
26) This ad helps the viewer think about the costs and benefits of this product.
27) This ad tries to persuade viewers by providing information.
28) This ad is intended to form an emotional bond with the viewer.
29) [Trip question] This ad is a commercial, but instead of rating this statement, choose the
‘slightly disagree’ option.
The next set of questions relates to how YOU PERSONALLY felt about the ad.
30) “I found this ad ____.”
1
Unemotional

2

3

4

5

6

7
Emotional

3

4

5

6

7
Not Moving

3

4

5

6

7
Not Touching

31) “I found this ad ____.”
1
Moving

2

32) “I found this ad ____.”
1
Touching

2

The next set of questions relate to how the commercial MADE YOU PERSONALLY FEEL.
This ad made me feel ____.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

33) Happy
34) Sad
35) Excited
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5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

36) Angry
37) Warm
38) Annoyed
39) Peaceful
40) Anxious
41) Calm
42) Disgusted
43) Have you ever seen this ad before today?
! Yes
! No
[Questions 44-83: repeat questions 4-43 for second video ad]
Please answer a few questions about yourself and your background. These questions are
optional. You may decline to answer any question that you do not feel comfortable answering.
84) What is your sex?
! Male
! Female
! I’d rather not say
85) What is your age? _____
86) Are you Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin? (Check all that apply)
! No, not Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin
! Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano
! Yes, Puerto Rican
! Yes, Cuban
! Yes, other Hispanic or Latino (please specify) _____________
87) What is your race? (Check all that apply)
! White or Caucasian
! Black or African American
! Asian
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! American Indian or Alaska Native
! Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
! Other (please specify) ___________
88) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
! Less than high school education
! High school diploma
! Some college, no degree
! Two-year/Associate’s degree
! Four-year/Bachelor’s degree
! Some graduate education, no degree
! Master’s degree (examples: M.A., M.S., M.B.A., M.F.A.)
! Graduate or professional degree (examples: M.D., J.D., Ph.D.)
! I’d rather not say
89) Are you currently a student, or will you be a student in fall 2011? (Please select the answer
that best represents your current status.)
! No
! Yes, in high school or a GED program
! Yes, in a vocational or technical school
! Yes, in a two-year college
! Yes, in a four-year college
! Yes, in a graduate or professional degree program
! Yes, in non-degree coursework or a certificate program
90) Can your parents (or anyone else) claim you as a dependent on their tax return? (If you are a
full-time college student, the answer is most likely yes.)
! No, no one else can claim me as a dependent
! Yes, my parents or someone else can claim me as a dependent
91) What is your annual household income? (If you’re not sure, your best guess is fine.)
! Less than $15,000
! $15,000 to less than $30,000
! $30,000 to less than $50,000
! $50,000 to less than $75,000
! $75,000 to less than $100,000
! $100,000 to less than $150,000
! $150,000 to less than $250,000
! $250,000 or more
92) How many people in your household are dependent on this income? (Include yourself as 1
person.) _____
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93) What state do you live in? [Select from menu]
94) Anything else you want to share?
__________________________________________________________
Debriefing Page
[Debriefing form]

Pilot Study 2
Mechanical Turk Preview Text
[The following text was displayed to individuals who chose to preview the HIT, before accepting
the HIT.]
This survey is part of a dissertation research project being conducted by a graduate student in
psychology at Claremont Graduate University in California.
This survey looks at people’s ability to do two things at once. For this reason, it is
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT that you are in a quiet, distraction-free environment while
completing this HIT. Please take a moment to turn off any TVs or music, minimize any other
windows you might have open on your computer, and turn off email alerts. Once you begin,
you will only have 15 minutes to complete this HIT, so it is very important that you not shift your
attention elsewhere.
AM I ELIGIBLE?
You are NOT eligible to participate if:
•
•
•
•
•

You are younger than 18 years old
Your location is outside the United States
You are not able to read and write fluently in English
Your MTurk approval rating is less than 95%
You have taken a previous version of this survey with the same title

If you completed a previous HIT titled “Survey: Opinions About Advertising, 10 minutes,” there
is a 25% chance you will not be eligible to complete this HIT, depending on which video ads you
viewed in the earlier HIT. If you meet the criteria listed above and wish to participate, click
“Accept HIT” and the survey will let you know whether you are eligible.
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WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO?
1.
2.
3.

4.

You will be asked to watch a brief video advertisement (commercial), either one or two
times. You may be asked to complete another task while watching the video.
You will be asked some questions about the video and how you felt while watching it, as
well as some questions about your background.
Please note that there are a few questions intended to trip up “bots” and people who are
not paying attention. These “trip” questions will tell you how to respond (for example,
“I must choose option A”), so please be sure to read ALL instructions and questions. If
you get any of these questions wrong, your work will be rejected.
The entire survey should take you no more than 6-9 minutes. Once you accept, you can
return the HIT at any time, but you will not be able to start the survey over again.

APPROVAL CRITERIA
In order for your work to be approved, you MUST:
1.
2.

Answer all required questions and click “SUBMIT SURVEY” at the end of the survey.
Correctly answer all “trip” questions designed to verify that you are paying attention,
and are not an automated computer script or answering entirely at random.

If your work is approved, you will receive $0.40 (forty cents) for completing this HIT.
We will try to check your work within a few hours and issue approval or rejection. If we do not
get to your work sooner, the HIT has been set to automatically approve every 24 hours, so the
longest you should have to wait is one day.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
Because this survey includes video, you must have JavaScript and Flash enabled on your
browser, and your computer’s sound must be turned on. Please check now, before you click
“Accept HIT.”
[After accepting HIT, if participated in Pilot Study 1 and viewed same ad] We’re sorry. Because
you completed one of our previous HITs (‘Survey: Opinions About Advertising’) you are not
eligible for this HIT. You will now be redirected back to Mechanical Turk.
Screening Questions
1) Are you age 18 or older?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
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[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be age 18 or older. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect to
MT]
2) Do you read and write English fluently?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be fluent in English. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect to
MT]
3) Is your primary residence in the United States?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, your primary residence must be in the
United States. If you are not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here.
[Exclude and redirect to MT]
Consent Page
[Consent form]
Survey Questionnaire
You will be asked to watch a video advertisement (commercial) from Australia. The advertised
product or brand may be unfamiliar to you. Please imagine that the advertised product is
available in the United States.
During the commercial, a number of colored squares will appear on your computer screen
around the video. Some of these squares may be red, and some of them may be blue. They will
appear for a half second and then disappear. Over the course of the commercial, please count
how many squares you saw in EACH COLOR.
Please do your best to focus on the commercial, while also keeping an accurate count of the red
and blue squares. You will be asked to answer some questions about the commercial afterward,
and also indicate how many squares you counted in each color. Please make sure you are in a
quiet, distraction-free environment (turn off any TV or music, minimize all windows open on
your computer).
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4) To ensure that you understand these instructions, please explain them in your own words the
box below:
____________________________________________________
[Video Ad (with or without distractions). After ad completes, survey automatically proceeds to
next page.]
Some people were exposed to a number of red and/or blue squares during the video, which they
were asked to count. If you do not remember seeing any red squares or blue squares, you can
enter 0 (zero) in the appropriate boxes below.
5) How many red squares did you count during the video? Remember, 0 (zero) is a valid answer.
_____
6) How many blue squares did you count during the video? Remember, 0 (zero) is a valid
answer. _____
7) Please list every thought you remember having in relation to the commercial. Some of these
thoughts may have been favorable toward the commercial. Some of them may have been
unfavorable. Some thoughts may have been neutral (neither favorable nor unfavorable). List as
many different thoughts as you can remember. Enter only one thought per box below.
Note: If you were asked to count red and/or blue squares during the commercial, please do not
list any thoughts you had in relation to this task. Only list thoughts related to the commercial
itself.
Enter only one thought per box below.
[Eight boxes presented initially, with opportunity to add more, up to 20.]
8) For each of the thoughts you listed, please indicate whether this thought was (1) unfavorable
toward the commercial; (2) neutral toward the commercial; (3) positive toward the commercial;
or (4) irrelevant (unrelated) to the commercial.
Note: Thoughts related to the commercial, but neither favorable nor unfavorable, should be
coded as neutral. Thoughts not related to the commercial itself, including any thoughts about
counting red and/or blue boxes, should be coded as irrelevant.
Unfavorable

Neutral

Favorable

Irrelevant
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The next set of questions relate to the commercial you viewed. Please answer these questions to
the best of your ability.
9) What was the name of the brand being advertised in the commercial?
__________________________________
10)What was the product being advertised in this commercial?
! A) A bag for storing food in the freezer
! B) A bag for keeping food fresh in the refrigerator
! C) A bag, and marinade mix, for preparing chicken
! D) A bag of frozen chicken
11) How many kids were in this commercial?
! A) 1
! B) 2
! C) 3
! D) 4
12) What arguments were specifically used in the commercial to promote this product?
! A) Healthy
! B) Easy to prepare
! C) Fresh
! D) Juicy
! E) A and C
! F) B and D
! G) None of the above
13) What were the 3 steps the mother mentioned in this commercial?
! A) Cut chicken into small pieces, add mix to bag, add chicken to bag
! B) Add mix to bag, shake, roast in oven
! C) Roast chicken, place chicken in bag, store bag in refrigerator or freezer
14) When the mother put the chicken in the oven, it was:
! A) Still in the bag
! B) No longer in the bag
15) IF YOU WERE TO USE THIS TYPE OF PRODUCT IN THE FUTURE, and it was
available in the U.S., how likely are you to choose THIS PARTICULAR BRAND?
1
Extremely
Unlikely

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Extremely
Likely

16) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was:
1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7
Good

17) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was:
1
Awful

2

3

4

5

6

7
Nice

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

18) The people in this commercial appear to be having fun
19) I find the people in this commercial to be good looking
20) I find this commercial appealing
21) [Trip question] I must choose moderately disagree for this item
22) People in this commercial are like people I know
23) This commercial is a realistic reflection of how people like me act
24) This commercial cannot be trusted
25) I would like to be like people in this commercial
The next set of questions relate to how you felt while watching the commercial.
26) How distracting did you find the colored squares in the background while the commercial
was playing?
1
Not at all
distracting

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Extremely
distracting

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each statement about how you felt
while watching the commercial.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

27) I was not able to give the commercial my full attention
28) I found myself distracted while watching the commercial
29) I was able to concentrate on the commercial
30) My attention was drawn away from the commercial
31) I could not focus on the commercial
32) I could not follow what was going on in the commercial
33) I was able to focus on the commercial the entire time
34) I had trouble following along with the commercial
35) I am being instructed to choose moderately agree
36) I was able to follow the arguments the commercial put forth
37) Have you seen this commercial before today?
! Yes
! No
38) Did you experience any trouble viewing this video? (Check all that apply.)
Note: If you were asked to count red and/or blue squares during the video, do not list this as
“trouble.”
! No
! Yes, it kept stopping and starting, but I got all the way through the video
! Yes, it froze in the middle and wouldn’t start up again
! Yes, it wouldn’t play at all
! Other _________________________
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Please answer a few questions about yourself and your background. These questions are
optional. You may decline to answer any question that you do not feel comfortable answering.
39) What is your sex?
! Male
! Female
! I’d rather not say
40) What is your age? _____
41) Are you Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin? (Check all that apply)
! No, not Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin
! Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano
! Yes, Puerto Rican
! Yes, Cuban
! Yes, other Hispanic or Latino (please specify) _____________
42) What is your race? (Check all that apply)
! White or Caucasian
! Black or African American
! Asian
! American Indian or Alaska Native
! Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
! Other (please specify) ___________
43) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
! Less than high school education
! High school diploma
! Some college, no degree
! Two-year/Associate’s degree
! Four-year/Bachelor’s degree
! Some graduate education, no degree
! Master’s degree (examples: M.A., M.S., M.B.A., M.F.A.)
! Graduate or professional degree (examples: M.D., J.D., Ph.D.)
! I’d rather not say

198

44) Are you currently a student, or will you be a student in fall 2011? (Please select the answer
that best represents your current status.)
! No
! Yes, in high school or a GED program
! Yes, in a vocational or technical school
! Yes, in a two-year college
! Yes, in a four-year college
! Yes, in a graduate or professional degree program
! Yes, in non-degree coursework or a certificate program
45) Can your parents (or anyone else) claim you as a dependent on their tax return? (If you are a
full-time college student, the answer is most likely yes.)
! No, no one else can claim me as a dependent
! Yes, my parents or someone else can claim me as a dependent
46) What is your annual household income? (If you’re not sure, your best guess is fine.)
! Less than $15,000
! $15,000 to less than $30,000
! $30,000 to less than $50,000
! $50,000 to less than $75,000
! $75,000 to less than $100,000
! $100,000 to less than $150,000
! $150,000 to less than $250,000
! $250,000 or more
47) How many people in your household are dependent on this income? (Include yourself as 1
person.) _____
48) What state do you live in? [Select from menu]
49) Anything else you want to share?
__________________________________________________________
Debriefing Page
[Debriefing form]
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Pilot Study 3
This survey is part of a dissertation research project being conducted by a graduate student in
psychology at Claremont Graduate University in California. This is an academic research study,
NOT a marketing survey.
You are eligible to participate if:
•
•
•
•
•

You are at least 18 years old
Your location is in the U.S.
You are able to read and write fluently in English
Your MTurk approval rating is at least 95%
You have not previously participated in this survey (under a different HIT)

The entire survey should take you no more than 2-3 minutes.
In order for your work to be approved, you MUST answer the question following the ad and
click Submit Survey. If your work is approved, you will receive $0.10 (ten cents) for completing
this HIT.
If you wish to participate, click Accept HIT.
Instructions: Please examine this print ad for around 30 seconds and form an impression of it.
[Print ad displayed]
1) How convincing did you find this ad?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Slightly Somewhat
Fairly
Convincing
Very
Extremely
convincing convincing convincing convincing
convincing convincing
Thank you for your participation!
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Main Study
Mechanical Turk Preview Text
[The following text was displayed to individuals who chose to preview the HIT, before accepting
the HIT.]
This survey is part of a dissertation research project being conducted by a graduate student in
psychology at Claremont Graduate University in California. This is an academic research study,
NOT a marketing survey.
Part of this study looks at people’s ability to do two things at once. For this reason, it is
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT that you are in a quiet, distraction-free environment while
completing this HIT. Please take a moment to turn off any TVs or music, minimize any other
windows you might have open on your computer, and turn off email alerts. Once you begin,
you will only have 60 minutes to complete this HIT, so it is very important that you not shift your
attention elsewhere.
AM I ELIGIBLE?
You are NOT eligible to participate if:
•
•
•
•
•

•

You are younger than 18 years old
Your location is outside the United States
You are not able to read and write fluently in English
Your MTurk approval rating is less than 95%
You previously participated in any of the following HITs: “Survey: Opinions About
Advertising,” “Survey: How People Respond to Advertising,” or “Survey:
Evaluate an Advertisement”
You have taken a previous version of this survey with the same title

If you are not sure whether you completed one of the HITs listed above and wish to participate,
please continue reading the instructions on this page. After you click “Accept HIT,” the survey
will let you know if you are not eligible.
WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO?
1) You will be asked to look at a print advertisement and answer some questions about it. You
will then receive some feedback. Please read this feedback before continuing.
2) Next, you will be asked to watch a brief video advertisement (commercial). You may be asked
to complete another task while watching the video.
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3) Finally, you will be asked a series of questions about the video and your perceptions of
advertising in general, as well as some questions about your background. Note: the
researcher has NO AFFILIATION with the brands or products shown in these ads, or with the
advertising agency. Please give your honest opinions.
4) Please note that there are a few questions intended to trip up “bots” and people who are not
paying attention. These “trip” questions will tell you how to respond (for example, “please
ignore this statement and instead select option A”), so be sure to read ALL instructions and
questions. If you get any of these questions wrong, your work will be rejected.
5) The entire survey should take you around 15 to 25 minutes. Once you accept, you can return
the HIT at any time, but you will not be able to start the survey over again.
WILL MY WORK BE APPROVED?
In order for your work to be approved, you MUST:
1) Answer all required questions and click “SUBMIT SURVEY” at the end of the survey.
2) Correctly answer all “trip” questions designed to verify that you are paying attention, and
are not an automated computer script or answering entirely at random.
If your work is approved, you will receive $0.51 (fifty-one cents) for completing this HIT.
The HIT has been set to automatically approve every 24 hours. If we do not review your work
sooner, the longest you should have to wait is one day.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
Because this survey includes video, you must have JavaScript and Flash enabled on your
browser, and your computer’s sound must be turned on. Please check now, before you click
“Accept HIT.”
[After accepting HIT, if participated in any of three pilot studies] We’re sorry. Because you
completed one of our previous HITs (‘Survey: Opinions About Advertising,’ ‘Survey: How People
Respond to Advertising,’ or ‘Survey: Evaluate an Advertisement’) you are not eligible for this
HIT. You will now be redirected back to Mechanical Turk.
Screening Questions
1) Are you age 18 or older?
! No
! Yes
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[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be age 18 or older. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect to
MT]
2) Do you read and write English fluently?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, you must be fluent in English. If you are
not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here. [Exclude and redirect
to MT]
3) Is your primary residence in the United States?
! No
! Yes
[If yes, continue]
[If no] We’re sorry. To participate in this research study, your primary residence must be in the
United States. If you are not automatically redirected back to Mechanical Turk, please click here.
[Exclude and redirect to MT]
Consent Page
[Consent form]
Survey Questionnaire
The first part of this survey relates to print advertisements. After clicking ‘Continue,’ you will
have 30 seconds to examine a print ad and form an impression of it.
[Print ad displays for 30 seconds before automatically progressing to next page]
4) How convincing did you find the ad?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Slightly Somewhat
Fairly
Convincing
Very
Extremely
convincing convincing convincing convincing
convincing convincing
5) What two aspects of the ad were most important in determining how convincing you found it?
a) ___________________________
b) ___________________________
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Control Condition Only
Did you know…
•

Strawberries are the number one most popular berry in the U.S., followed by
blueberries.

•

By contrasting in color with their background, berries are more attractive to
animals, making them more likely to be eaten and have their seeds dispersed.

•

Strawberries are not true berries. They are actually members of the rose family.

•

Strawberry shortcake is based on a Native American tradition in which
strawberries, (known as heart-seed berries because of their shape) were pounded
into cornmeal bread.

•

On average, there are 200 tiny seeds in every strawberry. If all the strawberries
produced in California this year were laid berry to berry, they'd wrap around the
world 15 times.

•

At a symposium on berry health benefits, reports showed consumption of
blueberries may help prevent the mental decline occurring in Alzheimer's disease
and other aging-related conditions.

•

The blue paint used to paint woodwork in Shaker houses was made from sage
blossoms, indigo, and blueberry skins, mixed in milk.

Here is the ad again, in case you want to take a second look.
[Print ad]
Let’s proceed to the second part of this study, which pertains to video forms of
advertising.
Vulnerability Condition Only
You said you found the ad ___ [insert response from #4 in bold: not at all to extremely
convincing] ([numerical value] on a scale from 1 to 7).
You may believe advertising messages affect other people, but not you. However, if you
found the ad at least somewhat convincing (3), that shows you let the advertiser
manipulate you with some very common persuasive tactics. The ad was quite subtle in its
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use of these tactics, so if you weren’t paying close attention, they probably slipped right
past your radar.
Fresh! Natural!
Food advertisers often play up the idea of freshness, by talking a lot about natural,
locally grown ingredients. This ad is no exception. The ad twice mentions the word fresh:
“taste the difference fresh can make” and “fresh-picked berries.” The ad also notes that
the strawberries are “hand-cut” and “picked at the peak of the season.” The salad
dressing is “all-natural.” Taken together, these statements evoke an image of fruits and
vegetables fresh from the farm, when in fact, this salad is from a fast-food establishment!
Limited time offer!
In the text at the top, the ad implores: “Try it today, because our fresh-picked berries only
last as long as summer!” In the bottom left corner, in small print, it says “For a limited
time only.” This tactic is known as a scarcity appeal. The advertiser is implying that the
product is in short supply, and if you don’t hurry, you will miss out on your chance to try
this amazing salad...forever! Maybe this is true, maybe not. The advertiser is more than
happy to tell you time is running out, if that’s what it takes to get you in the door.
So, did you notice the ad’s use of these persuasive tactics? Let’s take a look at your
answer to the second question:
What two aspects of the ad were most important in determining how convincing you
found it?
•
•

[Response to 5a]
[Response to 5b]

If you didn’t notice the persuasive tactics described above, then you left yourself
defenseless against manipulation by crafty advertisers. Don’t let yourself be fooled!
Here is the ad again. Now that you’ve learned to recognize some of the persuasive tactics
advertisers frequently use, how convincing do you find the ad?
[Print ad]
Let’s proceed to the second part of this study, which pertains to video forms of
advertising.
No Distraction Condition Only
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You will now be asked to watch a video advertisement (commercial) from Australia. The
advertised product or brand may be unfamiliar to you. Please imagine that the
advertised product is available in the United States.
Please do your best to focus on the commercial. After you finish watching, you will be
asked a series of questions about your perceptions of the commercial.
Before you click “Continue,” please make sure you are in a quiet, distraction-free
environment (turn off any TV or music, minimize all windows open on your computer).
Distraction Condition Only
You will now be asked to watch a video advertisement (commercial) from Australia. The
advertised product or brand may be unfamiliar to you. Please imagine that the
advertised product is available in the United States.
During the commercial, a number of red squares will appear on your computer screen
around the video. They will appear for a half second and then disappear. Please count
how many squares you see.
Please do your best to focus on the commercial, while also keeping an accurate count of
the red squares. After you finish watching, you will be asked a series of questions about
your perceptions of the commercial, and also asked to indicate how many red squares you
counted.
Before you click “Continue,” please make sure you are in a quiet, distraction-free
environment (turn off any TV or music, minimize all windows open on your computer).
All Conditions
[Video Ad (with or without distractions). After ad completes, survey automatically proceeds to
next page.]
You will now be asked to answer a series of questions about the VIDEO AD (commercial) you
just watched, and your experience while watching this ad.
6) Some people were asked to keep count of a number red squares, which flashed on the screen
outside the video frame. How many red squares did you count during the commercial? If you do
not remember seeing any red squares, you can enter 0 (zero) in the box below.
_____
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7) Please list every thought you remember having in relation to the commercial. Some of these
thoughts may have been favorable toward the commercial. Some of them may have been
unfavorable. List as many different thoughts as you can remember.
Note: If you were asked to count red squares during the commercial, please do not list any
thoughts you had in relation to this task. Only list thoughts related to the commercial itself.
Enter only one thought per box below.
[Eight boxes presented initially, with opportunity to add more, up to 20.]
8) For each of the thoughts you listed, please indicate whether this thought was (1) unfavorable
toward the commercial; (2) neutral toward the commercial; (3) favorable toward the commercial;
or (4) irrelevant (unrelated) to the commercial.
Note: Thoughts related to the commercial, but neither favorable nor unfavorable, should be
rated as neutral. Thoughts not related to the commercial itself, including any thoughts about
counting red squares, should be rated as irrelevant. If you listed any thoughts related to the
characters’ accents, please rate these as irrelevant.
Unfavorable

Neutral

Favorable

Irrelevant

The next set of questions relate to your perceptions of THIS VIDEO AD (commercial). Please
answer these questions to the best of your ability. Remember, the researcher has NO
AFFILIATION with the brand or product shown in this commercial, or with the advertising
agency. Please give your honest opinions.
9) What was the commercial for? (Please describe in your own words.)
______________________________
10) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7
Good

11) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Pleasant

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unpleasant

12) I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was ____.
1
Low
Quality

2

3

4

5
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6

7
High
Quality

13) If you were to use this type of product in the future, and it was available in the U.S., how
likely are you to choose THIS PARTICULAR BRAND?
1
Extremely
Unlikely

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
Likely

14) I found this commercial __.
1
Persuasive

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unpersuasive

4

5

6

7
Unconvincing

4

5

6

7
Influential

15) I found this commercial __.
1
Convincing

2

3

16) I found this commercial __.
1
Not
Influential

2

3

The following questions relate to how you personally felt about THIS VIDEO AD (commercial).
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

17) I am suspicious of what the advertiser was trying to do in this commercial.
18) This commercial seems realistic.
19) It would be nice to live like the characters in this commercial.
20) The characters in this commercial are similar to me.
21) The characters in this commercial do things I would like to do.
22) The characters in this commercial remind me of people I know.
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23) This commercial is an accurate reflection of real life.
24) I would like to be like the characters portrayed in this commercial.
25) It would be nice to be as good looking as people in this commercial.
26) [Trip question] This commercial is an ad, but please ignore this statement and instead choose
the moderately disagree option.
27) The characters in this commercial are like my family members.
28) This commercial can be trusted.
29) I know people similar to those portrayed in this commercial.
30) This commercial is a realistic reflection of how people behave.
31) This commercial is misleading.
32) The characters in this commercial are like my friends.
33) I would like to look like people in this commercial.
34) This commercial accurately reflects how people like me act.
The following questions relate to how you personally felt about THIS VIDEO AD (commercial).
35) I found this commercial ___.
1
Appealing

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unappealing

5

6

7
Attractive

5

6

7
Having Fun

36) I found the characters in this commercial to be ___.
1
Unattractive

2

3

4

37) I found the characters in this commercial to be ___.
1
Bored

2

3

4
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38) I found the characters in this commercial to be ___.
1
Happy

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unhappy

39) The characters in this commercial seem like they would be ___ by their peers.
1
Disliked

2

3

4

5

6

7
Well-Liked

The following questions relate to how you personally felt about THIS VIDEO AD (commercial).
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

40) The way this commercial tries to persuade people seems acceptable to me.
41) The commercial tried to manipulate the audience in ways that I don’t like.
42) This commercial seemed to be trying to inappropriately control the consumer.
43) The commercial tried to be persuasive without being overly manipulative.
44) I found this commercial to be __.
1
Fair

2

3

4

5

6

7
Unfair

4

5

6

7
Straightforward

45) I found this commercial to be __.
1
Sneaky

2

3
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The next set of questions relate to how you felt while watching THIS VIDEO AD (commercial).
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each statement.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

46) I was not able to give the commercial my full attention.
47) I was able to concentrate on the commercial
48) I was able to focus on the commercial the entire time.
49) I had trouble following along with the commercial.
50) Have you ever seen either the PRINT AD or VIDEO AD (commercial) before today?
! No
! Yes, print ad
! Yes, video ad (commercial)
! Yes, both ads
51) Do you have any dietary restrictions that may have influenced your responses to either of the
two ads you saw (print ad or video ad)? (Check all that apply, but ONLY if relevant to the ads
you saw.)
!
!
!
!
!
!

No dietary restrictions relevant to the ads I saw
Vegetarian
Vegan
Gluten-free diet
Nut allergy
Other (please explain) ___________________

52) Did you experience any trouble viewing the video ad? (Check all that apply.)
!
!
!
!
!

No
Yes, it kept stopping and starting, but I got all the way through the video
Yes, it froze in the middle and wouldn’t start up again
Yes, it wouldn’t play at all
Other (please explain) _______________

211

[Wording for questions 53-57 dependent on order condition (whether self or other-oriented
questions come first)]
53) How much do you think the VIDEO AD (commercial) you just watched affected YOUR
[would affect MOST PEOPLE’S] opinion[s] about the product?
1
Not at all

2

3

4
Somewhat

5

6

7
A great deal

Moving beyond the video ad you just watched, the next set of questions relates to your
perceptions of how advertisements and other media messages affect YOU [PEOPLE IN
GENERAL].
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

54) Media messages influence the way I [people] think about the world.
55) My [People’s] purchasing decisions are often influenced by what I [they] see in ads.
56) My [People’s] behavior is influenced by what I [they] see in ads.
57) I don’t think advertising affects me [people] much at all.
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements
about yourself.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
disagree
disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Slightly
agree

6
Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

58) I am strongly committed to my own beliefs.
59) My own beliefs are very clear.
60) [Trip question] My beliefs are correct, but please ignore this statement and instead choose
the slightly disagree option.
61) I find my opinions to be changeable.
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62) It could be said that I am likely to shift my attitudes.
63) I often vary or alter my views when I discover new information.
64) After forming an impression of something, it’s often hard for me to modify that impression.
65) My ideas are very stable and remain the same over time.
66) I have often changed my opinions.
[Wording for questions 67-71 dependent on order condition (whether self or other-oriented
questions come first) - repeat items 53-57 with alternate wording.]
Please answer a few questions about yourself and your background.
72) How familiar would you say you are with the concept of MEDIA LITERACY?
!
!
!
!
!
!

I don’t know what media literacy is
Not at all familiar
A little bit familiar
Moderately familiar
Quite familiar
Extremely familiar

[If ‘I don’t know what media literacy is’ or ‘not at all’, skip to question 76.]
73) You indicated you are at least a little bit familiar with the concept of media literacy. What
does media literacy mean to you?
__________________________________________________________
74) Have you ever had any formal education or training in media literacy?
!
!
!
!

No
I’ve read or learned about media literacy on my own
I learned about media literacy at home when I was growing up
I’ve had formal education or training in media literacy

[If ‘I’ve had formal education or training in media literacy, proceed to question 75. Otherwise,
skip to question 76.]
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75) Which of the following describes your training in media literacy? (Check all that apply)
!
!
!
!
!

I learned about media literacy outside of school (example: at camp)
I learned about media literacy in elementary school
I learned about media literacy in junior high/high school
I learned about media literacy in college/post-secondary education
I learned about media literacy as part of my professional development (please explain)
______________
! I teach media literacy or am otherwise involved in media literacy education (please
explain) ______________
! Other (please explain) ______________
Please answer a few questions about yourself and your background. These questions are
optional. You may decline to answer any question that you do not feel comfortable answering.
76) What is your sex?
! Male
! Female
! I’d rather not say
77) What is your age? _____
78) Are you Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin? (Check all that apply)
! No, not Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin
! Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, or Chicano
! Yes, Puerto Rican
! Yes, Cuban
! Yes, other Hispanic or Latino (please specify) _____________
79) What is your race? (Check all that apply)
! White or Caucasian
! Black or African American
! Asian
! American Indian or Alaska Native
! Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
! Other (please specify) ___________
80) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
! Less than high school education
! High school diploma
! Some college, no degree
! Two-year/Associate’s degree
! Four-year/Bachelor’s degree
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!
!
!
!

Some graduate education, no degree
Master’s degree (examples: M.A., M.S., M.B.A., M.F.A.)
Graduate or professional degree (examples: M.D., J.D., Ph.D.)
I’d rather not say

81) Are you currently a student, or will you be a student in fall 2011? (Please select the answer
that best represents your current status.)
! No
! Yes, in high school or a GED program
! Yes, in a vocational or technical school
! Yes, in a two-year college
! Yes, in a four-year college
! Yes, in a graduate or professional degree program
! Yes, in non-degree coursework or a certificate program
82) Can your parents (or anyone else) claim you as a dependent on their tax return? (If you are a
full-time college student, the answer is most likely yes.)
! No, no one else can claim me as a dependent
! Yes, my parents or someone else can claim me as a dependent
83) What is your annual household income? (If you’re not sure, your best guess is fine.)
! Less than $15,000
! $15,000 to less than $30,000
! $30,000 to less than $50,000
! $50,000 to less than $75,000
! $75,000 to less than $100,000
! $100,000 to less than $150,000
! $150,000 to less than $250,000
! $250,000 or more
84) How many people in your household are dependent on this income? (Include yourself as 1
person.) _____
85) What state do you live in? [Select from menu]
86) Anything else you want to share?
__________________________________________________________
Debriefing Page
[Debriefing form]
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APPENDIX D: FINAL MEASURES

Pilot Study 1
Strength (range: 0-18)
•

(# positive thoughts) / (# positive thoughts + # negative thoughts)

Persuasiveness (6-item scale; ! = .89; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•

IF YOU WERE TO USE THIS TYPE OF PRODUCT IN THE FUTURE, and it was
available in the U.S., how likely are you to choose THIS PARTICULAR BRAND?
I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was Bad/Good
I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was Low Quality/High
Quality
I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was Bad/Good
I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was Pleasant/Unpleasant (reversed)
I personally thought the COMMERCIAL ITSELF was Awful/Nice

Use of emotional techniques (10-item scale; ! = .94; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

This ad is designed to play on the viewer's emotions
A goal of this ad is to bring up positive memories
One purpose of this ad is to connect with the viewer's values
This ad seeks to make the viewer feel like they belong
This ad tries to persuade viewers by making them emotional
This ad is intended to bring up strong feelings in the viewer
This ad is intended to form an emotional bond with the viewer
I found this ad Unemotional/Emotional
I found this ad Moving/Not Moving (reversed)
I found this ad Touching/Not Touching (reversed)

Use of informational techniques (7-item scale; ! = .94; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
8

This ad helps me weigh the pros and cons of the product
This ad provides information about the product
This ad provides specific reasons to think about when deciding whether to buy this
product
This ad focuses on concrete features of the product
This ad provides useful information about the product that I can think about

Ranges listed are possible ranges for each variable, not observed ranges.
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•
•

This ad helps the viewer think about the costs and benefits of this product
This ad tries to persuade viewers by providing information

Pilot Study 2
Recall
Brand recall (1 item; incorrect = 0, correct = 1)
•

What was the name of the brand being advertised in the commercial?

Factual recall (5 multiple choice items; at least one incorrect = 0, all five correct = 1)
•
•
•
•
•

What was the product being advertised in this commercial?
How many kids were in this commercial?
What arguments were specifically used in the commercial to promote this product?
What were the three steps the mother mentioned in this commercial?
When the mother put the chicken in the oven, it was __ [still in the bag or no longer in
the bag]

Combined recall (sum of brand recall and factual recall items; range: 0-6)
•

# of brand recall and factual recall items answered correctly

Accuracy
No Discrepancy - Red (1 item; any discrepancy = 0, accurate count = 1)
•

How many red squares did you count during the video?

Within One - Red (1 item; discrepancy of two or more = 0, accurate within one = 1)
•

How many red squares did you count during the video?

Absolute Discrepancy
•
•

Red: | Reported # red stimuli - actual # red stimuli |
Blue: | Reported # blue stimuli - actual # blue stimuli |
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Distractedness
Total Relevant Thoughts (range: 0-20)
•

# favorable thoughts + # unfavorable thoughts

Subjective Distractedness (8-item scale; ! = .96; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

I was not able to give the ad my full attention
I found myself distracted while watching the ad
I was able to concentrate on the ad (reversed)
My attention was drawn away from the ad
I could not focus on the ad
I could not follow what was going on in the ad
I was able to focus on the ad the entire time (reversed)
I had trouble following along with the ad

Main Study
Thought Valence (range: -20 to 20)
•

(# favorable thoughts) - (# unfavorable thoughts)

Persuasiveness (6-item scale; ! = .89, range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•

IF YOU WERE TO USE THIS TYPE OF PRODUCT IN THE FUTURE, and it was
available in the U.S., how likely are you to choose THIS PARTICULAR BRAND?
I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was Bad/Good
I personally thought the BRAND featured in the commercial was Low Quality/High
Quality
I found this commercial Persuasive/Unpersuasive (reversed)
I found this commercial Convincing/Unconvincing (reversed)
I found this commercial Not Influential/Influential

Distrust (6-item scale; ! = .90; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•

I am suspicious of what the advertiser was trying to do in this commercial
This commercial is misleading
The commercial tried to manipulate the audience in ways that I don’t like
This commercial seemed to be trying to inappropriately control the consumer
I found this commercial to be Fair/Unfair
I found this commercial to be Sneaky/Straightforward (reversed)
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Realism (3-item scale; ! = .86; range: 1-7)
•
•
•

This commercial seems realistic
This commercial is an accurate reflection of real life
This commercial is a realistic reflection of how people behave

Similarity (6-item scale; ! = .93; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•

The characters in this commercial remind me of people I know
The characters in this commercial are like my family members
I know people similar to those portrayed in this commercial
The characters in this commercial are similar to me
The characters in this commercial are like my friends
This commercial accurately reflects how people like me act

Identification (3-item scale; ! = .87; range: 1-7)
•
•
•

I would like to be like the characters portrayed in this commercial
The characters in this commercial do things I would like to do
It would be nice to live like the characters in this commercial

Attractiveness (3-item scale; ! = .86; range: 1-7)
•
•
•

I would like to look like people in this commercial
It would be nice to be as good looking as people in this commercial
I found the characters in this commercial to be Unattractive/Attractive

Persuasibility (6-item scale; ! = .82; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•
•
•

I find my opinions to be changeable
It could be said that I am likely to shift my attitudes
I often vary or alter my views when I discover new information
After forming an impression of something, it’s often hard for me to modify that
impression (reversed)
My ideas are very stable and remain the same over time (reversed)
I have often changed my opinions
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Ad-Specific Third-Person Effects (single difference-score; range 0-6)
•

(“Ad Influence: Others” rating) - (“Ad Influence: Self” rating)
Ad Influence: Self (1 item; range: 1-7)
•

How much do you think the video ad (commercial) you just watched affected
YOUR opinion about the product?

Ad Influence: Others (1 item; range: 1-7)
•

How much do you think the video ad (commercial) you just watched would affect
most people’s opinions about the product?

General Third-Person Effects (scale constructed from 4 difference-scores; ! = .85; range 0-6)
•

For each “General Media Influence” item: (“Others” rating) - (“Self” rating)
General Media Influence: Self (4 items; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•

Media messages influence the way I think about the world
My purchasing decisions are often influenced by what I see in ads
My behavior is influenced by what I see in ads
I don’t think advertising affects me much at all (reversed)

General Media Influence: Others (4 items; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•

Media messages influence the way people think about the world
People’s purchasing decisions are often influenced by what they see in ads
People’s behavior is influenced by what they see in ads
I don’t think advertising affects people much at all (reversed)

Subjective Distractedness (4 items; ! = .90 ; range: 1-7)
•
•
•
•

I was not able to give the commercial my full attention
I was able to concentrate on the commercial (reversed)
I was able to focus on the commercial the entire time (reversed)
I had trouble following along with the commercial

Total Relevant Thoughts (range: 0-20)
•

(# favorable thoughts) + (# unfavorable thoughts)
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